Trinacria Grid Virtual Laboratory





A Secure Storage Service for the gLite Middleware

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Thanks to
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- Data Encryption and Secure Storage
 - Insider Abuse: Problem and Solution
- The Secure Storage Service for the gLite Middleware:
 - Command Line Applications
 - Application Program Interface
 - The Keystore



Data Encryption and Secure Storage

- The Secure Storage project is carried out by UNICO S.R.L. (http://www.unicosrl.it/) in collaboration with INFN Catania in the context of the TriGrid VL Project (http://www.trigrid.it).
- The objective of the project is to create a mechanism to store in a secure way and in an encrypted format data on the grid storage elements.
- Thanks to this solution we want to solve the insider abuse problem.




Insider Abuse: Problem

- A grid user could store sensitive data in a Storage Elements managed by external organizations.
- Storage Elements Administrators could access data (but the data are sensitive!). For this reason data MUST be stored in an encrypted format.
- Data Encryption/Decryption MUST be performed inside user secure environment (for example inside the user's organization).



Insider Abuse: A Solution





A Secure Storage service for the gLite Middleware

 Provides gLite users with suitable and simple tools to store confidential data in storage elements in a transparent and secure way.

The service is composed by the following components:

- Command Line Applications: commands integrated in the gLite User Interface to encrypt/upload and decrypt/ download files.
- Application Program Interface: allows the developer to write programs able to manage confidential data.
- Keystore: a new grid element used to store and retrieve the users' keys.



- We provide a new set of commands on the gLite User Interface:
 - Like lcg-utils commands, but they work on encrypted data.
 - Encryption and decryption process are transparent to the user.
- These commands allow to make the main Data Management operations:
 - Copy data/file on Storage Elements
 - Read data/file from Storage Elements
 - Delete data/file on Storage Elements

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• Main Commands:

- lcg-scr
 - encrypts a file and uploads it on a storage element, registering its Logical File Name in a LFC catalog. Moreover, it stores the key used to encrypt the file in a key repository. An ACL will be associated to each key on the repository. This ACL will contain all users authorized to access the file.
- lcg-scp
 - downloads an encrypted file, gets the key to decrypt the file from the repository, decrypts the file and store it on a local file-system.
 Only authorized users (inserted into an ACL) can access the key necessary to decrypt the file.
- lcg-sdel
 - deletes one or all the replicas of a file. It also deletes the key associated to this file (only if you delete the last replica!)



• lcg-scr:

lcg-scp:

```
[trigrid01@localhost trigrid01] $ lcg-scp lcg-scp Version 1.2
By Giordano Scuderi and Ivan Gurrieri for Unico SRL.

Usage:
lcg-scp [-v | --verbose] [--vo VO] <sourceFile> <destinationFile>
Optional parameters:
-v : Verbose Output
-h : Print this help screen
[trigrid01@localhost trigrid01] $ |
```



lcg-sdel:



Man pages available:

```
LCG-SCR(1)
                                 User Commands
                                                                    LCG-SCR(1)
NAME
       lcg-scr - copy and register a file with encryption
SYNOPSIS
       lcg-scr [ -d dest SE ] [ -h ] [ --help ] [ -l dest file ] [ -v ] [
       --verbose | --vo virtual organization src file
DESCRIPTION
       lcg-scr encrypt a file, copies it to a Storage Element and register it
       in LFC Catalog.
       src file
              specifies the source file name
       dest SE
              specifies the destination Storage Element. It must be the Stor-
              age Element fully qualified hostname.
       dest file
              specifies the destination filename: destination file must be an
              LFN. An entry is added to the LFC Catalog.
```




Command Line Applications details

- Details about the main commands:
 - lcg-scr
 - lcg-scp




Icg-scr: Encryption and Storage

- 1) Create random "Key" and "IV"
- 2) Encrypt "File" using the Key (AES 256 bit) Keystore
- 3) Store "Key", "IV" and $E(File)_{Key}$





lcg-scp: Retrieval and Decryption





Command Line Interface details

Encryption Algorithm:

 The command line applications use AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) with 256 bit key length.

Main development problems:

- GFAL does not allow to create a new file using a LFN as input
 - It is necessary to use lower level API.
- It is not possible to use standard (last version) OpenSSL library
 - Conflicts with OpenSSL version used by Globus.
 - New routines for encryption/decryption and keys generation are been developed.



Secure Storage API

- Secure Storage C API (like lcg API encrypt and decrypt entire file):
 - int lcg_scr (char *src_file, char *dest_file, char *guid, char* lfn, char *vo, char *relative_path, char *conf_file, int insecure, int verbose, char *actual_gid);
 - int lcg_scp (char *src_file, char *dest_file, char *vo, char *conf_file, int insecure, int verbose);
 - int lcg_sdel (char *src_file, int aflag, char *se, char *vo, char *conf_file, int insecure, int verbose, int timeout);
- To use Secure Storage C API add in your code:
 - #include "securestorage.h"



Under Development – API 2

- Development of API like GFAL (encrypt and decrypt block of data):
 - int securestorage_open(char *lfn, int flags, mode_t mode);
 - int securestorage_write (int fd, void *buffer, size_t size);
 - int securestorage_write_final (int fd);
 - int securestorage_read (int fd, void *buffer, size_t size);
 - int securestorage_read_final(int fd, void *buffer);
 - int securestorage_close (int fd);
- Read and Write encrypted data like plain data!
 - open
 - read/write
 - close



The Keystore (1)

 The Keystore is a new grid element used to store and retrieve the users' key in a secure way.

The Keystore:

- is identified by an host X.509 digital certificate;
- all its Grid transactions are mutually authenticated and encrypted as required by the GSI model;
- should be placed in a trusted domain and should be appropriately protected by undesired connections;
- is a black box with a single interface towards the external world. This interface accepts only GSI authenticated connections;



The Keystore (2)

The Keystore:

- the client request is processed only if the client is a member of a enabled users list and/or it belongs to an enabled Virtual Organization;
- if the client want to retrieve a key, the keystore checks if the request is coming from an authorized user inserted on the ACL associated to the request key.



Any questions?

