


# State of Study

Annotations following  
meeting


# System Functional Diagram




# Top-Level FMECA

situation	function	failure mode	effect (worst case)	criticality/downtime	reliability target	comment
quench or powering failure	detect FPA loop open	fail to detect FPA loop open	<div style="background-color: #0056b3; color: white; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> <b>1: open switch upon FPA loop opening</b> </div>	months	1/100y	
	drive switch opening	fail to drive switch		months		
	drive switch opening	successful opening		hours	1/y	
	collect data and transmit	prevent opening		hours	1/y	
normal operation	detect FPA loop closed	fail to detect FPA loop closed	cannot restart machine until problem diagnosed	hours	1/y	
	continuously drive closed switch	spuriously open switch (with opening FPA loop)	spurious dump or delay of fill	hours	1/y	
		spuriously open switch (without opening FPA loop)	spurious dump	hours	1/y	
	collect data and transmit	fail to collect data and transmit (on time)	PC will trip and send FPA	hours	1/y	
spurious opening of EE switches	detect switches opening	fail to detect switches opening (on time)	cannot restart machine until problem diagnosed	hours	1/y	there is no active protection of the switches by the EE controls in case of spurious opening, except vacuum switches
	open FPA loop	fail to open FPA loop (on time)	PC will trip and send FPA	hours	1/y	
	open all other switches	(see above)	PC will trip and send FPA	hours	1/y	
	collect data and transmit	fail to collect data and transmit (on time)	cannot restart machine until problem diagnosed	hours	1/y	
interlock indicating unsafe operation	detect unsafe operation	fail to detect unsafe operation	<div style="background-color: #0056b3; color: white; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> <b>2: prevent operation if interlock detected</b> </div>		1/10y	better discuss on case by case
	open switches	fail to open switches			1/10y	
	open FPA loop	fail to open FPA loop				
	collect data and transmit	fail to collect data and transmit			hours	1/y
loss of mains power (opens switches)	open FPA loop	fail to open FPA loop	<div style="background-color: #0056b3; color: white; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> <b>3: behaviour of new vacuum switches under loss of power</b> </div>			there is no active protection of the switches by the EE controls in case of spurious opening, except vacuum switches
	open switches	fail to open switches			hours	
	collect data and transmit	fail to collect data and transmit				

# 1: Simulation of switch opening request



- Simulation model of most critical function generated following last meeting
  - Failure if no path functional and demand (FPA open)
  - Considers that upon each demand, blind failures are discovered and fixed (e.g. if CNTL stopped triggering Driver 1)
- Used to estimate failure rate requirement for the “boxes”
  - Demand interval varied between 13 and 750 days
  - Based on initial Top-level requirement, failure rate per box ~few hundred FITS (1E6 – 1E7 hours MTTF)
    - FITS: failures in 10<sup>9</sup> hours, example: single discrete components have <10 FITS



# 1: Simulation of switch opening request

## Next steps

- Finalize top-level requirements
- Based on requirements, estimate whether boards fulfill them based on component prediction
  - To so so, would need design files (processed by design office)
    - so far: G:\Departments\TE\Projects\EnergyExtraction\UniversalElectronics\GLAB
  - Possibly: FMECA for selected boards to get components on critical path

Id	AlternatePN	Description	Category	PartNumber	Quantity	CategoryDescription	Page	failure_mode	Alpha	End Effect - User Permit	Comments	End Effect	Definition
1.1	C2	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Critical Permit A	Open	6	False dump				
1.1	C2	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Critical Permit A	Parameter change	61	No effect			Blind failure - CIBF	both channels fail
1.1	C2	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Critical Permit A	Short	30	False dump			Blind failure - path	a single channel fa
1.1	C2	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Critical Permit A	Other	3	No effect			False dump	transmission of a sg
10.1	C3	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Test & monitor	Open	6	False dump			Maintenance	allows the current
10.1	C3	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Test & monitor	Parameter change	61	No effect			No effect	having no effect or
10.1	C2	~10% SOV X7R SMD Multila 217-CA	CC0603_100NF_S0V_10%_X7R	1	Capacitor	Test & monitor	Short	30	False dump				

## 2: Critical interlocks?

- Document and clarify
  - Discussed e.g. interlock based on dump resistor temperature

### 3: Behavior of new vacuum switches under loss of power

- Clarify and document
  - New vacuum switches have to be latched not to re-close
  - Clarify and check whether failure rate estimation also necessary

# Notes (raw)

- Bozhidar - state of EE
  - chassis electronics able to serve all (beyond HL LHC)
    - vacuum, IGBT, FRESCA, Prevevssin test station
    - programming of control cards different
    - only connectors different (chassis backpanel)
    - PSU & capacitor boards may still change
    - universal motherboard
    - backpanel connected to other side of motherboard; connectors adapted to system
- current progress
  - made prototype for vacuum switch (most urgent)
  - launched pre series of ten systems for testing in poland and in charm
  - series design -> little changes by end of sept
    - have tester for PCBs
    - boards are not testable yet
  - launch production Jan/Feb next year
    - go to design office with big order



# Notes (raw)

- our state of study
  - slide 4: each FPA channel is actually going to both
    - depending on system different situation
      - vacuum system
    - focus on vacuum switches
      - needs power upon loss
- next steps
  - link to GLAB
  - vacuum switch critical path
    - FPA
    - critical interlock
    - no electricity
  - use a single optocoupler with two outputs
  - driver card
    - can be optocoupler (13KA) or relays (600A)
    - vacuum sw
      - three operations
        - open switch
          - pre charged capacitor
          - done by two fibers
          - same for sw2
        - kill the arc
          - pre charged capacitor
          - after delay activated
          - two fibers
          - same for sw2
        - trigger CC in opposite direction
          - kill the arc in the other direction (mainly needed for D1 & D2)
        - all done in microseconds
        - keep non vacuum switches with relays in mind
    - other switches
      - always two relays in series
      - EM switches
        - cut current - switch opens (slow due to magnetization) - controlled by two relays
        - transistor to push opening - faster than relay
        - both fast enough (redundant)
    - bozhidar prepares diagram for vacuum specifically
    - meanwhile we get the full schematics
    - electricity
      - UPS 1&2
      - distribution box
        - regular circuit breakers
        - emergency stop
      - transfer switch
        - single line goes to cluster of outlets
      - monitor the output line + line to each vacuum drivers is monitored as well --> fiber to interlock board + 24V transformed --> two PSUs redundant - also monitored (four wires)