

RCS-IT Technical Committee: Registry

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Registry Discussion

Last rounds after a request to IT (Sep 22nd 2023) and ATLAS S&C workshop (Feb)

CERN offers an officially supported central registry for OCI artifacts, including container images, helm charts, machine learning models and many others. The service is backed by [Project Harbor](#), a CNCF Graduated Project. Service and documentation are available at:

<https://registry.cern.ch>

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/registry/>

Core Features

The CERN registry supports all the standard functionality expected by a docker image registry but adds a significant number of relevant features.

The most relevant include:

- [per project quota](#) control and enforcement, and policy support for [tag retention and immutability](#).
- support for [multi-arch images](#) sharing the same tag.
- support for [singularity images](#).
- [proxy \(pull-through\) caches](#) allowing a local and efficient cache for upstream registries such as dockerhub, quay.io, gcr.io, ghcr.io, among others.
- automated replication with other OCI registries.
- signing and traceability of artifacts, with upcoming Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs).
- automated vulnerability scanning and CVE allowlists.

Integrations

The service offers a number of integrations with other CERN services.

- [Integration with the GitLab CI](#) is available for all GitLab projects via an official CI job. Support exists for building and deploying both container images and helm charts, with advanced features including builds for multiple architectures and accelerated images for lazy pulling.
- Unpacked CVMFS for selected projects.
- Custom integrations can be implemented via [Harbor webhooks](#), with event notifications for artifacts, vulnerability scans, project quotas and replication.

Technical Network

An additional (experimental) instance of the CERN registry exists inside the technical network. Its main purpose is to serve workloads from the CERN Accelerator Sector. While fully isolated from the GPN instance, automated artifact replication among instances is possible for individual projects - on request.

Availability

The service is available to all CERN internal and external users, with no restrictions or limitations. Support is available via the [Kubernetes Service](#) service element.

project All ▾

Harbor Health

Info

Harbor Health



Projects

292

Repos

2954

Public Projects

190

Public Repos

2610

Private Projects

102

Private Repos

344


Quota Overcommit

1.64

S3 Quota Usage (rough estimate)




Quota Usage



ci4fpga
docker.io
acc


	Last	Max	Min
ci4fpga	932 GiB	1.54 TiB	886 GiB
docker.io	1.44 TiB	1.46 TiB	1.43 TiB
acc	823 GiB	823 GiB	763 GiB

Artifact Pulled



	min	max	avg
acc	0	0.119	0.00338
acctesting	0	0.0111	0.000220
atlas	0	0.800	0.00262

Total Projects / Repositories




Total projects Total repositories

Total Artifacts



Total artifacts

Project Quota Usage



Core Metrics (3 panels)

JobService Metrics (8 panels)

Registry Metric (6 panels)

Project Overview

Harbor is a CNCF Graduated project

Backed by Distribution (the Docker Registry) with many added things

Project Quotas

OCI Artifact Support

Vulnerability Scanning (trivy, ...), Artifact Signing (sigstore, ...), SBOMs

Proxy Caches and Automated Replication

Non Blocking Garbage Collection

Tag Immutability and Retention Policies

Graduation Stage

To graduate from sandbox or incubating status, or for a new project to join as a graduated project, a project must meet the incubating stage criteria plus:

- Have committers from at least two organizations.
- Have achieved and maintained a Core Infrastructure Initiative [Best Practices Badge](#).
- Have completed an independent and third party security audit with results published of similar scope and quality as the following example (including critical vulnerabilities addressed): <https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy#security-audit> and all critical vulnerabilities need to be addressed before graduation.
- Explicitly define a project governance and committer process. The committer process should cover the full committer lifecycle including onboarding and offboarding or emeritus criteria. This preferably is laid out in a GOVERNANCE.md file and references an OWNERS.md file showing the current and emeritus committers.
- Explicitly define the criteria, process and offboarding or emeritus conditions for project maintainers; or those who may interact with the CNCF on behalf of the project. The list of maintainers should be preferably be stored in a MAINTAINERS.md file and audited at a minimum of an annual cadence.
- Have a public list of project adopters for at least the primary repo (e.g., ADOPTERS.md or logos on the project website). For a specification, have a list of adopters for the implementation(s) of the spec.
- Receive a supermajority vote from the TOC to move to graduation stage. Projects can attempt to move directly from sandbox to graduation, if they can demonstrate sufficient maturity. Projects can remain in an incubating state indefinitely, but they are normally expected to graduate within two years.

Quotas and Tag Handling

Strict quota handling for storage control with automated **garbage collection**

Advanced tag policies: retention and immutability

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/registry/best-practices/>

The screenshot shows a configuration panel for 'TAG RETENTION' with two tabs: 'TAG RETENTION' (active) and 'TAG IMMUTABILITY'. Below the tabs, it indicates 'Retention rules 3/15'. Three retention rules are listed, each with a green checkmark icon and an 'ACTION' label with a dropdown arrow.

Action	Policy
ACTION ▾	For the repositories matching **, retain the most recently pushed 10 artifacts with tags matching **
ACTION ▾	For the repositories matching **, retain the artifacts pushed within the last 365 days with tags matching ** with untagged
ACTION ▾	For the repositories matching **, retain the artifacts pulled within the last 1826 days with tags matching ** with untagged




Multiple Architectures

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/registry/quickstart/#multi-arch>

Image metadata manifest pointing to multiple artifacts

Similar mechanism for signatures and SBOMs

Ongoing work to support further optimization (CPU capabilities, ...)



Continuous Integration with GitLab

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/registry/gitlab/>


REGISTRY_USER	robot account, usually at group level
REGISTRY_PASSWORD	robot account, usually at group level
REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH	registry.cern.ch/myrepo/myimage:mytag
PUSH_IMAGE	true/false
ACCELERATED_IMAGE	true/false
PLATFORMS	linux/amd64,linux/arm64
COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY	base64 encoded, usually at group level

Proxy Caches

Pull-through cache for other registries

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/registry/quickstart/#pull-through-caches>

Useful to go around rate limiting, enforced CVE/Vulnerability checks



Automated Replication

Push to target or pull from source

Triggered manually, scheduled or event based

In use for integration with TN, public clouds, sync with upstream registries





Image Lazy Pulling

<https://kubernetes.docs.cern.ch/docs/runtime/lazypulling/>

File based (not layer) pull at runtime, on request



atlas/athena (~17GB)

mode	pulling time	RAM	ingress on node	execution time
native	3m37s	257MB	5.84GB	7m15s
esgz	16s	1360MB	0.84GB	8m14s

Security Enhancements

Automated vulnerability scans, image signing, SBOM generation (preview)

Policy enforcement for image access, CVE severity, allowlists, ...

Deployment security

- Cosign
Allow only verified images to be deployed.
- Prevent vulnerable images from running.
Prevent images with vulnerability severity of **Critical** and above from being deployed.

Vulnerability scanning

- Automatically scan images on push
Automatically scan images when they are pushed to the project registry.

CVE allowlist

Project allowlist allows vulnerabilities in this list to be ignored in this project when pushing and pulling images. You can either use the default allowlist configured at the system level or click on 'Project allowlist' to create a new allowlist. Add individual CVE IDs before clicking 'COPY FROM SYSTEM' to add system allowlist as well.

System allowlist Project allowlist

Overview

▼ Overview

architecture	amd64
author	
created	8/10/20, 8:19 PM
os	linux

Additions

Vulnerabilities Build History

SCAN

Vulnerability	Severity	Package	Current version	Fixed in version
> CVE-2020-14352 ⓘ	High	librepo	1.11.0-2.el8	1.11.0-3.el8_2
> CVE-2019-5827 ⓘ	High	sqlite-libs	3.26.0-6.el8	
> CVE-2020-8819 ⓘ	Medium	bind-export-libs	32.9.11.13-5.el8_2	32.9.11.20-5.el8
> CVE-2020-8622 ⓘ	Medium	bind-export-libs	32.9.11.13-5.el8_2	32.9.11.20-5.el8
> CVE-2020-8623 ⓘ	Medium	bind-export-libs	32.9.11.13-5.el8_2	32.9.11.20-5.el8
> CVE-2020-8624 ⓘ	Medium	bind-export-libs	32.9.11.13-5.el8_2	32.9.11.20-5.el8
> CVE-2018-1000876 ⓘ	Medium	binutils	2.30-73.el8	
> CVE-2018-20623 ⓘ	Medium	binutils	2.30-73.el8	
> CVE-2018-20621 ⓘ	Medium	binutils	2.30-73.el8	


Integration Points

Available webhooks for multiple events

Artifact PUSH, PULL, DELETE,

Image scan COMPLETED, FAILED

Project Quota EXCEED



Example usage: unpacked CVMFS, ATS workflows

Ongoing Work

Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery

Instance in the PDC, S3 bucket backup in 2nd Network Hub, Public Cloud

Improved SBOM integrations

Fully supported but recent work in the upstream project for visualization

Provenance and runtime checks


Zero vulnerabilities at pull time, but days later? And who's using it?

Harbor improvements: job dashboard, easier robot accounts, CloudEvents support, ...

Other Work

Ongoing thread with OSG for integration with [Soteria](#)

In a similar way to the GPN-TN automated replication described before



Questions?