

Middleware Requirements for Credential Validation

*The wish list for the authentication
functionality from EGI*

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- Recurring issues
 - Trust anchor releases repeatedly run into ‘trouble’ in deployment
 - Inconsistencies in the distribution itself (1.39/1.41)
 - Increasing number of trust anchors
 - Supposedly-standard features not supported in M/W
 - Middleware behaviour ‘suddenly’ changes
 - Use of namespaces Relying Party Defined Namespaces Constrains (RPDNC) format in VOMS/Admin implemented in 2009 appeared in production in 2011. It is a useful change, but it needs to be well-advertised
 - Operational issues
 - CRL downloading *and checking* is not reliable
 - in recent EGI ops VO incident, revocation did not take effect at some sites even after 18 hours
- For the future
 - try to prevent spreading of Network Security Service library use in m/w since this is dangerous for scalability and stability
 - re-confirm adherence to Community Best Practices and standards

- Support throughout all middleware for the SHA-2 family of hash algorithms for X.509 certificates
 - Starting from Jan-2012 SHA-2 based certs may start to appear
- All proxy certs should have RSA key size ≥ 1024
 - RSA512 can be cracked within the life time of the proxy
- Support for OCSP allowing for *both* use in
 - AIA in the EE certificates itself
 - For site-configured trusted responders
- Support any number of CAs
- Failures should be graceful
 - incorrect or expired data for a single trust anchor should not affect the other trust anchors in the set

- Honour meaning and scope on extensions
 - an attribute that says emailProtection is to protect email, not for signing documents, etc.
- Accept RFC3820 proxies (*Proxy Certificate Profile*)
 - and do the proper thing for *proxyPathLen* constraints
 - beware of NSS again!
- Allow CRL files to be updated on a file system
 - be prepared to re-read such files and implement new CRL contents at any time
- Allow middleware to make authorization decisions based on the certificate policy OID extension.

- Continue to support drop-in (directory based) trust anchor distributions
 - No monolithic databases please, no NSS on disk
- Announce semantic changes to EGI/NGI&IGTF
 - E.g. moving to namespaces may need preparation for RPs
 - Document, and tell which component does what
- The signing_policy format is not sufficiently expressive/well-defined, even for the current use cases.
 - Could EMI contribute to the drafting of a new standard for an RPDNC language?
 - based on the GFD.189 analysis
 - Participate in OGF's CAOPS-WG



Thanks!