Cybersecurity at CERN and in general

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
Polish Teacher Programme
February 2021

Why?

I am protected...?



I am protected....?



An incident in September 2008



A major data breach at Australian National University



ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

Public detailed <u>report</u> (Oct. 2nd, 2019)

"The initial means of infection was a sophisticated spear phishing email (targeting a senior staff member)

[..]

Information from victim's calendar was used to conduct additional spear phishing attacks later in the campaign"



Which links goes to *eBay*?

http://secure-ebay.com

http://www.ebay.com\cgi-bin\login?ds=1%204324@124.136.10.203/p?ufgs...

http://www.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn

http://scgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?RegisterEnterInfo&siteid=0&co_partnerid=2&usage=0&ru=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com&rafId=0&encRafId=default

Technology is often complex

http://secure-ebay.com http://secure.ebay.com


http://www.ebay.com\cgi-bin\login?ds=1%204324@124.136.10.203/p?ufgs...

http://www.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn

eba<u>y</u>.com


http://scgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?RegisterEnterInfo&siteid=0&co_partnerid=2&usage=0&ru=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com&rafId=0&encRafId=default


What issues do we deal with at CERN?



<sc0rp> nice


<sc0rp> haha











CERN Bulletin

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Issue No. 20-21/2014 - Monday 12 May 2014 No printable version available - Subscribe: III

Polarisation confirmed Celebrating with our

neighbours LS1 Report: PS Booster prepares for beam

From the drawing board to the test bench

Data defenders

The "Karma Level Sexy Bottom" awards are back at CERN

Winter Atomiades 2014: CERN skiers win 31 medals!

BEHIND THE SCENES OF GS: NOTHING LEFT TO CHANCE

The AS (Alarm Systems) Section in the GS-ASE Group is, as its name suggests, in charge of the various alarm systems spread across CERN's many sites. Its mission? To install, manage and maintain more than 26,000 alarms of all types located both above ground and in the tunnels.



Behind the scenes of GS Dans les coulisses de GS

Detection

Among these systems, the best known are of course the heat and/or smoke detectors, which quickly raise the alarm in the event of a fire. CERN has 8500 of

these devices in total. In combination with these, evacuation alarms are also found all over the which is then connected to a transmission unit. From here, the information - for example, which type of alarm has been activated in which building - is transmitted to the Fire Brigade's Safety Control Room (SCR) and to the CERN Control Centre (CCC). "The information is transferred via two channels," explains Henrik Nissen. "The first channel is a basic electrical (wire) network which, by its very nature, ensures a very high level of reliability. The second channel is a computer network which, although it allows more precise information to be transferred, is not as reliable as the first." All of the alarms essential for the safety of people and equipment (level 3 alarms), as well as vital technical alarms (for cryogenics, for example) always use both channels. This redundancy ensures that the information is transmitted whatever happens.

On the maintenance side, each of the 11,000 level 3 alarms is tested every year. This is a mammoth task which requires the expertise of seven people working full time in close cooperation with CERN's Fire Brigade.




Test platform for detecting gas (including ODH). The bottles at the bottom of the image contain different types of gas used for tests.




The Fire Brigade's Safety Control Room, which receives level 3 alarms.

Exposed passwords



CERN data stolen and sold on the Dark Web



Overall Rank		Item	Percentage		2010 Price Ranges		
2010	2009		2010	2009			
1	1	Credit card information	22%	19%	\$0.07-\$100		
2	2	Bank account credentials	16%	19%	\$10-\$900		
3	3	Email accounts	10%	7%	\$1-\$18		
4	13	Attack tools	7%	2%	\$5-\$650		
5	4	Email addresses	5%	7%	\$1/MB-\$20/MB		
6	7	Credit card dumps	5%	5%	\$0.50-\$120		
7	6	Full identities	5%	5%	\$0.50-\$20		
8	14	Scam hosting	4%	2%	\$10-\$150		
9	5	Shell scripts	4%	6%	\$2-\$7		
10	9	Cash-out services	3%	4%	\$200-\$500 or 50%-70% of total value		

Item	Bulk Prices Observed	Unit Price		
Credit card information	10 credit cards for \$17	\$1.70		
	100 credit cards for \$100	\$1.00		
	1000 credit cards for \$300	\$0.30		
	750 credit cards for \$50	\$0.07		
Credit card dumps	101 dumps for \$50	\$0.50		
Full identities	30 full identities for \$20	\$0.67		
	100 full identities for \$50	\$0.50		

http://securityresponse.symantec.com/en/ca/threatreport/topic.jsp?id=fraud_activit y_trends&aid=underground_economy_servers

Number	Туре	Name	Country	City	Phone	Mail	DOB	Price	Select
372845	AMEX	Chartec H.D	us	Con Marris	Y	N	Y	40\$	0
528713	Harri Carl	Christopher B.	us	Drouge 5.	Y	N	Y	40\$	(-)
64545C	DISCOVER	E MC NoTe	us	-	Y	N	Y	40\$	0
371527	AMEX	2 Bearing	us	(0.600)	Y	N	Υ	40\$	
64688C	DISCOVER	Date saling	us	ī .	Y	N	Y	40\$	
65192C	DISCOVER	District.	us	100.00075	Y	N	Y	40\$	
645857	DISCOVER	6 Septem	us	96 PHI	Y	N	Y	40\$	
371198	AMEX	E Maltingor	us	Federal Mil. 87000	Y	N	Y	40\$	
534248		Senton M.	us	Salt and the Salt	Y	Y	Y	40\$	
371726	AMEX	Greg 6	us		Y	N	Y	40\$	0
537161		resign in	us	Drouge, S.	Y	N	Y	40\$	
447630	VISA		IIS	-	·	N	_	405	

PLASTIQUE SHOP

	HECKER BALANCE CHECKER Support						\$0.00 💳 my cards 🖽					ogout	
				Sort	2000						Sort		
NAME	TYPE	NUMBER	CV2	EXP (Co. Addr1	City	State		ZIP	Country	\$		
Vernon *****	Visa	443460********	***	11/2013	** Charles Street	Kew	VIC	Victoria	****	Australia	6\$ show	+0.4\$ check	
willie *****	VISA	413821********	***	09/2012	***** old columbia pike #***	silver spring	MD		****	United States	2\$ show	+0.4\$ check	
Tony ****	AMEX	377232********	****	10/2015	**** Rock Meadow Cir	High Point	NC		****	United States	6\$ show	+0.4\$ check	
Beth *****	VISA	479370********	***	02/2015	*** N East St	Carlisle	PA		****	United States	3\$ show	+0.4\$ check	
LB *****	Visa	423954********	***	10/2013	** Fairlie Street	Mount Gambier	SA	South Australia	***	Australia	6\$ show	+0.4\$	

Cybercriminals against you and me

How cyber-criminals make money?



e-banking trojans



ransomware



phishing online accounts



extortion and other scams



identity theft




cryptocurrency mining¹⁸

E-mail is the main attack vector



E-mail is the main attack vector



It's very (too) easy and cheap to send e-mails



It's trivial to fake "From" field

Malicious e-mails contain infected attachments and links to malicious websites







Let's see some of criminals' tactics

Example 1

How to trick a victim

(without even infecting their computer)

"We infected your computer and video-recorded you – pay us, or we publish the videos"

(*) In reality, the computer is not infected, and there is no recording

From: robert. @cern.ch <robert @cern.ch>

Sent: 02 January 2019 06:13

To: accent.ch

Subject: robert. @cern.ch was under attack! Change your access data!

Hello!

As you may have noticed, I sent you an email from your account. This means that I have full access to your account.

Trick 1: send e-mail "from" victim

From: King Kornai < <u>@hotmail.com</u>>

Sent: 30 July 2018 17:29

To: Vincent vincent @cern.ch

Subject:

It is just so unfortunate. I am aware is your password. Moreover, I know your secret and I have evidence of your secret. You do not know me and no one hired me to check out you.

Trick 2: use victim's leaked password

I made a video showing you With one click of the mouse, I can send this video to all your emails and contacts on social networks. I can also post access to all your e-mail

correspondence and messengers that you use.

If you want to prevent this, transfer the amount of \$500 to my bitcoin address (if you do not know how to do this, write to Google: "Buy Bitcoin").

My bitcoin address (BTC Wallet) is: 1BPUUNghhuwQjDDvFd3TnJz2ato5dyDLr8

Demand

Example 2

How to steal victim's password and take over their online account

Standard phishing

Mail Delivery System < @cern.ch>
 Message Delivery Status Notification (Failure)
 To: @cern.ch

24 July 2019 at 08:36



Your messages are now returning a failure delivery because your email has not been verified, you are required to confirm your email account to restore normal email delivery.

This helps us stop automated programs from sending you spam.

Malicious link

Legitimate links

This is a mandatory servic

@cern.ch.


This message was seem an unmonitored e-mail address. Please do not reply to this message.


Privacy | Legal


http://click.email.microsoftonline.com/? qs=d306d1daab078722535d35b5ecac1aba5f08 f80731a1b3192b6b6d6198c35cc9d4370eaec2b d374e44641c036f61e2c5


Example 3


How to infect victim's computer, and steal their passwords











... half a year later ...



Let me know when you are available. There is something I need you to do. I am going into a meeting now with limited phone calls, so just reply my email.

Giovanni

Sent from my iPad

... and another 4 months later

I am planning a surprise for some of the staffs with gifts. I need you to get a purchase done, I'm looking forward to surprise some of the staffs with gift cards,I count on you to keep this as a surprise pending when they received it,I need 10 pieces of Amazon \$100 face value each gift cards. I need you to get the physical card, then you scratch the card take a picture of the cards pin,attach and email it to me. How soon can you get this done?

I will Reimburse you back later....

Regards Giovanni

Bonus

Advanced techniques

Advanced techniques used by criminals

- Spear phishing: malicious mails targeted at specific individuals,
 - crafted using information gathered earlier: project names, colleagues names, hierarchy, who is on holidays etc.
 - sent "from" a colleagues, a business partner, even the boss
- Using "contacts" lists: An attacker compromises mailbox of a victim, and send malicious e-mails "from" the victim to their contacts
- Joining existing conversation: An attacker compromises mailbox of a victim, and replies to existing conversations, adding a malicious attachment

So how can I defend myself?

Defense – golden rules

Rule 1: do not trust email

- From field can be faked anyone can send an mail as president@whitehouse.gov
- Don't follow links from suspicious e-mails
 - if in doubt, just type the URL in the browser
- Don't open unexpected attachments, don't enable macros

Rule 2: do not fall for scams and phishing attacks

- No, you haven't won or inherited a fortune, or been offered a great deal
- No, your bank / PayPal / webmail doesn't ask you to "confirm" your account
- No, your CEO/boss doesn't secretly ask you to make a "special" payment/transfer
- No, technical support doesn't call or e-mail you to help you

Defense – golden rules

Rule 3: be careful when browsing the web

- Think before you click
- Make sure you really are on the correct website
- Don't install any untrusted software downloaded from the web

Rule 4: protect your computer

- Keep your operating system (Windows, Mac OS etc.) updated
- Keep your software updated (especially the browser and its plugins/extensions)
- Use an anti-virus, keep it updated

Rule 5: protect your passwords and online accounts

- Use strong passwords, and use password managers
- Don't reuse password (same password on different websites)
- Enable strong authentication (multi-factor) whenever possible

Privacy and security risks

What about social media?

"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog"



By The New Yorker, Fair use,

Do not trust blindly people that you only met online

We all use these services...





facebook



Snapchat

Instagram





WhatsApp

Social media + cloud services: basic rules

- What you post/share privately may become public
- Once posted/shared, it will stay forever, even if you "delete"
- Think before you upload, post, share or comment online:
 - Am I giving up my privacy?
 - Could I be ashamed of it later?
 - Would I like my parents or employer to see it?
- Do not take inappropriate or intimate pictures and videos

We all use these services... but who pays for them?





facebook



Snapchat

Instagram





WhatsApp

We all use these services... but who pays for them?





facebook

If you are not paying, then **you** are the product

Snapchat



WhatsApp

Data is knowledge, data is power

After some time, these services know you better than your family, better than your friends, sometimes even better than you know yourself

your plans

your interests

your worries

how you look like

where you have been, and with whom

what you have been doing

your health

Conclusions

Final words

Be aware of the risks, so that you don't become a victim

- Protect
 - your accounts (social accounts, Google/Apple, email etc.)
 - your computer, smartphone, tablet
 - your data (pictures, documents)
 - your privacy (who you are)
- Think before you click

