



Protecting TOTEM

Mario Deile


PH-TOT

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
Damage Levels: Roman Pot: Window

Bottom foil of Roman Pot window

Fluka simulation by E. Dimovasili:



Accident Scenario:
 A nominal bunch (1.1×10^{11} p)
 through the bottom RP window




Beam dimensions according to high beta optics at XRP3 ($\beta^* = 1540$ m):

$$\sigma_x = 30 \mu\text{m}, \sigma_y = 80 \mu\text{m}$$

→ worst case scenario

Damage Levels: Roman Pot: Window



Impact on transverse window: $z = 150\mu\text{m} \rightarrow$ no problem

Mechanical stress effects not included!



Damage Levels: Roman Pot: Window

•Normal running (7 TeV):

RP at 10σ ;

- $\beta^* = 1540$ m: narrow beam: RP220: $\sigma_x = 0.03$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.08$ mm (scenario of the study above)
wider at RP147: $\sigma_x = 0.24$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.17$ mm

43 bunches: asynchronous beam dump: at most 1 bunch can hit the RP. (? To be checked)

Seems OK for bunches up to 6×10^{10} p.

- $\beta^* = 90$ m: wide beam: RP147: $\sigma_x = 0.4$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.3$ mm
RP220: $\sigma_x = 0.4$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.6$ mm \rightarrow much less concentrated

156 bunches: asynchronous beam dump: how many bunches can hit the RP ?

- $\beta^* = 2$ m, 0.5 m: wide beam: RP147: $\sigma_x = 0.3$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.5$ mm
RP220: $\sigma_x = 0.1$ mm, $\sigma_y = 0.3$ mm

2808 bunches: asynchronous beam dump: at most 8 bunches can hit the RP. (?)

Potentially dangerous even for small bunches.

“Safe beam” (10^{10} p total): OK for RP window.

•Injection (450 GeV):

RP retracted \rightarrow less risk

another Fluka simulation: 1 full bunch (1.1×10^{11} p) $\rightarrow \Delta T \sim 200^\circ\text{C}$ OK

“safe beam” (10^{12} p): $\Delta T \sim 2000^\circ\text{C}$???

Problem: ΔT does not scale linearly with the charge (specific heat depends on T).

What is the impact of the bunching scheme ?

(1 big bunch vs. several small ones with distance Δt and same total charge)



Damage Levels: Roman Pot: Silicon Detectors

Thin detectors (300 μm): damage by heat very unlikely.

Displacement damage by non-ionising energy loss:

- independent of HV
- expected hardness at 450 GeV and 7 TeV: $\Phi_{\text{max}} \sim 5 \times 10^{14} \text{ p/cm}^2$
- Fluence of 1 full bunch (area within $3 \sigma_{\text{beam}}$):
worst case scenario: thin beam at $\beta^* = 1540 \text{ m}$: $\Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 6 \times 10^{13} \text{ p/cm}^2$
damage limit: $\Phi_{\text{max}} / \Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 8 \text{ bunches}$
- standard scenario: thick beam at $\beta^* = 0.5 \text{ m}$: $\Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 9 \times 10^{12} \text{ p/cm}^2$
damage limit: $\Phi_{\text{max}} / \Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 58 \text{ bunches}$

• Fluence of safe beam at injection (10^{12} p total), $\beta^* = 11 \text{ m}$, $E = 450 \text{ GeV}$:

$$\Phi_{\text{safe beam}} \sim 3 \times 10^{13} \text{ p/cm}^2 < \Phi_{\text{max}}$$

OK

RP detectors will be retracted with HV off at injection.



Damage Levels: T2 (GEMs)

- No dedicated accident studies available
- **Melting:** unlikely but not studied
- **Ageing:** GEMs were tested up to $\Phi = 1.4 \times 10^{13} \text{ p/cm}^2$ without performance loss.

Fluence of 1 full bunch at 14 m from IP5:

$\beta^* = 0.5 \text{ m}$: $\Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 2.4 \times 10^{12} \text{ p/cm}^2$: OK

$\beta^* = 1540 \text{ m}$: $\Phi_{1 \text{ bunch}} = 1.9 \times 10^{12} \text{ p/cm}^2$: OK

Fluence of safe beam at injection: $\Phi_{\text{safe beam}} \sim 10^{13} \text{ p/cm}^2$

T2 will be off during injection.

General problem for studies of injection phase: Optics properties for $\beta^* = 11 \text{ m}$ needed.



Damage Levels: T1 (CSCs)

- No dedicated accident studies available
- **Melting**: unlikely but not studied [main material: 30 mm honeycomb (Nomex)]
- **Ageing**: tested by CMS for same gas mixture (NIM A515: 226-233, 2003)
up to 0.4 C/cm or 1.3×10^{12} p/cm² without significant performance deterioration.
→ tested fluence is of same order of magnitude as the one of a full bunch.



Problem Diagnostics

- During injection:

all detectors off → diagnostics only from

- BLMs
- BPMs
- radiation monitors fixed in various places on the RP

- During normal running:

- trigger rates from T1, T2, RP (individual detectors and track coincidences)
details of trigger scheme still in preparation;
RP trigger rates to be calibrated w.r.t. BLM rates;
- detector currents (read-out frequency still unclear; not on kHz level);
- radiation monitors, BLMs, BPMs.



Protection Strategy

1. Protection of T1, T2

- Detectors placed inside CMS → hopefully protected by CMS's BCMs at $z = 1.9$ m, $r = 4$ cm and $z = 14.4$ m, $r = 5 - 29$ cm (near T2);
to be investigated and to be discussed with CMS
- HV on → injection inhibit

2. Protection of RP

- RP has to be out except for "stable beam" or "unstable beam":
ensured by interlock system via "user_permit" (first CIBU)
- HV on → injection inhibit
- Wish: RP movement controlled by collimator supervisor system
(agreement still to be concluded)
ensures that RP stay always in the shadow of collimators
- rate too high → retract RP: **threshold still undefined;**
beam dump due to high detector rate not foreseen in the beginning.
Option for beam dump via "user_permit" (second CIBU) reserved for later.



Expected Roman Pot Rates

Estimated signal + background rates → gives an idea about orders of magnitude of possible retraction thresholds

- $\beta^* = 1540 \text{ m}$, $L = 10^{29} \text{ cm}^{-2} \text{ s}^{-1}$:
Single plane rate (2 vertical + 1 horizontal – overlap): $\sim 100 \text{ kHz}$
- $\beta^* = 90 \text{ m}$, $L = 10^{30} \text{ cm}^{-2} \text{ s}^{-1}$:
Single plane rate (2 vertical + 1 horizontal – overlap): $\sim 400 \text{ kHz}$
- $\beta^* = 0.5 \text{ m}$, $L = 10^{33} \text{ cm}^{-2} \text{ s}^{-1}$:
Single detector rate (1 horizontal): $\sim 200 \text{ MHz}$ (unusable)
Local track coincidence rate: $\sim 4 \text{ MHz}$

Background estimates difficult → Only experience will teach the real rates.



Interlock Actions

TOTEM has 2 CIBUs:

RP position


Detector information

(e.g. rate), unused in the beginning, corresponding “user_permit” kept permanently “high” (UPS)



Dumps the beam and inhibits injection if RP is IN and the mode forbids it.

Device_out = TRUE only if device is in home position
 Device_allowed = TRUE only if mode = stable or mode = unstable



Drives the RP out if it is IN and the beam is not stable.

Device_out = TRUE only if device is in home position
 Stable_beam = TRUE only if mode = stable

Back_home = TRUE only if device NOT in garage and mode ≠ stable



Software Interlock: Injection Inhibit

Prevent injection when

- RP is IN and existing beam should not be dumped, e.g. during normal running;
- Detector HV is on.

To be implemented as a software interlock.





Total Fluence after 1 fb⁻¹

Charged Hadrons:

- Averaged over horizontal detector: $\langle F \rangle = 0.7 \times 10^{12} \text{ cm}^{-2}$
- Maximum in the diffractive peak (protons with $E \approx 7 \text{ TeV}$):
averaged over $2 \times 2 \text{ mm}^2$ bin: $F_{\text{max}, 2 \times 2} = 6 \times 10^{13} \text{ cm}^{-2}$
extrapolated to detector edge ($10 \sigma + 0.5 \text{ mm} = 1.2 \text{ mm}$ from beam centre):

$$F_{\text{max}} = 3 \times 10^{14} \text{ cm}^{-2}$$

Damage factor of 7 TeV protons is 1/10 of 1 MeV neutrons

→ equivalent 1 MeV neutron fluence: $F_{\text{equ}} = 3 \times 10^{13} \text{ cm}^{-2}$

Detectors can survive $F_{\text{equ, det}} \sim 1 \times 10^{14} \text{ cm}^{-2}$
corresponding to **3 fb⁻¹**

Neutrons: much lower than charged hadrons:

- Averaged over horizontal detector: $\langle F \rangle = 0.1 \times 10^{12} \text{ cm}^{-2}$
- Maximum (over $4 \times 2 \text{ mm}^2$): $F_{\text{max}} = 2 \times 10^{12} \text{ cm}^{-2}$

Control of Roman Pots

