

Web-based graphics in ROOT

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JavaScript ROOT

TWebCanvas

Batch image production

Security aspects



- Data reading from ROOT files
- Interactive drawings and image production
- Powerful async API

- Works in all modern browsers
- Can be used in [node.js](#)
- Implements UI for *THttpServer*
- Used in jupyter and doxygen

<https://root.cern/js/>



JavaScript ROOT

JSROOT [7.7.4](#)

Read

User guide

Reference API

Change log

THttpServer

Test

Examples

Demos

Use

7.7.4 (latest)

dev (expert)

7.6.1 (old)

Download

7.7.4

dev

all


Visit

github.com

root.cern/js/

jsroot.gsi.de

npmjs.com/jsroot/





- ▶ In development since 2012
- ▶ Undergo several redesigns
 - evolves with JavaScript language
- ▶ now ES6 modules and **Promise**-based API
 - recent version 7.7.4



- ▶ Offline displays
 - ROOT files on http server
 - Simple URL syntax

- ▶ Online display
 - Data provider like *THttpServer*
 - Live drawing and updates

- ▶ In the ROOT session
 - `root --web=chrome hsimple.C`



Web graphics in ROOT

No need to change existing user code

Support interactive and batch modes

Produced images very close to ROOT graphics

Just add `--web=<type>` argument when running ROOT
or `gROOT->SetWebDisplay("chrome")`

Implemented in *TWebCanvas* - web-based *TCanvasImp*



Data provider for JSROOT client







- prepare data like stacks or axes histogram
- handle custom painters
- control primitives list
- create JSON

Server-side interactivity

- preserve select zooming
- provide and execute context menu commands
- extra UIs like GED or FitPanel



ROOT tutorials with web graphics






TWebCanvas exclusive features

- ❖ Two fully interactive scales on the same pad
- ❖ Extra log scales - \ln , \log_2 , \log_N
- ❖ Better horizontal axes support
- ❖ “in-frame” drawings of basic primitives
- ❖ `#url[link]{label}` latex syntax support
- ❖ Simple integration of custom fonts


https://root.cern/doc/master/group_tutorial_webcanv.html



Two scales







Two graphs sharing same Y scale, but using different X scales






Different logarithmic scales





Example of haxis with overlaid histograms





Exactly same user code:

```
c1->SaveAs("image.png")
```

```
c1->SaveAs("image.pdf")
```

Using headless browser mode:

Chrome/Firefox/Edge* browsers

Linux/MacOS/Windows

~1s per browser invocation



Supported formats:

- ▶ SVG - vector graphics, core format
- ▶ PDF - using [svg2pdf.js](#) library
- ▶ PNG, JPEG, WEBP - raster graphics

Not supported: GIF, PS



Testing ROOT graphics functionality and performance

creating 50 canvases and 250 images

verify size of created files

Testing PS, PDF, PNG, JPEG, C formats

using SVG instead of PS for web case

Without optimization run ~5 minutes in web mode



Image production performance

Solution: create several images per browser invocation

1. *TCanvas::SaveAll()*

- a. Works for classical and web graphics
- b. Let creates multi-page PDF

2. *TWebCanvas::BatchImageMode(100)*

- a. Next 100 operations buffered in internal queue
- b. All image files created together with single browser call

stressGraphics `–web=chrome` runs in ~40 - 60 s



- stressGraphics
 - classical and web mode
 - testing file sizes
- SVG production with classical graphics
 - testing content
- SVG production with JSROOT in [node.js](#)
 - testing content

Last two points - great work of Adrian Duesselberg



Potential risks:

unauthorized access

man in the middle attack - data packets manipulation



HMAC-based authentication

To ensure web widgets security:

- ▶ binding http server to loopback address
 - ▶ require connection key plus secret session key
 - ▶ HMAC for authentication of each message
 - ▶ temporary HTML files to start web widgets
-
- + excludes unauthorized access to widgets
 - + no message between server and client can be manipulated
 - + ensures integrity of the communication but not confidentiality



Solution for public nodes like Ixplus

- ▶ Run http server bound to unix socket
- ▶ Tunnel socket to local http port
- ▶ Run web browser on user local node

Implemented as **rootssh** utility



- ▶ Ready to use web-based graphics in ROOT
- ▶ Covers interactive and batch use-cases
- ▶ Integrated into CI





Why need such special class?

- Draw() and Paint() are not strictly separated in ROOT
- Paint() may change list primitives in the pad
 - like histogram palette or stats box
- changing object attributes may trigger painting
 - see THStack::GetXaxis() implementation

Require special instance for arbitration of such conflicts



Image production in headless browser

Steps to produce image:


1. Create JSON for the canvas
2. Put with JSROOT code into HTML file
3. Invoke browser with loading the HTML file
4. Render graphics and store images in HTML
5. Dump produced results into local file
6. Read file dump, extract produced images

All are file-based operations, no http, no display

Takes ~1 second per invocation



RWebWindow communication



That happens when widget is started:

1. Loading HTML (~10KB)
2. Loading JavaScript (~10MB)
3. Establishing WebSocket connection
 - a. longpoll http requests when does not work
4. Bi-directional data exchange



Does https helps?

Yes:

- ▶ protects traffic from sniffing
- ▶ excludes man-in-the-middle attacks

But:

- ▶ do not solve missing client authentication
- ▶ mostly impossible to implement for localhost applications



http server bind to loopback (127.0.0.1) address

Sniffing on Linux only with extra privileges

Mac and Windows not clear

Must be default mode in ROOT

Change only with API, no any shell or rootrc variables:

```
RWebWindowsManager::SetLoopbackMode(false);
```



Connection key (like Jupyter)

Generate unique connection key for each connection attempt

Will be presented in URL like:

<http://localhost:8087/win1/?key=ab65f2134c>

Reject any connection attempt without valid key

Reject any attempt to load HTML page without key

Use only WebSockets with loopback device

Make a default for any web-based widget



Solution:

introduce secret session key, do not expose it to network
use together with connection key for HMAC data signing

<http://localhost:8087/win1/?key=ab65f2134c#5498ffac>

checksum = HMAC(key+session_key, message)