



WLCG Tokens Update

18th FIM4R Workshop
30th January 2024

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
On behalf of the

WLCG Authorisation Working Group



Token Based AAI for WLCG

- VO Scoped Token issuers, which can:
 - Support multiple authentication mechanisms
 - Currently supporting CERN SSO or X.509
 - Provide users with a persistent VO-Scoped identity
 - Expose identity information, attributes and capabilities to services via JWT tokens and standard OAuth & OpenID Connect protocols
 - Integrate with existing VOMS-aware services
 - Support both Web and non-Web access, delegation, and token renewal
- WLCG uses **INDIGO IAM** as its token issuer



Status

- ATLAS and CMS moved to HTCondor 10 in Summer 2023, and support tokens from respective IAM instances
- ALICE
 - Token deployment campaign done, for HTCondor CE sites only
 - VOMS proxies will continue being used with ARC CEs for now
 - And with HTCondor CEs *in addition*, because APEL currently expects that
 - ALICE jobs do not need that proxy anymore
- LHCb
 - Token deployment campaign mostly done, for HTCondor CE sites only
- RUCIO token support in place for upcoming data challenge, with sufficient integration with FTS/gfal
 - RUCIO interaction non-standard at current, using the client credentials flow to request a token with a specific scope and audience





Status

- First HTCondor CE token [campaign](#) on EGI done
 - HTCondor CE v5 + condor-9.0.x
- Second EGI Campaign was launched Nov 3 and updated Nov 17
 - HTCondor CE v5 + condor **v9.0.20**
 - A stepping stone towards next phase
- Third EGI campaign to be launched in the spring of this year
 - HTCondor CE \geq **v23** with condor \geq **v23**



WLCG Token Infrastructure Design

Follows the AARC Blueprint: <https://aarc-community.org/architecture/> but not all AEGIS recommendations




WLCG Token Infrastructure Design

CERN SSO releases:

- Name,
- Email,
- CERN Person ID (indicates HR has performed ID check),
- CERN Kerberos Principal
- ...


Currently LHC experiment members can have CERN accounts, and so all access is via CERN SSO or Linked X.509, but aim is to work towards removing this need in future



WLCG Token Infrastructure Design

Outbound communication of user information to end services, which can be used to establish authorization.

VOMS proxies can still be used for as long as they are needed.



Current Focus

- Required updates to the WLCG Common JWT Profiles
 - Discussion and experience since the v1.0 release, Sept 2019, means there are a number of areas where re-writing and updating is required.
 - WLCG intends to collaborate closely with the “Grand Unified Token Profile” work, to best facilitate interoperability with other issuers.

- Operational Experience to be gained from DC24
 - Token authorised data transfers should take part during DC24 using production infrastructure components
 - This will provide vital operational expertise and help identify areas of improvement

AuthZ WG selected discussion topics

- How to determine the VO for various kinds of tokens?
 - Needed e.g. by APEL for accounting
 - Differences between how things are defined in the WLCG profile vs other issues, such as EGI Check-In
- Use of `scope` vs. `wlcg.groups`
 - Groups are primarily foreseen to provide *context* information, but may also be used for AuthZ decisions by services that have been configured to use groups *instead of* capabilities, as agreed between a VO and those services
 - WLCG token profile to be updated accordingly
- Token rates and lifetimes
 - Avoid IAM being the bottleneck
 - High rates vs. transparent service downtimes
 - Mitigate through longer lifetimes and/or less fine-grained scopes
 - Impacts IAM, FTS, Rucio, DIRAC
 - Different treatments of read / create vs. modify (delete)
 - Today no such distinctions with VOMS proxies!
 - We hence do not need a perfect system right from the start

We will gain operational experience in **DC24** (Feb 12-23)



Token Trust and *Traceability* (TTT) WG

- Instantiated in August, intended to fill a role similar to that of the previous Traceability and Isolation WG.
 - And drawing from the findings of that group.
 - Working alongside members of the AuthZ WG, meetings within the [Security Group](#) in Indico.
- Meeting approximately once a month, no regular slot yet.
- Aiming to bring together collaborators from a range of communities
 - [WLCG](#), [EGI](#), [DUNE](#), [SKA](#), others
- Intended to cover the Token side of the AuthZ coin - Federated Identity provision is important but mostly out of scope.
 - As is the user-side experience.
- Goal is to produce tangible outputs
 - [Policy: Consider what is Best Practice. Risk Identification and Analysis. Building Trust in Tokens.](#)
 - [Documentation: Write down the above. And also produce “How-Tos”, guides and manuals.](#)
 - E.g. “Understanding Token Flows for Admins”, “Token Job Tracing”, “Incident Response and Forensics in a Token-based environment.”
- Want to know more? Contact [Matt Doidge m.doidge@lancaster.ac.uk](mailto:m.doidge@lancaster.ac.uk)
 - Or look up the [CERN e-group token-trust-and-traceability-wg](#)



Conclusions and outlook

- The main token *development*, *deployment* and *testing* objectives at this time are about:
 - Computing – HTCondor CE versions that no longer support **GSI**
 - Data transfers – preparations for **DC24**
- Work is underway to resolve issues with the existing WLCG token profile
 - As well as participation in the GUT Profile activity
- The *trust* and *traceability* of token workflows are to be served by various kinds of documentation to be produced by the **TTT** WG

