


# Cryogenic System Operating Experience at SNS

Presented at the  
**CEC/ICMC 2015 – C3OrA**

**Matthew Howell**  
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Research Accelerator Division, ORNL

**July 01, 2015**



# Outline

- SNS cryogenic system overview
- System reliability and down time statistics
- Approach to prioritizing efforts
- Tools for maintaining reliability
- Operating experience and lessons learned with components of the cryogenic system
- Summary

SN



FUTURE  
CRYOGENIC TEST  
FACILITY

OLD BOX

DEWAR

He DEWAR

4K GOLD

RAILERS



He FORMER



HE GAS STORAGE

SNS HELIUM  
EQUIP

EM





# The SNS CHL Design Specifications

	Primary	Secondary	Shield
Supply Temperature	4.5K	4.5K	38K
Return Temperature	2.1K	300K	55K
Supply Pressure	3bar	3 bar	4 bar
Return Pressure	0.041bar	1.05 bar	3 bar
Static Load	850 W	5.0 g/s	6070 W
Dynamic Load	600 W	2.5 g/s	0
Capacity	125 g/s	15g/s	8300W



# System reliability and down time statistics for CHL

- Much experience gained in last ten years of operation
- High reliability of cryogenic system
  - ~99.7% availability during production run
- Proactive maintenance program developed to correct problems/annoyances prior to becoming issues
- FMEA conducted to prioritize efforts on high risk items
- Continuously improve system



# Preventative Maintenance Activity

- Primary goal is to correct issues before affecting neutron production
- Continuously improved and modified for emerging issues
  - Routine tightening of wire terminals added to plan
  - Compressor maintenance techniques evaluated and updated
  - Procedure and Job Hazard Analyses (JHA) red lined and updated
- DataStream software utilized
  - Creates work order based on time, operating hours, or manual entry
  - Routes work order for approval



Page 1 of 2

JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS  
SNS 104370400P0003 BA

Title: HTA Disassembly

WORK ORDER/JHA No: [ ] NEW REVISED Date: Jan 14, 2015

JOB DESCRIPTION: Removal of Cavity Assembly from HTA

RADIOLOGICAL: ☐ RAD SURVEY REQUIRED ☐ EMP REQUIRED ☒ N/A

LOCKOUT/TAGOUT: Mechanical ☐ Electrical ☒ N/A

Electrical Hazard Analysis Required: ☐ YES ☒ NO

JHA Analysis By: Brian Remahl Task Leader: Brian DeGraft

Additional Concerns (Optional): Additional Concerns (Optional):

Basic Job Steps

1. Remove top-hat bellows assembly
2. Remove primary supply u-tube
3. Opening cavity access door
4. Remove thermal and shields
5. Remove cavity assembly

POTENTIAL HAZARDS

1. Crush and pinch hazard due to working underneath assembly
2. Risk of strain. Risk of fall while working on ladder
3. Risk of damage to WTC assembly
4. Pinch and strain hazards
5. Crush and pinch hazards

MITIGATION ACTIONS OR APPROACH

1. Wear safety glasses and gloves. Use two people to lower assembly from two sides
2. Exercise safe lifting practices. Team lift. Exercise safe ladder practices
3. Use two people to stabilize WTC during operation
4. Wear gloves. Team lift. Exercise safe lifting practices
5. Use dedicated lifting fixture. Minimize time underneath assembly. Use locking mechanism on fixtures before moving

Work Order Card

Work Order: 1395582 Facility Status: Planned Outage

Description: Maintenance VFD cabinet

Location: 8310-1-CY-106 CHL Cold Box Area

Safety: -Safety Designation- HR

Criticality: Released

Status: Released

Scheduled Start Date: 25-JUN-2015

Priority: High

WO Type: PM-Preventative Maintenance

Scheduled End Date: 02-JUL-2015

Task Level: 3

Standard Work Order

PM Schedule

Labor & Materials Cost Code

Problem Code: RADCRYO

Equipment: 15 kW Variable Frequency Drive

Asset Loc Info

Position: CHL\_2KCB VFD1

Pos Loc Info

Manufacturer: BOSCH REXROTH Model: RD611-4B-Q15-L-4N-PW

Serial Number: B015-18615-0001-04 IE Number:

Requested By: 00038142

Task Leader: 00038142

Technical Contact: 00038142

Performer: No Phone Listed

ES POC: Bulman Jr, H. James

Parent Work Order: RADCRYO

Department: Cryogenics Systems

Warranty:

SNS CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS PROCEDURES

CRYO-2.9 Warm Compressor Limited Maintenance Not Requiring 4160 LOTO

The CHL Main Compressor Diagrams are shown on PHPK drawings P5441-0201 (First Stage) and P5441-0202 (Second Stage) and on P&ID Main Compressor System Flow Diagram 79100-D-001

Before using a printed copy, check the last modified date and revision number against the OFFICIAL COPY on the SNS OPM website.

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Hand Processed Changes

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# Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the CHL


- **Breaks work down to task level for analysis**
- **Systematic approach asking two questions**
  - How could this fail during this process task?
  - If it does fail, what is the effect based on severity, probability, and detection?
- **This process delivers**
  - Weaknesses in our process
  - Ranked items in need of focus
  - An opportunity for a group to focus on a process
  - A driving force to produce action
- **Results of the FMEA**
  - $\text{Probability} \times \text{Severity} \times \text{Detection} = \text{Risk Priority Number (RPN)}$
  - 60% decrease in RPN
  - Reduction of high risk items from 76 to less than 20



# SNS Warm Compressor System

Three first stage and three second stage compressors

- Two of each run during 2-K operation with an in-line spare
- Howden compressors with Teco Westinghouse motors
- Equipped with oil removal stage at each skid
- Additional oil removal system on high header upstream of 4-K cold box
- Adjustable built in volume ratio



	1 <sup>st</sup> Stage	2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage
<b>Model #</b>	<b>MK6S/ WLVI321165</b>	<b>MKS/ WLVIH321165</b>
<b>Motor Size (hp)</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>2500</b>
<b>Rotor Diameter (mm)</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>321</b>
<b>Length to Dia. Ratio</b>	<b>1.65</b>	<b>1.65</b>
<b>Discharge Temp (K)</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>BVR</b>	<b>2.2-5.0</b>	<b>2.2-5.0</b>
<b>Displacement @ 3550 RPM (CFM)</b>	<b>3341</b>	<b>3341</b>
<b>Flow Rate (g/sec)</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>690</b>
<b>Required Oil Flow (GPM)</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>180</b>






# Warm Compressors– Lesson Learned

- **In-line spare compressors are beneficial**
  - Allows maintenance of compressor while operating another
- **Shaft seal upgrades**
  - Old seal
    - Experienced blistering resulting in oil leaks
  - New design
    - Utilizes dual seal
    - Improved flex by changing from a spring system to a SS bellows
- **Oil removal strategy**
  - Consider separation on bypass lines
  - Eliminates oil migration

Original design



New design





# 4-K Cold Box

- Provides primary cooling
- Provides shield cooling 38/50K (8300 watts)
- Liquefies helium in sub-cooler and dewar
- Provides two purification steps
  - Two 80-K carbon beds in parallel
  - One 20-K carbon bed with bypass
- Helium storage contained in 8 warm gas tanks and a dewar
- Ten years of operation with no prolonged shutdowns




# 4K Cold Box – Lessons Learned

- **LN2 loop uses excess liquid nitrogen**
  - See B. DeGraff's paper "Liquid nitrogen historical and current usage of the central helium liquefier at SNS" at this conference
- **Speed sensors in turbines have been problematic when outputting low voltage signal**
  - Moved speed sensors closer to target to increase voltage of signal
  - Consider dual speed sensors in future installations
  - Dual channel oscilloscope measure output of speed sensor and output of tachometer
- **Carbon bed regeneration has been problematic**
  - Isolating bed while in operation has been difficult
- **Coriolis flow meters may be a nice upgrade as budget allows**



# Power Failure



- Power reliability has been incredible
- Initial pressure increase in cryomodule pressure while at 4-K operation
  - Pressure transients have resulted in component failures and cavity detuning
  - Cryomodule design for pressure fluctuations should account for safety and performance
- RS compressors allow for managing pressure until power is restored





# Electrical and Controls – Lessons Learned

- **IOC Communication – 2007 event**
  - Process variable and control device are contained within the same IOC whenever possible
- **Suggested improvements to consider**
  - Move more control into PLC
  - Decreases dependency on IOC
  - Utilize IOC as communication interface
  - Run “hot spare” PLC
- **Component failures – Calibration program**
- **FMEA drove upgrade to PLCs, IOCs, Software to avoid obsolescence**
- **Alarm auto-dialer for call-ins during alarm events**
- **Switchgear maintenance**
  - Often delayed
  - Evidence of arcing found during maintenance




# Summary

- The SNS CHL has operated for approximately ten years
- It is a highly reliable system making use of several tools
  - 99.7% available over ten years during neutron production
  - Preventative maintenance program
  - Process FMEA
  - Incorporating lessons learned
- Consideration to the lessons learned at SNS may benefit future installations



# Back up slides

# CHL Block Flow Diagram





# Assigning Values and Calculate RPN

Potential Failure Mode	Potential Effect(s) of Failure	Severity	Classification	Potential Cause(s) of Failure	Current Process				RPN
					Control Prevention	Occurance	Controls Detection	Detection	
Trip a second stage compressor	Unable to maintain required flow to refrigerator, delayed trip of 4KCB	7		Oil Pump Trip	Preventative Maintenance	1	na**	7	49
		7			Monitor Temperature, Pressure, Oil Level, Visual Inspection	1	na**	7	49
		7		Skid PLC Failure	na**	10	na**	7	490
		7		High discharge pressure	System Controls	1	System alarm	1	7
		7		High discharge temperature	na**	1	na**	10	70
		7		High oil temperature	na**	1	na**	10	70
		7		Low oil inventory in skid separator	Procedural & Operator Training	1	Daily checksheet & Log	7	49