



Federated Identity in the Earth Science Domain: the Earth System Grid Federation, EGI-Inspire and GENESI-DEC

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
Overview

- Background and drivers for federated access control in the Earth Science domain
- the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF)
 - A distributed infrastructure for the discover, access and analysis of Earth science data
 - CMIP5 as a motivator for the development
- Inter-federation trust
 - EGI-Inspire EU FP7 Project
 - ESGF ↔ EGI
 - GENESI-DEC ↔ EGI





Data Challenge for the Earth Science Community




- Environmental scientists use numerous sources of data
- The ability to combine and compare **diverse** datasets is critical to furthering our understanding of the Earth system.
- *but* the integration of such datasets can be difficult, largely due to inherent technical complexities.
- Increasing data volumes necessitate distributed infrastructures
- **Organisational domains, trust, licensing, identity management**
- As a result, many valuable environmental datasets are underused.



CMIP5 and the Earth System Grid

- Size of prospective archive + distribution challenge => centralised approach will not work
- Federated archive => federated security
- High profile and real deadlines mean a solution *must* work



ESGF Requirements and Challenges


- Requirements
 - Low level of assurance required for CMIP5 access
 - PCMDI (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) to administer registration of access rights
 - Audit access
 - Register users to keep them up-to-date with changes to data and services
 - Protect finite resources at service providers (compute, bandwidth ...)
- How to apply access control in a heterogeneous environment of data access services and tools in this domain?
 - OPeNDAP, Live Access Server/Ferret, OGC web services, GridFTP, CDAT, Matlab, IDL, Ferret ...
- Multiple technologies in the field of access control and security
 - Grid, Shibboleth, SAML, OpenID, OAuth, Kerberos ...



OPeNDAP



OGC[®]
Making Location Count




saml.org




MyProxy
Credential Management Service



A Solution in Modular Design Principles



- Divide and Conquer approach applying SOA, AOP, REST and NetCDF



- REST based access policy: Restrict Policy to properties of the interface: URI, HTTP Action – GET, POST etc.

Slicing up the Client Side:

- Simple interface suited to Wget and Curl
- Rich clients: Security integrated at a base level in the client software stack: into NetCDF client libraries

Organisational Boundaries: SOA (Service Oriented Architecture):


- Defined interfaces with web services with *profiled* specs : OpenID, SAML, PKI => interoperability

Slicing up the Server Side: AOP – Aspect Oriented Programming:


- Maintain a separation of concerns between **access control functionality** and **application** to be protected
- A standard interface between the two enables access control middleware to be configured to protect any app which supports that interface




Federated Security Architecture



OpenID



HTTP(S)



SAML/SOAP




- Single sign on with OpenID and MyProxy
 - Dual authentication mechanisms link to the same credentials
- Applications *simultaneously* support the dual authentication methods
 - The server-side access control layer is agnostic to the authentication approach employed by the client
 - The underlying application is kept independent
 - Access control filters can be assembled in different configurations to suit different application scenarios
- Attribute propagation:
 - Pull-based model with SAML Attribute Services
 - Push-based also supported with OpenID AX (Attribute Exchange) and embedding of SAML assertions in user certificates
- Authorisation:
 - Authorisation Service with SAML interface
 - Can accept queries from a range of PEPs fronting services – GridFTP, OPeNDAP
 - XACML Policy engine used in Python implementation at the BADC/CEDA
- Service Discovery with Yadis protocol: XRDS over HTTP(S)
 - Introspect IdP services from a user's OpenID URI
 - Discover Attribute Service and MyProxy server endpoints from a user's OpenID



Multiple Authentication Methods

sd OPeNDAP SSL Authentication





Successes

- A standard solution for securing OPeNDAP and other HTTP-based services
 - Access for simple HTTP clients: **Wget/Curl**
 - Integrated into new **NetCDF**
 - filters down to all the dependent packages: CDAT, Ferret ...
 - Access for Grid based infrastructure: SSL-based authentication
 - Delegation capability for securing workflows
- Interface Control Document
 - Python and Java implementations
- Highly configurable access control middleware
 - Easy to support multiple security paradigms e.g. OpenID and SSL based
- Security is built on trust – relationships between organisations
 - The importance of a strong common goal in CMIP5
 - The close collaboration required has in turn fostered more partnerships
 - ESGF Open Source development effort






Issues

- Security is inherently complex
 - PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), a fundamental building block to anchor trust but difficult to manage and administer
- Does the level of security required justify effort needed?
 - Need to support Levels of Assurance for authentication mechanisms
- Federation management, SLAs must not be overlooked
- Remember who are the stakeholders
 - Users: do they understand Single sign-on?!
 - Deployers: can organisations easily deploy?
 - **Developers:** A need to pass on knowledge and expertise



ESGF Integration with EGI

- Objective: enable access for Grid services to CMIP5 Data through ESGF OPeNDAP services
- How to solve trust between grids: *exchange of PKI trust roots or credential translation?*
- Exchange of trust roots
 - ESGF credentials trusted in EGI
 - Make ESGF MyProxy Online CAs subordinate to IGTF trust roots
 - Add respective EGI trust roots to ESGF infrastructure
 - Proxy certificate support
 - Certificate lifetime and CRLs
 - OpenID in X.509 Subject Name
- Credential translation
 - Convert from ESGF to EGI certificate
 - Removes need for EGI to hold ESGF trust roots
 - Preserves separation between domains
 - But, reverse mapping needed EGI -> ESGF?
 - ESGF certificates hold a SAML assertion, if signed this could be used as the authentication credential and passed in different certificate 'containers'



GENESI-DEC

- Goal: harmonisation of satellite data access
 - FP7 project successor to GENESI-DR
 - Completes in 2012
 - Portal and search services to interface with other applications
 - Standards work with OGC (Open Geospatial Consortium) and OpenSearch
 - Uses Grid-based security model – PKI/Proxy certificates
- Handling of VOs in federated infrastructures
- Cloud IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) and OGC WPS (Web Processing Services)
- More developments underway with security model ...





Future and Related Work

- OAuth for delegation
 - MashMyData Project
 - Proxy Certificate based Delegation in workflow with WPS and OPeNDAP services
 - ExArch Project
 - G8 funded collaboration, US, Canadian and European partners
 - WPS: keep the processing near the data
- IS-ENES (InfraStructure for the European Network for the Earth System Modelling) EU FP7
 - Delegation use case is important e.g. Portal ↔ WMS client ↔ WMS access control
- ISIC (International Space Innovation Centre), RAL
 - Create critical mass for space-related activities
 - Earth observation hub
 - ESA also now located at RAL
- Shibboleth support?





Any Questions?

- More information on ESGF security:
 - ESGF Security paper for GCA2011, Las Vegas, July
 - <http://philipkershaw.blogspot.com/>

