

BE-ICS openlab activities around Data Analytics and Machine Learning

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February, 3rd 2021

CERN-Siemens openlab collaboration



- CERN collaboration with *Siemens* since 2011 to work in areas of common interest:
 - Evolution of SCADA systems
 - IoT, machine learning and data analytics
- 2 fellow positions fully funded by Siemens
- Knowledge sharing between Siemens and CERN


Big Data for Industrial Controls

Exploit the Big Data volume produced by our systems to:

- **Reduce operational and maintenance costs**
 - Anticipate when sensors and actuators have to be replaced
 - Detect anomalous behavior and over-usage of industrial devices
- **Make our control systems smarter**
 - Detect symptomatic effects in the data which do not trigger alarms
 - Guide engineers and operators to take corrective actions
- Optimise process stability
- Assist during system engineering



Control System




Data Analytics


The two faces of Data Analytics

In the cloud

At the edge



Our vision



BE-ICS Activities

BE-ICS

Siemens (openlab)

- Anomaly detection — Forensic analysis of Cryo data causing a beam dump
- Root-cause analysis — Ping-pointing root-cause of major faults in Cooling and Ventilation systems
- Process optimisation —
 - Linac3 beam current stability
 - Detection of abnormal oscillations of Cryo valves
- Engineering — Detection of misbehaving Cryo control loops
- Predictive maintenance — Detection of clogging of Oxygen Deficiency Sensors

Procon

Predictive Maintenance — Heat Exchangers in Cooling and ventilation

UC1: Oscillation analysis for cryogenics valves

Goal: detect anomalous oscillation of valves

- Lifespan of valves in km!




Impact on:

- Process system stability and safety
- Communication load
- Maintenance (overuse of valves)
- Performance (Physic time)

Why data analytics?

- General algorithm to detect different oscillations
- Monitoring several thousands of signals (not manually!)
 - Over 34000 physical instrumentations and channels
 - 12136 AI, 4856 AO, 4536 DI, 1568 DO, 8000 spare and virtual channels, ~4000 analogical control loops
 - More than 120 PLCs
 - Siemens S7-416-2DP, 30000 conceptual objects/parameters

Examples of abnormal behaviour of valves



UC2: Anomaly detection in CRYO signals

Presence of different anomalies not detected by the control systems!

Possible causes:

- hardware failures/degradations
- wrong tuning/structure
- false measurements...


Impact

- Process stability and safety
- Maintenance (overuse of valves)
- Performance and downtime

Why data analytics?

- Too complex to embed calculations into the control systems
- Learn from historical data the group of signals with similar behaviour

Valves CV910 positions in L2 (26th June 2017)




Direct impact on the operational cost!!!

UC4: Root-cause analysis in Experiments Gas Control Systems

Diagnose Alarm flood

Misleading feedback!
Actual problem in the
distribution and not in the
Pump



⊗ Fault in the distribution system

Domino effect



Short	Local Time	Alias	Description	Domain	Nature	Name	Value
W	2013.09.27 15:49:37.810	CMSCSC_Di_61InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 61 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 61 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:42.880	CMSCSC_Di_68InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 68 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 68 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:42.880	CMSCSC_Di_70InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 70 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 70 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:42.880	CMSCSC_Di_69InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 69 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 69 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:42.890	CMSCSC_Di_67InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 67 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 67 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:43.090	CMSCSC_Di_63InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 63 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 63 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:43.090	CMSCSC_Di_64InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 64 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 64 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:49:43.090	CMSCSC_Di_65InPresAI	PTxx24 - Rack 65 input	CSC_Details		PTxx24 - Rack 65 input pres	FALSE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_69OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 69 far output	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 69 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_66OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 66 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 66 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_69OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 69 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 69 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_70OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 70 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 70 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_70OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 70 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 70 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_67OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 67 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 67 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_66OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 66 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 66 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_67OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 67 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 67 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_68OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 68 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 68 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:09.900	CMSCSC_Di_68OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 68 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 68 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_64OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 64 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 64 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_64OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 64 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 64 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_65OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 65 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 65 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_65OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 65 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 65 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_63OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 63 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 63 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_61OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 61 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 61 output pres	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_63OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 63 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 63 far output	TRUE
W	2013.09.27 15:52:10.440	CMSCSC_Di_61OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 61 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 61 far output	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:12.880	CMSCSC_Di_66OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 66 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 66 output pres	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:12.880	CMSCSC_Di_66OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 66 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 66 far output	TRUE
bad	2013.09.27 15:52:12.960	CMSCSC_Di_DiRack66PCCO	Distribution rack 66 PCCO	CSC_Details		Full Stop Alarm Status	TRUE
bad	2013.09.27 15:52:12.960	CMSCSC_Di_DiRack61PCCO	Distribution rack 61 PCCO	CSC_Details		Full Stop Alarm Status	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:13.370	CMSCSC_Di_61OutPresFA	PTxx26 - Rack 61 far out	CSC_Details		PTxx26 - Rack 61 far output	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:13.370	CMSCSC_Di_61OutPresAI	PTxx25 - Rack 61 output	CSC_Details		PTxx25 - Rack 61 output pres	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:32.110	CMSCSC_Di_AlarmRack68	Some alarms in rack 68	CSC_Details		Rack 68 alarm	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:52:32.110	CMSCSC_Di_AlarmRack61	Some alarms in rack 61	CSC_Details		Rack 61 alarm	TRUE
A	2013.09.27 15:57:47.130	CMSCSC_Vb_AtmPrSensAI	PTD101 - Atmospheric pnt	CSC_Details		PTD101 - Atmospheric pres	TRUE

Alarms flooding

> Diagnosing a fault is complex: it may take weeks!

- Alarms flood: a single fault can generate up to thousands of events
- The 1st alarm is not necessarily the most relevant for the diagnosis
- The same fault generates different events sequence depending on the system status
- A single fault can stop the whole control process




UC5: Evaluation of PID performance

Assist system engineering

BE-ICS in collaboration with the University of Valladolid (**not an openlab activity with Siemens**)


Based on: "Performance monitoring of industrial controllers based on the predictability of controller behaviour", R. Ghraizi, E. Martinez, C. de Prada

- › Impact on the regulation of the entire control systems
- › Too many PIDs to check manually!
- › A general method to assess different PIDs structure
- › Many sources of faults/malfunctions
 - System status dependency
 - External disturbances/factors
 - Bad tuning/Wrong controller type/structure
 - Slow degradation




UC6: Leak detection in Cooling and ventilation systems

- Problem:
 - Manually set alarms thresholds
 - Changing filling conditions
- Anomaly detection based on historical data
 - Detection of “large” leaks:
Anomalous valve opening time
 - Detection of “small” leaks:
Anomalous frequency of valve openings
- Achievements:
 - Identification of anomalous behaviours
 - Improving thresholds setting





Distribution of valve openings [FSED_001_VMA400]




O₂ level monitoring in the LHC tunnel


- 378 oxygen sensors are spread across LHC tunnel
- Periodically sensors get clogged
- We want to avoid false alarms
- Anticipate when recalibration is required



LINAC3 heavy ion beam




Predicting LINAC3 beam current



Pb⁵⁴⁺ ion beam @ 4.2 MeV/u


- Predict adiabatic beam decay
- Beam current forecasting (ongoing)
- Collaboration with BE-ABP-HSL

LINAC3 schematic layout




Predicting LINAC3 beam current


a) LINAC3 Wavelet Analysis Fourth Week Aug 2018 right before current drop, not dropping zeroes



b) LINAC3 Wavelet Power Spectrum (Morlet)





c) Global Wavelet Spectrum



UC3: Feed analytical results into the control system

Visualize the results of the analysis to the operators in order to take the proper actions!



Status: Working prototype



Thank you!