

Scientific Computing



GridPP Security


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GridPP 47, March 2022, Durham

Overview

- 1 Landscape
- 2 SVG update
- **3** CSIRT update
- 4 SOC updates
- 5 pDNS SOC
- **6** Next steps/conclusions











Landscape

Landscape

- While broadly landscape is similar to 6 months ago, current events have focused the need for increased cybersecurity readiness
- Important for GridPP that we do this in a well-considered fashion. Make sure you:
 - have your incident response plans to hand
 - have your patching processes up to date
 - understand your <u>authorisation mechanisms</u>










SVG update

SVG: Vulnerability issue handling

- Since Sept 2021
 - 32 Tickets created
 - 12 advisories issued to sites
 - 6 Critical
 - 3 High
 - 2 Moderate
 - 1 not defined
- Some have multiple updates

Should now use https://advisories.egi.eu
after migration from older wiki platform







SVG Evolution: Deployment Experts Group

 Evolution of SVG process to include the DEG continues

Ask for approval from OMB













IRIS/GridPP Security Team update

- No incidents impacting GridPP since Sep 2021
- Vulnerability assessment reports continue to be really useful
 - Considering how we can improve this in the future

 Becoming increasingly clear that we really need a ticket system/collaborative space that can be used across GridPP/IRIS





Training

- Training is a key area of development
 - Thematic CERN School of Computing
 - STFC
 - GridPP
 - IRIS
- Aim for materials that we can reuse for GridPP/other purposes
- A syllabus is important!





EGI CSIRT SSC Update

- A quick SSC update
- There won't be a challenge in March (!)
- We are now looking for alternative dates this year
- Very important that we have the preparation in place to undertake an effective challenge





UKRI STFC perspective

- STFC and UKRI are undergoing a process of a greatly increased priority for cybersecurity
 - What processes do we need?
 - What people do we need?
 - What technology do we need?
- For GridPP
 - The needs of GridPP/WLCG are being placed clearly as part of these plans
 - Make sure that GridPP benefits from additional capabilities
 - STFC SOC/MISP...





Wellbeing / Security Team capabilities

- Security work has a notable risk to act as a stressor for staff
 - Repeated, urgent requests
- Work this year on additional areas the security team can support sites
 - Centralised monitoring services, etc...
 - Leading to resource needs





Pakiti

- EGI CSIRT now uses Pakiti v3
- New capability: sync CVE tagging with downstream pakiti instances, eg...
 - STFC central instance
 - Glasgow
- Are other sites interested in trying this out?
- Aim for something that all sites can/should use












STFC SOC update

- All hardware installed
- Network taps in place and ready for use
 - Start with LHCOPN link first
- Internal networking mostly prepared
- Deployment config in testing
 - Plan to deploy Zeek node very soon
- Thanks to Olivier who worked last 6 months on this
 - Welcome to Liam and James who are joining us!








STFC SOC zeek worker nodes

4 x zeek worker nodes each with:

- 2 x 7H12 AMD (2 x 64 physical cores)
- 1 TB RAM
- 4TB SSD
- 2 x ConnectX-6 100Gb/s cards (4 x 100 Gb/s)
- 1 x Intel 25/10 Gb/s card (4 x 25/10 Gb/s)







Threat intelligence update

- Almost all Threat Intelligence contacts have access to the central R&E MISP instance
 - Small number of well-understood issues
- Plan for additional technical meeting (after Easter) to look more at using this intelligence





Wider SOC update

- SOC WG update at ISGC
- Initial work on Kubernetes SOC (CERN)
- Work on HA SOC services at Nikhef
- Share links to these once they are available









pDNS SOC

Motivation







- Building a SOC is hard
 - Setting up a fully-fledged threat intelligence platform is extremely difficult for most sites
 - Deploying network monitoring + threat intelligence infrastructure is an unrealistic scenario for many sites
 - Only a very small fraction of WLCG sites have a production SOC

We have to lower the entry barrier









- What is passive DNS?
 - Historical DNS records originating from DNS server probes
 - Only DNS record domain associations stored
 - DNS client information is stripped out, preserving privacy

- How can passive DNS data be useful?
 - Detect traffic to well-known malicious websites
 - Used in incident response lifecycle
 - Historical details beyond standard DNS

Current approach







Currently

Direct SOC deployment & threat intelligence support for large/mature institutions

Minimal SOC deployment solution for smaller/less mature institutions









Currently

Direct SOC deployment & threat intelligence support for large/mature institutions

Minimal SOC deployment solution for smaller/less mature institutions



pDNSSOC

Focus on pDNS data

Deploy minimal pDNS probes to institutions

Correlate pDNS-MISP data in central infrastructure


Generate alerts




















STFC...



Central SOC, multiple institutions with pDNS probes

Central SOC + pDNS probe at the same organization

Institution operating the full stack





Next steps / Conclusion

Next steps

- 1. Access central threat intelligence by all GridPP/IRIS sites
- 2. Central logging review at all sites
 - Anticipate that many / all will have this in place







Conclusions

- Cybersecurity readiness is of immediate importance
 - Essential for sites to prepare but
 - Prepare carefully
 - Continuous sprinting is not useful
 - Long term processes are key
- (Inter)national context continues to be vital
 - What steps are your organisations taking?









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