


SMP @ MPP



Stephane
GABOURIN

Benjamin
TODD

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Amanda
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Maciej
KWIATKOWSKI

Nikolai
TROFIMOV

Maxime
AUDRAIN

Introduction

B. Todd

Hardware

M. Kwiatkowski

Testing and Testers

S. Gabourin

Software

I. Romera

User Interface

M. Audrain

Status & Future

I. Romera

SMP 3v0

Introduction

Safe Machine Parameters

receives accelerator information

generates flags & values

directly transmitted and / or broadcast

injection procedure



Extraction Interlocks




protection configuration



Beam Interlocks
Collimation
Beam Loss Monitors ...

*fast *safe *reliable *available

CERN = System Safety





SPS Parameters



SPS_PBF = TRUE when
 $(\text{SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY} \leq \text{PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT})$
 else SPS_PBF = FALSE


PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT may be trimmed down by OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT



OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT = 1.4e10
 PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT = 1.0e11



SPS_SBF = TRUE when
 (SPS_BCT3_INTENSITY ≤ SETUP_BEAM_LIMIT)
 else SPS_SBF = FALSE

SETUP_BEAM_LIMIT = 5.0e11






Fail-Safe = 524.280 GeV



E_CNGS = TRUE when
[SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≥ E400_LOWER_LIMIT = 397.440 GeV
AND
SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≤ E400_UPPER_LIMIT] = 402.600 GeV
else E_CNGS = FALSE

E_HIRADMAT = TRUE when
[SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≥ E440_LOWER_LIMIT = 437.400 GeV
AND
SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≤ E440_UPPER_LIMIT] = 442.560 GeV
else E_LHC = FALSE



E_LHC = TRUE when
[SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≥ E450_LOWER_LIMIT = 448.440 GeV
AND
SPS_MACHINE_ENERGY ≤ E450_UPPER_LIMIT] = 453.600 GeV
else E_LHC = FALSE



LHC Parameters




highest of the VALID received values to be **LHC_MACHINE_ENERGY**





Fail-Safe = $1.6777215e15$


Fail-Safe = $6.5535e14$

highest of the VALID received values to be LHC_INTENSITY_x












Fail-Safe = FALSE






Fail-Safe = 0m

Moveable Devices and Stable Beams







```
if (PHYSICS_ENERGY_LOWER ≤ LHC_MACHINE_ENERGY ≤ PHYSICS_ENERGY_UPPER)
    PHYSICS_ENERGY = TRUE
else PHYSICS_ENERGY = FALSE
```

Operator: <10 GeV window between LIMITs

Moveable Devices and Stable Beams






```


if (BEAM_SQUEEZED_n_LOWER ≤ SQUEEZING_FACTOR_n ≤ BEAM_SQUEEZED_n_UPPER)
    IR_n_SQUEEZED = TRUE
else IR_n_SQUEEZED = FALSE

```

Operator: <1m window between LIMITs

Moveable Devices and Stable Beams





MDI Flag calculation:

```

if (PHYSICS_ENERGY = TRUE)
    AND
    (BEAM_MODE = "STABLE BEAMS" OR BEAM_MODE = "UNSTABLE BEAMS" OR
     BEAM_MODE = "BEAM DUMP")
    AND
    (BEAM_SQUEEZED = TRUE) then
        MDI = TRUE
    Else MDI = FALSE
    
```

STB Flag calculation:

```

if (PHYSICS_ENERGY = TRUE)
    AND
    (BEAM_MODE = "STABLE BEAMS")
    AND
    (BEAM_SQUEEZED = TRUE) then
        STB = TRUE
    Else STB = FALSE
    
```




Dependable Electronics Basis



Receiver

Generator LHC
or
Generator SPS

Arbiter



Monitor FPGA

Receiver – CISR

Generator LHC – CISGL

Generator SPS – CISGS


Arbiter – CISA

Control FPGA

VHDL implementation
Safety approach?

2011/03/15 15:15

Hardware Dependable Design



Requirements requested by operators and/or approved by MPP.

E.G. Set-up Beam Flag equation

$$\left(\frac{E [\text{GeV}]}{450 [\text{GeV}]} \right)^{1.7} \times I [p] \leq 1 \times 10^{12} \quad \text{normal}$$

$$\left(\frac{E [\text{GeV}]}{450 [\text{GeV}]} \right)^{1.7} \times I [p] \leq 5 \times 10^{12} \quad \text{relaxed}$$

$$\left(\frac{E [\text{GeV}]}{450 [\text{GeV}]} \right)^{1.7} \times I [p] \leq 1.3 \times 10^{13} \quad \text{very relaxed}$$

$$\left(\frac{E [\text{GeV}]}{450 [\text{GeV}]} \right)^{1.7} \times I [p] \leq 2.5 \times 10^{11} \quad \text{ion}$$

English language vs formal language

English + diagrams

2.3 PARAMETER CALCULATION, THRESHOLDS AND TRIMS

2.3.1 SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY CALCULATION

`SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY` is derived from `SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A` and `_B`. This implementation is to be made using a high-availability approach, **at least one** of the two intensity sources must be functional, `SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A` is to be used when it is VALID¹. If it is NOT VALID, then the value of `SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B` is to be used. Finally, if neither intensity is VALID, the fail safe value is to be applied.




Figure 6 : `SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY` derived from `_A` and `_B` Values.

2.3.2 SPS PROBE BEAM FLAG CALCULATION

Parameter	<code>SPS_PBF</code>
Data Type [Default Value]:	Boolean [FALSE]
Source Data:	<code>SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY</code>
Related Threshold [Default Value]:	<code>PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT</code> [1 x 10 ¹¹ p]
Related Trim:	<code>OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT</code>

Calculation: `SPS_PBF = TRUE` when
 $(SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY \leq PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT)$
 else `SPS_PBF = FALSE`

`PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT` may be trimmed by setting `OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT`, the lower value of `PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT` and `OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT` will be used in the calculation of the `SPS_PBF`.

predicate logic

```

FAIL_SAFE_LOW_INTENSITY: int := 1.6777215 * 10^15;

SPS_SMPC_PBF (OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT : int,
              OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT_is_set : bool,
              PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT : int,
              SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A : int,
              SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A_is_valid : bool,
              SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B : int,
              SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B_is_valid : bool,
              SPS_PBF : bool
              ) :=

exists SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY : int. (
  (SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY =
   if SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A_is_valid then SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A;
   else if SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B_is_valid then SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B;
   else FAIL_SAFE_LOW_INTENSITY;
  )
  AND

  /* if operator probe beam limit is set, use it to trim probe beam limit */
  exists LIMIT : int. (
    (LIMIT =
     if NOT(OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT_is_set) then PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT;
     else min(PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT, OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT);
    )
    AND

    SPS_PBF =
     if SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY <= LIMIT then TRUE;
     else FALSE
  )
);
  
```

Unlike the English, there is only one way to understand formal language.

English language vs formal language

English + diagrams

predicate logic

2.3 PARAMETER CALCULATION

SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY is derived from **SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A** and **_B**. This implementation is to be made using a high-availability approach, **at least one** of the two intensity sources must be functional, **SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A** is to be used when it is **VALID**¹. If it is **NOT VALID**, then the value of **SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B** is to be used. Finally, if neither intensity is **VALID**, the fail safe value is to be applied.

2.3.1 SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY

SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY implementation is to be made using two intensity sources. **SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A** is to be used when it is **VALID**¹. If it is **NOT VALID**, then the value of **SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B** is to be used. Finally, if neither intensity is **VALID**, the fail safe value is to be applied.

- SPS_BCT4_IN

- SPS_BCT4_IN

Figure 6 : SF

2.3.2 SPS PROBE BEAM LIMIT






Data Type [Default Value]: Boolean [FALSE]
 Source Data: SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY
 Related Threshold [Default Value]: PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT [1 x 10¹¹ p]
 Related Trim: OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT


```
/* if operator probe beam limit is set, use it to trim probe beam limit */
exists LIMIT : int. (
(LIMIT =
if NOT(OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT_is_set) then PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT;
else min(PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT, OPERATOR_PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT);
```

Calculation:

```
exists SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY : int. (
(SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY =
if SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A_is_valid then SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A;
else if SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B_is_valid then SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B;
else FAIL_SAFE_LOW_INTENSITY;
)
AND
```

PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT lower value in the calc





```
-----  
-- code and transmit data to the CISA  
-- transmit 9 frames every 2 ms  
-----  
  
-- CISA frames rate interval counter (125 us)  
us125_cnt_pr : process(rst, clk)  
begin  
    if rst = RESET_ACTIVE then  
        us125_cnt <= us125_cnt_max;  
        us125_cnt_en_d1 <= '0';  
    elsif rising_edge (clk) then  
        if us125_cnt_en = '0' then  
            us125_cnt <= us125_cnt - 1;  
        else  
            us125_cnt <= us125_cnt_max;  
        end if;  
        us125_cnt_en_d1 <= us125_cnt_en;  
    end if;  
end process;  
us125_cnt_en <= '1' when us125_cnt = 0 else '0';  
  
-- CISA frames counter  
cisa_frames_cnt_pr : process(rst, clk)  
begin  
    if rst = RESET_ACTIVE then  
        cisa_frames_cnt <= "0000";  
    elsif rising_edge (clk) then  
        -- increase frame number after me is started  
        if us125_cnt_en_d1 = '1' then  
            if cisa_frames_cnt = "1111" then  
                cisa_frames_cnt <= "0000";  
            else  
                cisa_frames_cnt <= cisa_frames_cnt + 1;  
            end if;  
        end if;  
    end if;  
end process;  
  
-- start ME only when there is valid frame to transmit for selected time slot  
cisa_meir <= us125_cnt_en and cisa_mei(32);
```


VHDL is not a programming language.
It is a Hardware Description Language


Must understand expected synthesis result

comments and naming convention
important for the code review


Critical code = strict
Non-Critical code = engineer has freedom

High % code reuse





Unit Under Test
Bus Functional Model
Register Transfer Level




Test-bench = software wrapped around model


response should be correct for all stimulus

Simulation tool can examine code coverage


```

410 -----
411 -- stop error detection and register
412 -----
413 s_expected_p: process (clk, rst) begin
414     if rst = RESET_ACTIVE then
415         stop_expected <= '0';
416     elsif rising_edge(clk) then
417         --reset error when start condition is detected
418         if start_en = '1' and started_flg = '0' then
419             stop_expected <= '0';
420         --set error when all frame is received and stop condition wasn't detected
421         elsif started_flg = '1' and bits_cnt_done = '1' and sdata_en = '1' and bitv = '0' then
422             stop_expected <= '1';
423         end if;
424     end if;
425 end process;
426
  
```






DeviceUnder Test



similar to simulation but real hardware

Hardware response should be correct for each stimulus

embedded logic analyzers provided by FPGA vendors
Chip Scope, SignalTap, ...





Hardware tester vs. simulation

Complementary

Software simulation:

source code tracking

code coverage

Hardware tester:

real time

real distortions



Hardware Dependable Design Summary

Our approach – dependable PLD design goes on top of dependable electronics design

formalisation of the specification

split critical – non-critical

reduction to minimum function

exhaustive source code simulation

full code coverage


hardware testers

code reviews

external reviews

System Testing & Testers

The “V” Approach



English Specification used for the Tester

Determine Tests needed to verify each function

Developed Independently of Controller


Validation of Controller versus Tester versus English Specification

Definition : Ensure the SMP controller works as specified


Roles :

Simulates the inputs


Analyzes the outputs




Functionalities of the SMP tester



SPS Probe-Beam Flag: Test Protocol




- SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_A
- SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY_B



SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY

SPS_PBF = TRUE when
(SPS_BCT4_INTENSITY ≤ PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT)
else SPS_PBF = FALSE

LabVIEW SubPanel



Excel file

RESULTS GA								
Last Data Received		I10_A	I10_B	Intensity	PBF	Value after 3 sec	HB Timing	Correct
A	B	Error/NoData	Error/NoData					
8A007772	8B007772			7772	0	0	0	T
8A007772	8B007772			FFFF	0	0	0	T
8A007772	8B007772			FFFF	0	0	0	T

Text File

```

SMP_TEST 24_02_2011 -11_50.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
11:50:29 - CARD PRESENCE
11:50:29 All test boards present
11:50:29 All boards to test present
11:50:29 - CONFIGURATED DATAS
11:50:32 DATA1_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 DATA2_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 DATA3_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 DATA4_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 VALID_INPUT_HDR : 3A1A9A92
11:50:32 VALID_OUTPUT_HDR : 2A1A3C3A
11:50:32 CISX_LAB.LHC_RA : correct configured datas
11:50:32 DATA1_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 DATA2_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 DATA3_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 DATA4_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 VALID_INPUT_HDR : 3A1A9A92
11:50:32 VALID_OUTPUT_HDR : 2B1B303B
11:50:32 CISX_LAB.LHC_RB : correct configured datas
11:50:32 ENERGY_A_HEADER : 3A
11:50:32 ENERGY_B_HEADER : 3B
11:50:32 ENERGY_C_HEADER : 3C
11:50:32 ENERGY_D_HEADER : 3D
11:50:32 ENERGY_A_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 ENERGY_B_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 ENERGY_C_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 ENERGY_D_TIMEOUT : 1B58
11:50:32 INTENSITY_1_A_HEADER : 1A
11:50:32 INTENSITY_1_B_HEADER : 1B
11:50:32 INTENSITY_2_A_HEADER : 2A
11:50:32 INTENSITY_2_B_HEADER : 2B
11:50:32 INTENSITY_1_A_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 INTENSITY_1_B_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 INTENSITY_2_A_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 INTENSITY_2_B_TIMEOUT : AA60
11:50:32 SQUEEZING_FACTOR_1_UPPER_LIMIT : 78
    
```

What it does:

- Replaces all elements connected to the SMP
- Tests automatically many input combinations
- Validates the boards for the operation

Software

FESA – RBAC – MCS – Checks - GUI

FESA class

RBAC protection and MCS

Operational checks

SMP-GUI

FESA class provides access to hardware registers


no complex logic behind, just valid range checks

Different type of access

read-only access for everyone

write access for experts through dedicated expert properties

write access for critical registers for operation




SPS

Property	Roles	Applications	Location	MCS
ProbeBeamLimit	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SEQUENCER		X


LHC

Property	Roles	Applications	Location	MCS
SqueezingFactor	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SIS	SIS-HOSTS	
SqueezingFactorLimits	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SEQUENCER		X
PhysicsEnergyLimits	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SEQUENCER		X
BeamMode	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SEQUENCER		
ForceSetupBeamFlag	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SMP-GUI		
SetupBeamFlagNormal	LHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMP	SMP-GUI		
SetupBeamFlagSpecial	SMP-THRESHOLD-EXPERT	SMP-GUI		
ExpertRegisterSetting	SMP-EXPERT	SMP-GUI		


Pre-operational checks to ensure system ready for operation
 HW consistency vs DB, Test mode to ensure critical paths working to spec...



DIAMON checks to detect infrastructure issues
PS, Timing, Communication problems...



Post-Mortem for post-operational check sequence
 Role played in last dump, Redundancy, Safety for next mission...



GUI Demonstration

GUI to monitor status of the systems (SPS and LHC)

Send commands to the controllers

Logged data viewer

Useful tool for diagnostics

Same tool used for Operators and Experts:

Provide different functionalities depending on user roles

Status & Future Plans

+ ongoing documentation

+ study intensity logic

+ 10 trivial issues in monitoring and diagnostics


+ beta Pre-Op

+ beta DIAMON

+ beta Post-Mortem

+ Cross-checking hardware

+ Cross-checker tester





+ Cross-checking hardware

+ Cross-checker tester

+ VME Receiver

+ VME Transmitter





+ Cross-checking hardware

+ Cross-checker tester

+ VME Receiver

+ VME Transmitter

+ Pre-Op

+ DIAMON

+ Post-Mortem

fin Intro to CSKyou!