Bernd Dehning CERN BE/BI

Content

- Project planning
 - Functional Specification
 - Technical specification result of several simulations:
 - loss of proton loss
 - shower location
 - quench level
 - reliability study of system
 - Budget, Personal, schedule
 - Project reviews with (internal, external, private companies)
- The systems
 - Detectors
 - Ionisation chambers
 - Photo multiplier (Aluminum Cathode, Cherenkov radiator, fibre)
 - Secondary emission monitor
 - Acquisition chain (analog front-end, digitalization, data treatment)
 - New high dynamic range current measurements
 - Digital design overview
 - Management of Settings
 - Organization of data bases
 - Procedure of setting validations
 - Data presentations



Functional

Page 4 of 30

		9.4.1
	Table of Contents	9.4.2
		9.4.3 9.4.4
	SCOPE6	9.5
2.	INTRODUCTION & GOALS6	9.5.1
з.	BEAM LOSS SCENARIOS	9.5.2
4.	PROTONS VERSUS IONS	9.6
5.	USE OF THE BLM'S FOR MACHINE PROTECTION7	9.6.1 9.6.2
6.	USE OF THE BLM'S FOR MACHINE OPERATION AND STUDIES	9.8.2
6.1	HELP IN COMMISSIONING	9.7.1
6.2	MEASUREMENT OF THE TRANSIENT AZIMUTHAL LOSSES	9.7.2
6.3	DIAGNOSTICS IN CASE OF BAD INJECTION	9.7.3
6.4	SETTING OF COLLIMATORS AND OTHER MOVABLE TARGETS	9.8
6.4.1	COARSE SETTING	9.9
6.4.2	COMMISSIONING	
6.4.3	TUNING WITH NOMINAL BEAMS	
6.5	PROBING THE MACHINE WITH LOWER INTENSITY BEAMS 12	<
6.6	OPERATIONS SAFEGUARD12	
6.7	MONITORING OF THE AZIMUTHAL STEADY LOSSES	
6.8	MONITORING OF THE BUNCH-BY-BUNCH STEADY LOSSES	
6.9	BEAM AND MACHINE STUDIES	
6.10	POST-MORTEM ANALYSIS	
7.	BEAM LOSSES: DYNAMIC RANGE AND TIME CONSTANTS14	1
7.1	DEFINITION OF THE OBSERVABLE	
7.2	ASSUMED COLLIMATION EFFICIENCIES	
7.3	STEADY LOSSES	
7.3.1	SOURCES	
7.3.2	AZIMUTHAL DISTRIBUTION	
7.3.3	LOSS RATES	
7.4 7.4.1	INJECTION ERRORS IN IR2 AND IR8	
7.4.1	ASYNCHRONOUS KICK BY THE DUMP KICKERS IN IR6	2
7.4.3	FAST GROWTH OF THE BEAM AMPLITUDE	4
7.4.4	BEAM MANIPULATIONS AND MEASUREMENTS	
8. /	ASSUMED QUENCH AND DAMAGE THRESHOLDS	
8.1	QUENCH LIMIT	
8.1.1	LIMIT TO THE LOCAL HEAT DEPOSITION	
8.1.2	LIMIT TO THE HEAT DEPOSITION PER CELL	
8.2	DAMAGE LIMIT	
9.	FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BLM SYSTEM	
9.1	LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE BLM SYSTEM	
9.2	LAYOUT & NUMBER OF LOCATIONS TO BE MONITORED	
9.3	GEOMETRICAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE MONITORS	
9.4	DYNAMIC RANGE, RESOLUTION AND RESPONSE TIME	

BLMA	22
BLMS	
BLMC	
BLMB	
PRECISION AND CALIBRATION	
ABSOLUTE PRECISION OR CALIBRATION OF THE LOSS SCALE	
RESOLUTION AND RELATIVE PRECISION OF THE MONITORS	
SIGNAL SEPARATION	
BEAM 1/BEAM 2 DISCRIMINATION	
COLLIMATOR TO COLLIMATOR DISCRIMINATION	
DATA AND DATA HANDLING	
DATA PROCESSING FOR QUENCH PREVENTION	
DATA FOR THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE LOGGING SYSTEM	
EXPERIMENTAL BEAM LOSS MONITORS	
POST-MORTEM ANALYSIS	
RELIABILITY AND RADIATION RESISTANCE	

- General description of physical processes, over half of the text
- Important to have basic process described 1. which should be monitored, because of changes in functional requirements may change and reason for monitoring not clear
- Complete requirements very useful to be 2. defined, including description of measurement, reliability consideration, data presentation and logging, ...; all may have an influence of the system design


Specification: Beam Loss Durations and Protection Systems

LOSS DURATION P	ROTECTION SYSTEM			
Ultra-fast loss	Passive Components			
4 turns (356 μs) Fast losses	+ BLM (damage and quench prevention)			
10 ms Intermediate losses	+ Quench Protection System, QPS (damage protection only)			
10 s Slow losses				
100 s Steady state losses	+ Cryogenic System			

Since not active protection possible for ultra-fast losses => passive system

Classification loss signals to be used for functional and technical specification

Specification: The Active Protection System and Involved Systems




Study of equivalent system to be used for functional and technical specification


8.

. . .

Particle shower simulations

One of the most spectacular quench tests: generate millisecond scale losses using with Wire Scanner at 3.5 TeV.







Max E_{dep} FLUKA: 62.5 mJ/cc QP3: 38 mJ/cc (preliminary) we call it a good agreement

Shower simulation could be accurate to few 10% in transverse tails of 20 to 30 cm

Reliability: Safety System Design Approach



Reliability: Failure Rate and Checks




Systems parallel + survey + functional check:

- 1. in case of system failure dump beam (failsafe)
- verification of functionality: simulate measurement and comparison with expected result => as good as new

Key implementation to obtain low failure rate

Reliability: Check of Analog Signal Chain



Modulation Example

Basic concept:

Automatic test measurements in between of two fills (LHC), new systems: continuous check during operation (0.05 Hz)


Modulation of high voltage supply of chambers

- Check of cabling
- Check of components, R- C filter
- Check of chamber capacity
- Check of stability of signal, pA to nA (quench level region)
- Measurement of dark current
- Not checked: gas gain of chamber (only once a year with source)

Functional checks – Monitoring of drifts

Reliability: Settings and Checks from Database to Frontend

Corruption in frontend are more likely as in reference database, therefore =>



- Setting storage in Oracle database
- Settings:
 - Threshold values
 - Voltages, currents, phase limits for automatic test
 - Serial numbers for ever equipment in the acquisition chain
 - Software version numbers
- Comparison of frontend settings with database every 12 hours or after every update
 - If positive hardware base beam permit given
 - If negative after retry, manual intervention (no beam permit)


Request for comparison issued by front-end, most reliable (no software layers in between)

Reliability: Fault Tree Analysis

Almost 160 Failure Modes have been defined for the BLMS using the FMD-97 standard.

Three Ends Effects:

- 1. Damage Risk: probability not to be ready in case of dangerous loss.
- 2. False Alarm: probability to generate a false alarm.
- 3. Warning: probability to generate a maintenance request following a failure of a redundant component.
- The probability to have an Failure Mode A, Pr{A}, is calculated per each Failure Modes of the FMECA, given the hazard rate, the repair rate and the inspection period :....



Several (commercial) programs are available, which include component catalogue

Comments to Project Planning I


- Specification (LHC observations)
 - Specification changes (mainly technical, few functional changes) during project time due to knowledge increase (deeper understanding, reviews)
 - Iterative specification approach was needed to in cooperate continuously the specification changes not compromising the protection functionality and other requirements
- Budget (LHC observations):
 - Not enought contingencies included => every time when more budget was needed lengthy discussion, sometimes resulting in compromises without considering a complete system review. Reliability and functional degradation possible.
 - LHC BLM 33% cost overrun, reasons:
 - increase of functionality (knowledge gain during design process) (30%)
 - Unknown costs during planning phase (30%)
 - Wrong costs estimates (30%)
- Reviews (about 10 for the LHC system)
 - Main comments: Missing written operating procedures and documentation
 - Internal review: viewpoint of referees not independent enough, some times conflict of interest
 - External review: often to short, referees become not enough familiar with the system
 - Company review: introduce knowledge from different field (safety)

Comments to Project Planning II

• Reliability:


- 2010+2011: 4 beam aborts due to internal BLM failure (4000 monitors, simulated failure per year 15)
- Failure rate estimate need frequent recalculation, because of design changes (iterative process)
- Data corruption in frontends observed due to radiation induced single events (at surface), unreliable electrical connections (soldering), ...

Beam Loss Detectors used at CERN




27.09.2011

Ionisation Chamber Simulation and Measurements




Good knowledge of behaviour => Reliable component



Comparison simulation measurements


	Rel. diff %	Error %
Proton	13.1	11.4
Gamma	14.3	12.1
neutron	37.4	13.9
Mixed field	20.5	11.4




Chamber current vs beam current

Intensity density: - Booster 6 10⁹ prot./cm², two orders larger as in LHC

Simulations Ionisation chambers



Gain Variation of Ionisation Chambers



Total received dose:

ring 0.1 to 1 kGy/year extr 0.1 to 10 MGy/year

- 30 years of operation
- Measurements done with installed electronic
- Relative accuracy
 - $\Delta\sigma/\sigma$ < 0.01 (for ring BLMs)
 - $\Delta\sigma/\sigma$ < 0.05 (for Extr., inj. BLMs)
- Gain variation only observed in high radiation areas
- Consequences for LHC:
 - No gain variation expected in the straight section and ARC of LHC
 - Variation of gain in collimation possible for ionisation chambers

Reliable component, N2 gas filling




(Roughly) Estimated Sensitivities



• Ionization chamber:	70 µC/Gy	CERN IC 54 uC/Gy
1 liter argon S ≈ active mass · charge per ionization energy ≈ V	·p·e/E _{ion} ≈ 1 l · 1.8 g/l · e / 26 eV	LIC 1.4 uC/Gy
	20 µC/Gy	
 PIN diode: 1 cm² surface, 100 µm depletion depth S ≈ active mass · charge per excitation energy ≈ A 	6 µC/Gy	
 Secondary emission monitor: 100 cm² surface, 0.01 average secondary emission S ≈ surface · SEY · electron charge · density of prin ≈ 100 cm² · 0.01 · e · 1/(2 MeV·cm²/g) 	500 pC/Gy vield (SEY)	CERN
 Aluminum cathode electron multip 10 cm² surface, 0.01 average secondary emission y S ≈ surface · SEY · electron charge · density of prin ≈ 10 cm² · 0.01 · e · 1/(2 MeV·cm²/g) · 10⁵ 	plier: 5 μC/Gy vield (SEY), tube gain 10⁵ naries per dose · gain ≈ A · SEY · e ·	CERN (p/(dE/dx)) · G damage
 PMT with organic scintillator: 1 liter scintillator, 60% collection efficiency, 30% pl S ≈ active mass · photon yield per energy · collection ≈ V · ρ · Y · C · P · G · e = 1 l · 1 g/cm³ · 1/(100) 	200 C/Gy notocathode efficiency, tube gain 10^5 on efficiency \cdot photocathode efficiency eV) $\cdot 0.6 \cdot 0.3 \cdot 10^5 \cdot e$	problematic!
 Bare PMT (Čerenkov light): 10 cm² surface, 1 mm thick, 30% photocathode eff S ≈ active volume · density of primaries per dose · ≈ A · d · ρ · (ρ/(dE/dx)) · Y · P · G · e ≈ 1 cm³ · : 	4 mC/Gy ficiency, tube gain 10 ⁵	
 PMT with Cerenkov fiber: 1 meter length, 100 μm radius, 2% collection efficients S ≈ active volume · density of primaries per dose · ≈ πr² · L · ρ · (ρ/(dE/dx)) · Y · C · P · G · e ≈ 31 µ 	2 μC/Gy ency, 30% photocathode eff., tube ga photon yield per length · coll. eff. · pl	ain 105 hotoc. eff. · gain · electron charge
Flexible gain \rightarrow linearity and calibration pro	blematic!	
ERL Instrumentation Workshop, Cornell University	y, 2-3 June 2008	Lars Fröhlich, DESY


Diamond detector at a collimator

150 ns bunch spacing




Diamond detector at a collimator

150 ns bunch spacing




Diamond detector at a collimator

150 ns bunch spacing




Diamond detector at a collimator


150 ns bunch spacing



Diamond and Radiation Hardness



Diamonds in Counting Mode




Measurement of bunch filling scheme with high dynamic

1.8 Kelvin Loss Detection

Single Particle beam test at CERN PS (20 GeV)






Under test: sCVD, Si, and LHe ionisation chamber


Next year: radiation test up to 1 MGy with online monitoring at CERN PS

1.8 Kelvin Loss Detection



Open questions: radiation hardness, DC current value, non linearity effects for high losses

The BLM Acquisition System



Analog front-end FEE

- Current to Frequency Converters (CFCs)
- Analogue to Digital Converters (ADCs)
- Tunnel FPGAs: Actel's 54SX/A radiation tolerant.
- Communication links: Gigabit Optical Links.

Real-Time Processing BEE

- FPGA Altera's Stratix EP1S40 (medium size, SRAM based)
- Mezzanine card for the optical links
- 3 x 2 MB SRAMs for temporary data storage
- NV-RAM for system settings and threshold table storage

Fully Differential Current to Frequency Converter Principle


LHC current to frequency converter:


- only positive signals (limitation in case of signal under shoots)
- 2. 500 Gy radiation tolerance

Dynamic range	six decades		
	SIA UCCAUES		positive and negative currents
	nine decades		(indirect measurement)
Minimum detected current	1	nA	(user selectable, minimum value)
Linearity error	$<\pm10$	%	relative error $\Delta I/I$
Integration window	40	μs	
Total integrated dose	$1 imes 10^4$	$\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$	in 20 years
L	inearity error ntegration window	inearity error $<\pm 10$ ntegration window 40	inearity error $<\pm10$ % ntegration window 40 μs


Target technology

CMOS $0.25\,\mu m$






f = Iinput / (Qref * Tref)



Fully Differential Current to Frequency Converter Principle




1. Specifications:

2.

- 1. Dynamic range 7 orders
- 2. Integration window 2 us 1nA to 200mA
- 3. Integration window 1 s 10pA to 200mA
- A status signal selects in which branch of a fully deferential stage the input current is integrated.
- 3. Two comparators check the differential output voltage against a threshold, whenever is exceeded, the status signal changes to the complementary value (0 ! 1 or 1 ! 0) and the input current is integrated in the other branch.

Differential Current to Frequency Converter





Available Resources: 8 Input Analog Interfaces; FPGA local or remote programming; bidirectional optical and Ethernet link; power supplies with protection and diagnosis; temperature and humidity measurement; ID Chip; Auxiliary ADC for Housekeeping Monitor.


Noise

- Important for availability (false dumps) and dynamic range
- Main source of noise: long cables (up to 800 m in straight section)
- Aim: factor 10 between noise and threshold
- Thresholds decrease with increasing energy → noise reduction before 7 TeV
 - Single pair shielded cables, noise reduction: > factor 5
 - Development of kGy radiation hard readout to avoid long cables









- 1. Modular design of data base very useful (if changes are needed limited impact)
 - 1. MTF: history of equipment e.g. ionisation chamber, electronic cards, ...
 - 2. Layout: description of links between equipment

MTF DF

oracle hardware description

BLM expert

Availiability relevant, scaling applied table


history

- 3. LSA: reference for all data needed in the front-end (some imported from MTF and Layout)
- 2. Storage of data in frontend in FPGA memory (even here corruptions observed)
- 3. Master for comparison is the front-end (this allows immediate beam inhibit)
- 4. Design very early defined in PhD thesis on reliability (root was followed during project)
- 5. Issue of design: protection and measurement functionality are implemented in same front-end (review remark).
 - 1. Critical, because of upgrades are more often needed on measurement functionality compared to protection functionality
 - 2. New design: locking of FPGA firmware, which has protection functionality (partial solution)
 - 3. Occupation of FPGA by firmware too large, first estimate of occupation will be about 30% for new BLM systems


triggered data: post mortem, XPOC, Study data, Collimation

BLM Published Data – Logging Data – Online Display

- Extensively used for operation verification and machine tuning
- 1 Hz Logging (12 integration times)
 - Integration times < 1s: maximum during the last second is logged
 - \rightarrow short losses are recorded and loss duration can be reconstructed (20% accuracy)
 - Also used for Online Display




BLM Published Data – Logging Data – Online Display



BLM Published Data – Logging Data – Online Display


Post Mortem Data: Event triggered read out of all acquisition buffers

- 1. Online (after 10 s 2000 values with 40 us integration time
- 2. Off line 43000 values




BLM Published Data – Logging Data – Online Display

- Extensively used for operation verification and machine tuning
- 1 Hz Logging (12 integration times)
 - Integration times < 1s: maximum during the last second is logged</p>
 - \rightarrow short losses are recorded and loss duration can be reconstructed (20% accuracy)
 - Also used for Online Display



Storage of several running sums allows reconstruction of duration of loss event (reduction of network traffic and data storage place)

Resonance Crossing – SEM signal Issue



No signal from secondary emission monitors expected: due to ionisation in air at non insulated wire connection (patch boxes)


Optimized tools are very help full during commissioning (design during test phases)

Reserve Slides

DADC Principle

Input 50 ohm resistor split in two: 47 + 3

Re-routing on the ADC buffer amplifier



Ionisation Chamber and Secondary Emission Monitor




- Stainless steal cylinder
- Parallel electrodes distance 0.5 cm
- Diameter 8.9 cm
- Voltage 1.5 kV
- Low pass filter at the HV input

Signal Ratio: IC/SEM = 60000

IC:

- Al electrodes
- Length 60 cm
- Ion collection time 85 us
- N₂ gas filling at 1.1 bar
- Sensitive volume 1.5 l





- Ti electrodes
- Components UHV compatible
- Steel vacuum fired
- Detector contains 170 cm2 of NEG St707 to keep the vacuum
 < 10-4 mbar during 20 years

4 Diamond BLMs for Observation


ATS/Note/2011/048 (TECH), B. Dehning et al.


- Chemical Vapour Deposition (CVD) diamond
- IP7 collimators (TCP) one per beam
 - All sizable local losses also seen at collimators












3.5 TeV operational collimator settings (not best possible)

No quench – consistent with BLM thresholds (64% of assumed quench level)

Noise Level Distributions



Procedure:


- require data during nominal operation conditions of LHC
- Choose most sensitive integration intervals
- Set histogram max value to lowest quench threshold level (MB-magnet)
- Overflows are interpreted as false signals

Loss in a bending magnet


PM application: BLM data of 0.082 sec

online available


Longer PM buffer: BLM data of 1.72 sec offine available



Quench and Damage Levels




- High dynamic range dynamic
 - Arc: 10⁸
 - Collimation: 10¹³ second detector
- Change of the




Literature

- http://cern.ch/blm
- LHC
 - Reliability issues, thesis, G. Guaglio
 - Reliability issues, R. Filippini et al., PAC 05
 - Front end electronics, analog, thesis, W. Friesenbichler
 - Front end electronics, analog-digital, E. Effinger et al.
 - Digital signal treatment, thesis, C. Zamantzas
 - Balancing Safety and Availability for an Electronic Protection System, S.
 Wagner et al., to be published, ESREL 2008


Drift times of electrons and ions (I)



Post Mortem Data (some examples), Zoom




1.75




BLM System Upgrades

- Online program predicting loss characteristics and likely loss origin, PhD
- Long cable issue in IP3
- Development of an Detector with intermediate measurement range
- New cables for noise channels (7 TeV operation)



Data set: 8.1.2010-15.1.2010



spacing

