COMPUTER SECURITY UPDATE


LIVIU VÂLSAN
FOR THE CERN COMPUTER SECURITY TEAM
HEPIX SPRING 2023 ONLINE WORKSHOP

AGENDA


- Ransomware trends
- Recent vulnerabilities
- Cloud security
- Authentication / session security
- Credential leaks / code security testing
- Key takeaways

Ransomware Trends

RANSOMWARE TRENDS IN 2022




RANSOMWARE TRENDS IN 2022




RANSOMWARE TTP


- Start by compromising accounts (either through phishing or by purchasing from initial access brokers)
- Use compromised accounts to connect to VPN
- Connect to VDI infrastructure or internal PCs
- Downloads and deploy a collection of Powershell scripts to move laterally and escalate privileges
- Gain domain admin
- Exfiltrate data
- Deploy ransomware
- Hope to be paid

CERN "DATA LEAK"





CERN "DATA LEAK"




Security Vulnerabilities


MICROSOFT OUTLOOK VULNERABILITY CVE-2023-23397

- Critical vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook on Windows
- Exploited by delivering a specially crafted message to a user
 - Set the PidLidReminderFileParameter property to a path on a threat actor-controlled server via SMB (TCP port 445)
 - Leads to Net-NTLMv2 hash leak to threat actor-controlled servers
 - No user interaction needed
 - Leaked Net-NTLMv2 hash used either to relay for authentication against other systems that support NTLMv2 authentication or to perform offline cracking to extract the clear text password

MICROSOFT OUTLOOK VULNERABILITY CVE-2023-23397




EXPLOITATION



Observed threat actor exploitation of CVE-2023-23397 to gain unauthorized access to Exchange Server and modify mailbox folder permissions for persistent access to the mailbox

MICROSOFT OUTLOOK VULNERABILITY CVE-2023-23397



MITIGATIONS

- Microsoft provided scripts at https://microsoft.github.io/CSS-
 Exchange/Security/CVE-2023-23397/
 - Works both for Exchange Online and Exchange on-prem
 - Extremely slow to complete
 - Expect some false positives
 - Presents you with results at a specific point in time, will not be able to detect future malicious messages unless you re-run it
- Exchange Online and Exchange on-prem (with March 2023 SU) drop the PidLidReminderFileParameter message property when a new message is received.
- Disable outgoing SMB traffic if not already done

CREDENTIALS / SECRETS ACCIDENTAL LEAK

```
) git push
WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.
The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is
SHA256:uNiVztksCsDhcc0u9e8BujQXVUpKZIDTMczCvj3tD2s.
Please contact your system administrator.
Add correct host key in /home/dragon/.ssh/known_hosts to get rid of this message.
Offending RSA key in /home/dragon/.ssh/known_hosts:4
Host key for github.com has changed and you have requested strict checking.
Host key verification failed.
fatal: Could not read from remote repository.
Please make sure you have the correct access rights
and the repository exists.
```

CREDENTIALS / SECRETS ACCIDENTAL LEAK

- https://github.blog/2023-03-23-we-updated-our-rsa-ssh-host-key/
 - At approximately 05:00 UTC on March 24, out of an abundance of caution, we replaced our RSA SSH host key used to secure Git operations for GitHub.com.
 - We discovered that GitHub.com's RSA SSH private key was briefly exposed in a public GitHub repository.
- Most code hosting services include built in protections
 - GitLab Auto Secret Detection
 - GitHub Secret Scanning
- While at it, make use of other security tools, e.g.:
 - GitLab Static Application Security Testing (SAST)
 - GitHub Code Scanning
 - GitHub Dependabot

CLOUD SECURITY

- Configure cloud services with security in mind
- Default settings may not always be the most secure ones
- Disable services that you don't need / use in order to reduce your attack surface
- Always check intended behaviour
 - Documentation may be lacking / may make certain assumptions regarding deployment
 - E.g. a password change on AD on-prem doesn't necessarily trigger a revocation of the refresh token in Azure AD
- Follow the principle of least privilege and ensure that ACLs are properly set

AUTHENTICATION / SESSION DURATION

- MFA is the silver bullet in protecting computing accounts
- But MFA it's not of much use in case of device compromise
 - Stealers are commonly exfiltrating browser cookies and passwords stored in the in-browser password manager
- Mitigations:
 - Configure short lived session durations
 - Cloud services prioritise convenience and usually come with very long sessions, e.g. 90 days
 - A password change may not necessarily invalidate session cookies, you may need to force revocation
 - Detection of unusual logins (impossible travel)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ransomware continues to be a major threat
- Reduce your attack surface as much as possible
 - Prompt deployment of security updates
 - Do not unnecessarily expose internal services to the Internet
 - Configure cloud services with security in mind
 - Configure automatic code scanning and detection of secrets
 - Protect identities as much as possible

