

MPP meeting 19th July 2013 – A. Apollonio, V. Vatansever

# **Connection between LHC BIS and LBDS re-triggering system: dependability studies**



# Outline

- Overview and considerations of the connection between LHC BIS and LBDS re-triggering system
- Dependability studies on the Trigger Delay Unit
- Dependability studies on the Link between the BIS and the Trigger Delay Unit


# Technical considerations and goals

- Modify as little as possible the BIS
- Obtain SIL level
- Not more than 1 false asynchronous beam dump in 10 years
- Not more than 2 false synchronous beam dumps per year



➔ Reliability analysis of Trigger Delay Unit and the Link

# Reliability Analysis

- Failure rates for each component  
(Military Handbook, manufacturer data, assessment of lifetime statistics)
- 3-6 failure modes for each component  
(Military Handbook)
- Each failure mode checked in simulation for effects on output signal / trigger
- Other effects on functionality investigated



# Trigger Delay Unit (TDU)




# Main failure modes of the TDU


1. Asynchronous beam dump (unwanted)
  - TDU causes an asynchronous beam dump although the LBDS is working
2. System not available on demand
  - TDU cannot forward the trigger
3. Silent failures, failures w/o effect on output
  - Loss of redundancy
  - Loss of additional functions

# Reliability block diagrams TDU failure modes

## Asynchronous beam dump




System not available on demand




# Asynchronous Beam Dumps

- Almost no asynchronous beam dumps expected
  - Asynchronous beam dumps only with trigger input
  - Just one diode and changes in LC parameters are contributing to this failure mode
- Components in Delay Circuit all passive
  - **No spurious triggers from TDU expected**




# Open Diode BYV27-200



# TDU not available on demand


- 21 components contribute
- Effect: TDU cannot forward trigger




# Other failures TDU

- 337 FIT w/o effect on output pulse
  - Redundant components
  - Detectable failures (changes in delay time)
  - Other failures with no effect on trigger delay

# Other failures



# Failure Probabilities TDU




# Summary TDU reliability

- High reliability
- Almost no asynchronous beam dumps expected
- Most frequent failure: Not available on demand (MTTF=390 years)
- No back link to BIS loop necessary (regarding the TDU)

# Link to TDU: status of analysis


- reliability analysis is in early state
- different designs regarded
  - Analogic / digital
  - Redundant paths in the link
  - Combining the output signals to trigger both retriggering lines at the same time
  - Backlink opening the BIS to prevent spurious triggers causing an ABD

# Principle of the new link



# Reliability block diagrams Link failure modes


Asynchronous beam dump



System not available on demand (1 beam)




# Link to TDU: first look at failure modes




## Gates

- Failure mode: “stuck in TRUE/FALSE”
- Effects to be investigated, depending on solution



# Link to TDU: first look at failure modes



# Link to TDU: first look at failures




# Link to TDU: first look at failure modes



# Component failure rates (preliminary)

Component	Total failure rate [FIT]	Source
Schmitt-Trigger Buffer	2	Manufacturer
Inductors	3	MIL-217
MOSFET Driver	4	Manufacturer
Optocoupler	8	Manufacturer
Hex Schmitt-Trigger Inverter	10	Manufacturer
Gates	12	Manufacturer
Connectors	36	MIL-217
Fuses	40	MIL-217
Capacitors	135	MIL-217
Diodes	151	MIL-217
Resistors	210	MIL-217
CPLD	?	?

# Failure probabilities Link and TDU



# Different solutions investigated:

- One path for LBDS local mode
  - + fewer components, less failures
  - single point of failure: logic gate
- Connection to the CIBU
  - + spurious triggers wont cause an asynchronous beam dump
- - more connectors, more synchronous beam dumps?
- Combining the signals to trigger both retrigerring lines at the same time after a dump request
  - + shortens time to dump
  - new failure modes, single points of failures possible, post analysis difficult, silent failures possible

# Summary Link reliability

- Reliability analysis is in early state
- Sum component failure rate: 611+ FIT
- Failure modes effects will be investigated on output signal and other effects on the link
- More critical failures expected than in the TDU
- More asynchronous beam dumps expected
- Impact on machine availability due to possible false synchronous beam dumps

# Thank you!

