


## The Sector 3-4 incident

Ph. Lebrun *on behalf of the*  
Task Force on the Analysis of the 19 September 2008 Incident

LHC Performance Workshop 2009  
Chamonix, 2-6 February 2009




# Contents



- The Task Force on Analysis of the 19 September Incident
- Sector 3-4 before the incident
- The incident: facts and findings
- Recommendations




## Mandate of the Task Force



- Establish the sequence of facts, based on experimental measurements before incident, observations after incident and timing
- Analyse and explain the development of events, in relation with design assumptions, manufacturing & test data and risk analyses performed
- Recommend preventive and corrective actions for Sector 3-4 and others



## Contributors to the Task Force




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Raymond VENESS  
Arjan VERWEIJ  
Louis WALCKIERS  
Rob WOLF



## Electrical joints on 12 kA bus bars



History of interconnections in sector 3-4 (Oct 2006-July 2007) shows no particular cause of defect, but worst working conditions of all machine:



- low temperature and humidity in tunnel
- low productivity of industrial staff (Jan 2007) following contract policy of company

P. Fessia







# Electrical joint in 12 kA bus bar







# QA of electrical joints: witness samples





# Temperature drift during 7 kA current flat top (15 Sep 2008)





L. Tavian






# Simulated thermal runaway threshold of electrical interconnect






A resistive joint of about  $220 \text{ n}\Omega$  with bad electrical and thermal contacts with the stabilizer





No electrical contact between wedge and U-profile with the bus on at least 1 side of the joint

No bonding at joint with the U-profile and the wedge





# Measured vs simulated incident with 220 nΩ joint and bad contact with U-profile and wedge





Arjan Verweij, TE-MPE

A. Verweij



# Simulation of incident with 220 nΩ joint and bad contact with U-profile and wedge






Arjan Verweij, TE-MPE

A. Verweij






# Schematic of dipole circuit in sector





# Event Nr. 1 @ 11:18:36.260




## Abnormal value of U<sub>res</sub> of bus bar detector









# Event Nr. 2 @ 11:18:36.798

## I meas not following Iref by 300 mA






# Event Nr. 3 @ 11:18:36.822 Idc Current overflow: FAULT









# Events Nr. 4-6 @ 11:18:36.842


## TRGEARTH-Fault, Active filter off, PWRFAILURE




11:18:36.842 TRGEarth Fault, Active filter off,  
PWRFAILURE






|                         |                  |                                     |         |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|---------|
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.822 | DIM.AF           | TRG IDC_OVER_CURRENT                | FAULT   |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.VS           | TRG EARTH_FAULT_(FROM_EXTERNAL_BOX) | FAULT   |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.LOOP         | STA ACTIVE_FILTER                   | off     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.LOOP         | STA LOOP                            | ON      |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.LOOP         | STA VLOOP_OK                        | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_ON                          | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_OFF                         | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_PLUG                        | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_UNPLUG                      | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_EARTH                       | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA MCB_NOT_EARTH                   | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA PREMAG_ON                       | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA PREMAG_OFF                      | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA DCCT_ZERO_CURRENT               | no      |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA INSULATION_SWITCH_IN            | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA INSULATION_SWITCH_OUT           | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA INSULATION_SWITCH_EARTH         | inactiv |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA INSULATION_SWITCH_BLOCKED       | ACTIVE  |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIM.ACT          | STA ACTIVE_FILTER                   | PRESENT |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | STATE.PC         | FLT_STOPPING                        | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | VS.STATE         | VS_INVALID                          | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIG.STATUS       | VSFault                             | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIG.STATUS       | PWRFAILURE                          | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIG.STATUS       | VSRUN                               | CLR     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DIG.COMMANDS     | VSRUN_CMD                           | CLR     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | DEVICE.FAULTS    | VS_FAULT                            | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | FGC.ST_UNLATCHED | PWR_FAILURE                         | SET     |
| 2008-09-19 11:18:36.842 | FGC.ST_UNLATCHED | POST_MORTEM                         | SET     |







# Event Nr. 12 @ 11:18:37.373 Switches open







# Current decay in dipole circuit from 8.7 kA







# Decay of current in sub-circuits measured at DCCT & dump resistors on UJ33 and UA43




# Estimated Power dissipation by the arc

Based on PC data





## Estimated Power dissipation by the arc

Based on PC data








# Energy balance in dipole circuit



| Energy                        | MJ    | %   |
|-------------------------------|-------|-----|
| Stored in the magnets         | 595.0 | 100 |
| Dissipated in UJ33            | 71.0  | 12  |
| Dissipated in UA43            | 104.8 | 18  |
| Dissipated in cold mass       | 144.4 | 24  |
| Dissipated in electrical arcs | 274.8 | 46  |



# Electrical arc between two magnets













# Simplified scheme of a sub-sector



- Cold-mass
- Vacuum vessel
- Line E
- | Cold support post
- | Warm Jack
- ~ Compensator/Bellows
- ⚡ Vacuum barrier




# Development of pressure in helium, insulation vacuum and beam vacuum enclosures







# Estimation of helium discharge from cold mass



Recorded data



Estimated mass flow



## Hypothesis:

Helium temperature given by sensor P4\_34:LQOAA\_25R3\_TT821




All helium discharged through 1 hole. No plug major failure.

Constant hydraulic diameter 54 mm

Total mass of helium =  $214 \text{ m} \times 0.026 \text{ m}^3/\text{m} \times 147.8 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^3 = 822 \text{ kg}$




# Existing ports on SSS vacuum enclosure






# Relief device on insulation vacuum enclosure






# Flow discharge characteristics of relief devices on insulation vacuum enclosure (per sub-sector)





Present configuration: 2 DN90



(DP: Design Pressure)



# Assessment of maximum pressure in insulation vacuum enclosure from deformation of W sleeve





Corrugated sleeve of 1 mm thick AISI 316 L

Yield stress 275 MPa

Nominal diameter 1016 mm



Maximum diameter 1055 mm

FE calculation in large displacement case (iterative geometry) gives 7 bar overpressure






# Oxygen content [%] in tunnel (at ceiling)









R. Nunes





# Simplified scheme of SSS with vacuum barrier







# Pressure forces on SSS vacuum barrier







# Collateral damage: magnet displacements



QQBI.27R3



# Collateral damage: magnet displacements




QQBI.27R3  
N line



QQBI.27R3  
V2 line



# Collateral damage: magnet displacements





**QBBI.B31R3**  
Extension by 73 mm

**QBQI.27R3**  
Bellows torn open





## Collateral damage: secondary arcs




QQBI.27R3 Dipole bus line

QBBI.B31R3 M3 bus line






## Collateral damage: ground supports







# Longitudinal displacements in damaged area



## Displacements status in sector 3-4 (From Q17R3 to Q33R3) : P3 side

Based on measurements by TS-SU, TS-MME and AT-MCS

|           | Q17 | A18 | B18 | C18 | Q18 | A19 | B19 | C19 | Q19 | A20 | B20 | C20 | Q20 | A21 | B21 | C21 | Q21 |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cryostat  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  |
| Cold mass | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | ?   | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  |

|           | Q21 | A22 | B22 | C22 | Q22 | A23 | B23  | C23  | Q23  | A24  | B24  | C24 | Q24 | A25 | B25 | C25 | Q25 |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cryostat  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | -7  | <2  | <2   | <2   | -187 | <2   | <2   | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  |
| Cold mass | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | -25 | -67 | -102 | -144 | <5   | -190 | -130 | -60 | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  |






|           | Q25 | A26 | B26 | C26 | Q26 | A27 | B27 | C27  | Q27 | A28 | B28 | C28 | Q28 | A29 | B29 | C29 | Q29 |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cryostat  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2   | 474 | -4  | <2  | <2  | 11  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  |
| Cold mass | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | 57  | 114 | 150? | -45 | 230 | 189 | 144 | 92? | 50  | 35  | <5  | <5  |

|           | Q29 | A30 | B30 | C30 | Q30 | A31 | B31 | C31 | Q31 | A32 | B32 | C32 | Q32 | A33 | B33 | C33 | Q33 |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cryostat  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  | 188 | <2  | <2  | <2  | 5   | <2  | <2  | <2  | <2  |
| Cold mass | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | <5  | 19  | 77  | 148 | <5  | 140 | 105 | 62  | 18  | <5  | <5  | <5  | ?   |


>0 [mm]  
 ? Not measured yet  
 Blue arrow: Cold mass displacement  
 Green arrow: Cryostat displacement  
 Black bar: SSS with vacuum barrier  
 Grey bar: Towards P4  
 Red star: Electrical interruptions  
 Purple star: Dipole in short circuit  
 Orange arrow: Electrically damaged IC  
 Cyan bar: Disconnected  
 Double arrow: Buffer zones  
 Green bar: Open interconnection






# Lumped dynamic model of cryomagnet string



# Beam vacuum contamination




| <p>Beam Screen (BS) : The red color is characteristic of a clean copper surface</p> | <p>BS with some contamination by super-isolation (MLI multi layer insulation)</p>   | <p>BS with soot contamination. The grey color varies depending on the thickness of the soot, from grey to dark.</p> |
|---|---|---|
|   |  |                                 |





## Recommendations



### Prevention of initial fault



- Analyse thoroughly temperature evolution history of cold mass during past power tests to identify « doubtful » cells/subsectors/magnets
  - done in all sectors
- Perform electrical measurements with higher sensitivity ( $< 100 \mu\text{V}$ ) on « doubtful » cells/subsectors powered at limited current
  - done in few locations (15-17R1)
- Track temperature evolution during further power tests, applying normalized ramp/flattop/deramp durations and normalized cryogenic configuration, filtered electrical measurements using quench recorder in « snapshot » mode
  - MB circuits: done on sectors 1-2, 5-6, 6-7, 7-8 and 8-1
  - MQ circuits: done on sectors 5-6, 6-7, 7-8 and 8-1
  - procedure to be established and included in power tests of sectors
- Modify quench detection system to include interconnects and bus bar splices, making use of available voltage taps to generate early warning & interlock signals
  - technical solution defined and implementation launched Dec 2008
- Consider option to measure currents in 13 kA circuits at both ends of sector and detect differentials
- Review possible improvement of mechanical clamping of interconnects and gradually implement whenever possible




# Additional quench detection system





# Recommendations



## Mitigation of consequences



- Redefine MCI to cope with collateral effects of helium discharge from cold mass
  - done for electrical arcs
  - to be done for beam-induced damage
- Increase number/size of relief devices on cryostat vacuum vessels for coping with redefined MCI
  - equip SSS with increased-flow, spring-loaded devices on available DN100 and DN63 ports (can be implemented on cold SSS)
  - cut/weld DN 200 ports on cryodipoles and equip with spring-loaded devices (can only be implemented on warm cryodipoles)
  - implement compensatory measures for transitory phase on sectors not yet equipped with DN 200 relief devices
- Review number, size & position of pressure relief devices on beam vacuum system
- Review closure logic of beam vacuum sector valves
- Consider possibility of triggered opening of quench relief valves below set pressure
- Consider general firing of quench heaters pertaining to an electrical circuit as a measure to dissipate energy away from an electrical problem (e.g. arc) occurring in circuit
- Reinforce external anchoring at locations of vacuum barriers
  - will avoid displacement of vacuum vessels, but risk of additional damage to cold supports
- Reexamine personnel underground access rules when powering
  - including neighbouring underground spaces
- Review location of AUG in tunnel and protection from blast
- Review recorded signals, recording frequency and time stamping coherence among different systems



# Revision of MCI due to electrical arc




MCI?

080919 incident





# Flow discharge characteristics of relief devices on insulation vacuum enclosure (per sub-sector)





New configuration on cold sectors:

15 DN100

(DP: Design Pressure)


New configuration on warm sectors:

12 DN200 + 8 DN100





## Still to be found or understood



- Exact nature of initial fault
  - Primary evidence destroyed
  - Sample tests to reproduce interconnect with 200 n $\Omega$  resistance: only omission of soldering can account for such high resistance
  - Inter-aperture splice with 90 n $\Omega$  resistance on other magnet examined, confirming likelihood of defect
- Long-distance propagation mechanism of quenches to other magnets in sector
  - Electrical discharge of QPS in helium cloud? negative test!
  - In-rush of warm helium in beam vacuum pipes? simulations inconclusive!
  - Second sound in He II? hydraulic restrictions!
- Comprehensive extent of damage
  - to cold mass of magnets
  - to beam vacuum systems