Probabilistic Reasoning in Physics

- inference, forecasting, decision -

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"Probability is good sense reduced to a calculus" (Laplace)

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
Outline

- "Science and hypothesis" (Poincaré)
- Uncertainty, probability, decision.


"The essential problem of the experimental method" (Poincaré).

- A toy model and its physics analogy: the six box game "Probability is either referred to real cases or it is nothing" (de Finetti).
- Probabilistic approach [but ... What is probability?]
- Basic rules of probability and Bayes rule.
- Bayesian inference and its graphical representation:
 Bayesian networks
- Some examples of applications in Physics
- Conclusions

Physics




Physics



(*) A quantity might be meaningful only within a theory/model


From past to future



Task of physicists:

- Describe/understand the physical world
 inference of laws and their parameters
- Predict observations
 - \Rightarrow forecasting


From past to future



Process


- neither automatic
- nor purely contemplative
 - \rightarrow 'scientific method'
 - \rightarrow planned experiments ('actions') \Rightarrow decision.


From past to future




\Rightarrow Uncertainty:

- 1. Given the past observations, in general we are not sure about the theory parameters (and/or the theory itself)
- 2. Even if we were sure about theory and parameters, there could be internal (e.g. Q.M.) or external effects (initial/boundary conditions, 'errors', etc) that make the forecasting uncertain.








(S. Raman, *Science with a smile*)

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(S. Raman, *Science with a smile*)

Even if the (*ad hoc*) model fits perfectly the data, we do not believe the predictions because we don't trust the model!


[Many 'good' models are ad hoc models!]

2011 IgNobel prize in Mathematics


- D. Martin of USA (who predicted the world would end in 1954)
- P. Robertson of USA (who predicted the world would end in 1982)
- E. Clare Prophet of the USA (who predicted the world would end in 1990)
- L.J. Rim of KOREA (who predicted the world would end in 1992)
- C. Mwerinde of UGANDA (who predicted the world would end in 1999)
- H. Camping of the USA (who predicted the world would end on September 6, 1994 and later predicted that the world will end on October 21, 2011)

"For teaching the world to be careful when making mathematical assumptions and calculations"

Deep source of uncertainty




Deep source of uncertainty



$\textbf{Causes} \rightarrow \textbf{effects}$


The same *apparent* cause might produce several, different effects



Given an observed effect, we are not sure about the exact cause that has produced it.

$\textbf{Causes} \rightarrow \textbf{effects}$


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 $\mathbf{E_2} \Rightarrow \{C_1, C_2, C_3\}?$

The "essential problem" of the Sciences

"Now, these problems are classified as *probability of causes*, and are most interesting of all their scientific applications. I play at *écarté* with a gentleman whom I know to be perfectly honest. What is the chance that he turns up the king? It is 1/8. This is a problem of the probability of effects.

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I play with a gentleman whom I do not know. He has dealt ten times, and he has turned the king up six times. What is the chance that he is a sharper? This is a problem in the probability of causes. It may be said that it is the essential problem of the experimental method."

(H. Poincaré – *Science and Hypothesis*)

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Why physics students are not taught how to tackle this kind of problems?

Uncertainty and probability

We, as physicists, consider absolutely natural and meaningful statements of the following kind

- $P(-10 < \epsilon'/\epsilon \times 10^4 < 50) >> P(\epsilon'/\epsilon \times 10^4 > 100)$
- $P(172 \le m_{top}/\text{GeV} \le 174) \approx 70\%$
- $P(M_H < 125.5 \,\text{GeV}) > P(M_H > 125.5 \,\text{GeV})$

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[The fact that for several (most?) people in this audience this criticism is misterious is a clear indication of the confusion concerning this matter]

Doing Science in conditions of uncertainty

The constant status of uncertainty does not prevent us from doing Science (in the sense of Natural Science and not just Mathematics)


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Indeed


"It is scientific only to say what is more likely and what is less likely" (Feynman)

From 'true value' to observations




Given μ (exactly known) we are uncertain about x

From 'true value' to observations




Uncertainty about μ makes us more uncertain about x




The observed data is <u>certain</u>: \rightarrow 'true value' <u>uncertain</u>.

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
Where does the observed value of x comes from?

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We are now uncertain about μ , given x.

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Note the symmetry in reasoning.

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Let's make an experiment

Let's make an experiment

- Here
- Now

Let's make an experiment



Now

For simplicity

• μ can assume only six possibilities:

 $\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}, \dots, \mathbf{5}$

• x is binary:

$\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}$

[(1,2); Black/White; Yes/Not; ...]

Let's make an experiment



Now

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
 $\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}, \dots, \mathbf{5}$


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 \Rightarrow Later we shall make μ continous.






Let us take randomly one of the boxes.

We are in a state of uncertainty concerning several *events*, the most important of which correspond to the following questions:


- (a) Which box have we chosen, H_0 , H_1 , ..., H_5 ?
- (b) If we extract randomly a ball from the chosen box, will we observe a white $(E_W \equiv E_1)$ or black $(E_B \equiv E_2)$ ball?

Our certainties:


$$\bigcup_{j=0}^{5} H_j = \Omega$$
$$\bigcup_{i=1}^{2} E_i = \Omega.$$



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 - Intuitively feel how to roughly change our opinion about
 - the possible cause
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- What happens after we have extracted one ball and looked its color?
 - Intuitively feel how to roughly change our opinion about
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 - a future observation
 - Can we do it *quantitatively*, in an 'objective way'?
- And after a sequence of extractions?

The toy inferential experiment

The aim of the experiment will be to guess the content of the box without looking inside it, only extracting a ball, record its color and reintroducing in the box

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This toy experiment is conceptually very close to what we do in Physics

⇒ try to guess what we cannot see (the electron mass, a branching ratio, etc)

... from what we can see (somehow) with our senses.

The rule of the game is that we are not allowed to watch inside the box! (As we cannot open an electron and read its properties, unlike we read the MAC address of a PC interface.)

We all agree that the experimental results change

- the probabilities of the box compositions;
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Where is the probability?

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Where is the probability? Certainly not in the box!

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Probability depends on the status of information of the *subject* who evaluates it.

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where I_s is the information available to subject s.

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 \longrightarrow Three boxes TV contests

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\Rightarrow How much we believe something

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\rightarrow 'Degree of belief' \leftarrow

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"The usual touchstone, whether that which someone asserts is merely his persuasion - or at least his subjective conviction, that is, his firm belief – is betting. It often happens that someone propounds his views with such positive and uncompromising assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought of possible error. A bet disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has a conviction which can be estimated at a value of one ducat, but not of ten. For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when it is a question of ten he becomes aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very well be that he is in error." (Kant)

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 $\rightarrow P(3477 \le M_{Sun}/M_{Sat} \le 3547 \,|\, I(\text{Laplace})) = 99.99\%$

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Is a 'conventional' 95% C.L. lower/upper bound a 19 to 1 bet?

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
Hint: $P(\theta \le \theta_{obs} \mid m_0) \ne P(m \ge m_o \mid \theta_{obs})$

 \Rightarrow more in second lecture.

favorable cases


- $p = \frac{n}{\# \text{possible equiprobable cases}}$
- $p = \frac{\# \text{ times the event has occurred}}{\# \text{ independent trials under same conditions}}$

It is easy to check that 'scientific' definitions suffer of circularity




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It is easy to check that 'scientific' definitions suffer of circularity, plus other problems



Very useful evaluation rules

$$A) \quad p = \frac{\# \text{favorable cases}}{\# \text{possible equiprobable cases}}$$

B)
$$p = \frac{\# \text{ times the event has occurred}}{\# \text{ independent trials under same condition}}$$

If the implicit beliefs are well suited for each case of application.

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BUT they cannot define the concept of probability!

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In the probabilistic approach we are following

- Rule A is recovered immediately (under the assumption of equiprobability, when it applies).
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- Rule A is recovered immediately (under the assumption of equiprobability, when it applies).
- Rule B results from a theorem (under well defined assumptions): \Rightarrow Laplace's rule of succession

Wide range of applicability

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- Probability statements all have the same meaning no matter to what they refer and how the number has been evaluated.
 - P(rain next Saturday in Vienna) = 68%
 - P(Usain Bolt will win the 100m in London) = 68%
 - $P(M_H \le 125.5 \, \text{GeV}) = 68\%$
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- You might agree or disagree, but at least <u>You know</u> what this person has in his mind. (<u>NOT TRUE with "C.L.'s"!</u>)
- If a person has these beliefs and he/she has the chance to win a rich prize bound to one of these events, he/she is indifferent to the choice.

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We can talk very naturally about probabilities of true values!

Probability Vs "probability"...

Errors on ratios of small numbers of events F. James^(*) and M. Roos Nucl. Phys. **B172** (1980) 475

(http://ccdb4fs.kek.jp/cgi-bin/img_index?8101205)

When the result of the measurement of a physical quantity is published as $R=R_0+\sigma_0$ without further explanation, it is implied that R is a Gaussiandistributed measurement with mean R_0 and variance ${\sigma_0}^2$. This allows one to calculate various confidence intervals of given "probability", i.e. the "probability" P that the true value of R is within a given interval. P is given by the area under the corresponding part of the Gaussian curve, and is the basis of well-known rules-of-thumb such as "the probability of exceeding two standard deviations is 5%".

(*) Influential CERN 'frequentistic guru' of HEP community

Mathematics of beliefs

The good news:

The basic laws of degrees of belief are the same we get from the inventory of favorable and possible cases, or from events occurred in the past.

[Details skipped...]

Basic rules of probability

- $1. \quad 0 \le P(A \mid \mathbf{I}) \le 1$
- 2. $P(\Omega \mid I) = 1$
- 3. $P(A \cup B \mid \mathbf{I}) = P(A \mid \mathbf{I}) + P(B \mid \mathbf{I}) \quad [\text{ if } P(A \cap B \mid \mathbf{I}) = \emptyset]$
- 4. $P(A \cap B \mid I) = P(A \mid B, I) \cdot P(B \mid I) = P(B \mid A, I) \cdot P(A \mid I)$

Remember that probability is always conditional probability! *I* is the background condition (related to information ' I'_s) \rightarrow usually implicit (we only care on 're-conditioning')

Basic rules of probability

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Remember that probability is always conditional probability!

- I is the background condition (related to information I'_s)
- \rightarrow usually implicit (we only care on 're-conditioning')
- Note: 4. <u>does not</u> define conditional probability. (Probability is always conditional probability!)

Mathematics of beliefs

An even better news:


The fourth basic rule can be fully exploided!

Mathematics of beliefs

An even better news:

The fourth basic rule can be fully exploided!

(Liberated by a curious ideology that forbits its use)



 $P(A \mid B \mid I) P(B \mid I) = P(B \mid A, I) P(A \mid I)$ $P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(B \mid A) P(A)}{P(B)}$

$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A) P(A)}{P(B)}$ P(B)Take the courage to use it!

$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A) P(A)}{P(B)}$ It's easy if you try.

"The greater the probability of an observed event given any one of a number of causes to which that event may be attributed, the greater the likelihood of that cause {given that event}.

 $P(C_i \mid E) \propto P(E \mid C_i)$

"The greater the probability of an observed event given any one of a number of causes to which that event may be attributed, the greater the likelihood of that cause {given that event}. The probability of the existence of any one of these causes {given the event} is thus a fraction whose numerator is the probability of the event given the cause, and whose denominator is the sum of similar probabilities, summed over all causes.

$$P(C_i \mid E) = \frac{P(E \mid C_i)}{\sum_j P(E \mid C_j)}$$

"The greater the probability of an observed event given any one of a number of causes to which that event may be attributed, the greater the likelihood of that cause {given that event}. The probability of the existence of any one of these causes {given the event} is thus a fraction whose numerator is the probability of the event given the cause, and whose denominator is the sum of similar probabilities, summed over all causes. If the various causes are not equally probable *a priory*, it is necessary, instead of the probability of the event given each cause, to use the product of this probability and the *possibility of the cause itself*."

$$P(C_i \mid E) = \frac{P(E \mid C_i) P(C_i)}{\sum_j P(E \mid C_j) P(C_j)}$$

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"This is the fundamental principle (*) of that branch of the analysis of chance that consists of reasoning *a posteriori* from events to causes"

(*) In his "Philosophical essay" Laplace calls 'principles' the 'fondamental rules'.

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(*) In his "Philosophical essay" Laplace calls 'principles' the 'fondamental rules'.

Note: denominator is just a normalization factor.

 $\Rightarrow \qquad P(C_i \mid E) \propto P(E \mid C_i) P(C_i)$

Most convenient way to remember Bayes theorem

A reference to the Princeps Mathematicorum (Prince of Mathematicians) is <u>a must</u> in this town and in this place.

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$$P(C_i | \mathsf{data}) = \frac{P(\mathsf{data} | C_i)}{P(\mathsf{data})} P_0(C_i)$$

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"post illa observationes" "ante illa observationes" (Gauss)

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
"post illa observationes" "ante illa observationes" (Gauss)

Arguments used to derive Gaussian distribution

- $f(\mu | \{x\}) \propto f(\{x\} | \mu) \cdot f_0(\mu)$
- $f_0(\mu)$ 'flat' (all values a priory equally possible)
- \checkmark posterior maximized at $\mu = \overline{x}$


Cause-effect representation

box content \rightarrow observed color




Cause-effect representation

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


An effect might be the cause of another effect

A network of causes and effects



A network of causes and effects



and so on... \Rightarrow Physics applications

Inferring 'proportions'

Let's turn the toy experiment to a 'serious' physics case:

Inferring H_j is the same as inferring the proportion of white balls:

$$H_j \iff j \iff p = \frac{j}{5}$$

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Increase the number of balls

$$n: 6 \to \infty$$

 $\Rightarrow p \text{ continous in } [0,1]$

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
Increase the number of balls

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
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
- Generalize White/Black —> Success/Failure
- \Rightarrow efficiencies, branching ratios, ...

Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p




Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p






Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p




"independent Bernoulli trials"




"binomial distribution"

Making several independent trials assuming the same p




"independent Bernoulli trials"



"binomial distribution"


 \Rightarrow In the light of the experimental information there will be values of p we shall believe more, and others we shall believe less.

Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p



"independent Bernoulli trials"


 $P(p_i | O_1, O_2, ...)$ $f(p | O_1, O_2, ...)$



"binomial distribution"

 $P(p_i | X, n)$ f(p | X, n)


Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p



"independent Bernoulli trials"

 $P(p_i | O_1, O_2, ...)$ $f(p | O_1, O_2, ...)$

 $\propto f(O_1, O_2, \dots | p) \cdot f_0(p)$




"binomial distribution"

 $P(p_i | X, n)$ f(p | X, n)

$$\propto f(X \mid n, p) \cdot f_0(p)$$

Making several independent trials *assuming* the same p



"independent Bernoulli trials"

 $P(p_i | O_1, O_2, ...)$ $f(p | O_1, O_2, ...)$ $\begin{array}{c} P(p_i \,|\, X, n) \\ f(p \,|\, X, n) \end{array}$

p

"binomial distribution"

n trials


Are the two inferences the same? (not obvious in principle)

Before analysing in some detail this case let's make an overview of other important cases in physics


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
⇒ Nowadays, thanks to progresses in mathematics and computing, drawing the problem as a 'belief network' is more than 1/2 step towards its solution!

Signal and background





Signal and background






Determistic link μ_x 's to μ_y 's Probabilistic links $\mu_x \to x$, $\mu_y \to y$ (errors on both axes!) \Rightarrow aim of fit: $\{x, y\} \to \theta$






Determistic link μ_x 's to μ_y 's Probabilistic links $\mu_x \rightarrow x$, $\mu_y \rightarrow y$ (errors on both axes!) \Rightarrow aim of fit: $\{x, y\} \rightarrow \theta$ Extra spread of the data points


A physics case (from Gamma ray burts):






Adding systematics

Stated differently:




Only systematics (on both axes)




In this approach systematic effects reflect our uncertainty

⇒ they can be handled rigorousely using probability theory!


Probabilistic links: Cause-bins \leftrightarrow effect-bins




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
Sharing the observed events among the cause-bins




Academic (quite nasty!) smearing matrices:



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Application to the six box problem



Remind:

- $E_1 = White$
- $E_2 = \mathsf{Black}$

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

•
$$P(H_j | I) = 1/6$$

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• $P(E_i | I) = 1/2$
• $P(E_i | H_j, I)$:
• $P(E_1 | H_j, I) = j/5$
• $P(E_2 | H_j, I) = (5-j)/5$

Our tool:

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

$$P(H_j | I) = 1/6$$

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$$P(E_i | H_j, I) :$$

$$P(E_1 | H_j, I) = j/5$$

$$P(E_2 | H_j, I) = (5-j)/5$$

-Our prior belief about H_j

Our tool:

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

•
$$P(H_j | I) = 1/6$$

• $P(E_i | I) = 1/2$
• $P(E_i | H_j, I)$:
 $P(E_1 | H_j, I) = j/5$
 $P(E_2 | H_j, I) = (5-j)/5$

- Probability of E_i under a well defined hypothesis H_j It corresponds to the 'response of the apparatus in measurements.

 \rightarrow likelihood (traditional, rather confusing name!)

Our tool:

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

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- Probability of E_i taking account all possible H_j \rightarrow How much we are confident that E_i will occur.

Collecting the pieces of information we need

Our tool:

$$P(H_j | E_i, I) = \frac{P(E_i | H_j, I)}{P(E_i | I)} P(H_j | I)$$

•
$$P(H_j | I) = 1/6$$

• $P(E_i | I) = 1/2$
• $P(E_i | H_j, I)$:
 $P(E_1 | H_j, I) = j/5$
 $P(E_2 | H_j, I) = (5-j)/5$

- Probability of E_i taking account all possible H_j \rightarrow How much we are confident that E_i will occur. We can rewrite it as $P(E_i | I) = \sum_j P(E_i | H_j, I) \cdot P(H_j | I)$

We are ready

Now that we have set up our formalism, let's play a little

- analyse real data
- some simulations

Then

- $I \hspace{0.1cm} I \hspace{0.1cm} \longmapsto j \hspace{0.1cm} \longleftrightarrow \hspace{0.1cm} p_{j}$
- \bullet extending p to a continuum:
 - \Rightarrow Bayes' billiard

(prototype for all questions related to efficiencies, branching ratios)

• On the meaning of p

Which box? Which ball?

Inferential/forecasting history:

- 1. k = 0 $P_0(H_j) = P(H_j | I_0)$ (priors)
- 2. begin loop:
 - k = k + 1 $\Rightarrow E^{(k)}$ (k-th extraction)
- **3.** $P_k(H_j | I_k) \propto P(E^{(k)} | H_j) \times P_{k-1}(H_j | I_k)$

 $P_k(E_i \mid I_k) = \sum_j P(E_i \mid H_j) \cdot P_k(H_j \mid I_k)$ 4. \rightarrow go to 2

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4. \rightarrow go to 2

Let's play!

Bayes' billiard

This is the original problem in the theory of chances solved by Thomas Bayes in late '700:

- imagine you roll a ball at random on a billiard;
- you mark the relative position of the ball along the billiard's length (l/L) and remove the ball
- then you roll at random other balls
 - write down if it stopped left or right of the first ball;
 - remove it and go on with n balls.
- Somebody has to guess the position of the first ball knowing only how mane balls stopped left and how many stoppe right

It is easy to recongnize the analogy:

- Left/Right \rightarrow Success/Failure
- if Left \leftrightarrow Success:
 - $l/L \leftrightarrow p$ of binomial (Bernoulli trials)

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$$f(p \mid S) \propto f(S \mid p) = p$$

$$f(p \mid S, S) \propto f(S \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S) = p^{2}$$

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$$f(p \mid S, S, F) \propto f(F \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S, S) = p^{2}(1-p)$$

It is easy to recongnize the analogy:

- $\textbf{ Left/Right} \rightarrow \textbf{Success/Failure}$
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$$\begin{aligned} f(p \mid S) &\propto f(S \mid p) = p \\ f(p \mid S, S) &\propto f(S \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S) = p^2 \\ f(p \mid S, S, F) &\propto f(F \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S, S) = p^2 (1 - p) \\ & \dots \\ f(p \mid \#S, \#F) &\propto p^{\#S} (1 - p)^{\#F} = p^{\#S} (1 - p)^{(1 - \#S)} \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to recongnize the analogy:

- if Left \leftrightarrow Success:

• $l/L \leftrightarrow p$ of binomial (Bernoulli trials)

Solution with modern notation: Imagine a sequence $\{S, S, F, S, ...\}$ [f_0 is uniform]:

 $f(p \mid S) \propto f(S \mid p) = p$ $f(p \mid S, S) \propto f(S \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S) = p^{2}$ $f(p \mid S, S, F) \propto f(F \mid p) \cdot f(p \mid S, S) = p^{2}(1 - p)$ $f(p \mid \#S, \#F) \propto p^{\#S}(1 - p)^{\#F} = p^{\#S}(1 - p)^{(1 - \#S)}$

 $f(p | x, n) \propto p^{x} (1-p)^{(n-x)} \qquad [x = \#S]$

Parametric inference

 \rightarrow Choose a model and infer its parameter(s).

Bayes theorem for continuous variables has following structure


$$f(\theta \mid \mathsf{data}) \propto f(\mathsf{data} \mid \theta) f_0(\theta)$$


$$f(p \mid x, n, \mathcal{B}) = \frac{f(x \mid \mathcal{B}_{n,p}) f_{\circ}(p)}{\int_{0}^{1} f(x \mid \mathcal{B}_{n,p}) f_{\circ}(p) dp}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{n!}{(n-x)! x!} p^{x} (1-p)^{n-x} f_{\circ}(p)}{\int_{0}^{1} \frac{n!}{(n-x)! x!} p^{x} (1-p)^{n-x} f_{\circ}(p) dp}$$

$$= \frac{p^{x} (1-p)^{n-x}}{\int_{0}^{1} p^{x} (1-p)^{n-x} dp},$$

Inferring the Binomial p





Inferring the Binomial *p*

$$f(p \mid x, n, \mathcal{B}) = \frac{(n+1)!}{x! (n-x)!} p^x (1-p)^{n-x},$$

$$E(p) = \frac{x+1}{n+2}$$
Laplace's rule of successions
$$Var(p) = \frac{(x+1)(n-x+1)}{(n+3)(n+2)^2}$$

$$= E(p) (1 - E(p)) \frac{1}{n+3}.$$

Interpretation of $\mathbf{E}(p)$

Think at any future event $E_{i>n}$ \Rightarrow if we were sure of p, then our confidence on $E_{i>n}$ will be exactly p, i.e.

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$$P(E_{i>n} | x, n, \mathcal{B}) = \int_0^1 P(E_i | p) f(p | x, n, \mathcal{B}) dp$$

=
$$\int_0^1 p f(p | x, n, \mathcal{B}) dp$$

=
$$\mathbf{E}(p)$$

=
$$\frac{x+1}{n+2}$$
 (for uniform prior).

From frequencies to probabilities

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Laplace's rule of successions
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For 'large' n, x and n - x: asymptotic behaviors of f(p):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{E}(p) &\approx p_m = \frac{x}{n} \quad [\text{with } p_m \text{ mode of } f(p) \\ \sigma_p &\approx \sqrt{\frac{p_m \left(1 - p_m\right)}{n}} \xrightarrow[n \to \infty]{} 0 \\ p &\sim \mathcal{N}(p_m, \sigma_p) \,. \end{aligned}$$

Under these conditions the frequentistic "definition" (evaluation rule!) of probability (x/n) is recovered.

$$f(p \mid 0, n, \mathcal{B}) = (n+1)(1-p)^n$$

$$F(p \mid 0, n, \mathcal{B}) = 1 - (1-p)^{n+1}$$

$$p_m = 0$$

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
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
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
$$P(p \le p_u | 0, n, \mathcal{B}) = 95\%$$

 $\Rightarrow p_u = 1 - \sqrt[n+1]{0.05} :$

Probabilistic upper bound







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$$f(p | x = n, B) \propto p^n$$
 [Bayes Th.]

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 [its cumulative]

$$\Rightarrow p_m = 1$$
 [mode of posterior]

$$\Rightarrow \mathsf{E}[p] = \int_0^1 pf(p) \, dp = \frac{n+1}{n+2} \quad \text{[expected value]}$$

$$\begin{split} \sigma^2(p) &= \mathsf{E}[(p-\mathsf{E}[p])^2] = \mathsf{E}[p^2] - \mathsf{E}^2[p] \\ &= \int_0^1 p^2 f(p) \, dp - \left(\frac{n+1}{n+2}\right)^2 \\ &= \frac{n+1}{n+3} - \frac{(n+1)^2}{(n+2)^2} = \frac{n+1}{(n+3)(n+2)^2} \\ &\to \frac{1}{n^2} \,. \end{split}$$

 \Rightarrow Asymptotically ($n \rightarrow \infty$) the variance is the same for the two cases x = 0 and x = n (just a question of symmetry)

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
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The six box model can help to make the question clear.



Degree of belief Vs 'propension'

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Instead, "probability is the limit of frequency for $n \to \infty$ " is not more than an empty statement.

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Probability theory (in Laplage's sense) allows to attach probabilities to whatever we feel uncertain about!

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Other important parameters are related to background, systematics, 'etc.' [arguments not covere here]

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 (Diffidate chi vi promette di far germogliar zecchini nel Campo dei Miracoli! – Collodi docet)

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- It makes little sense to stick to old 'ah hoc' methods that had their raison d'être in the computational barrier.
- Mistrust all results that sound as 'confidence', 'probability' etc about physics quantities, if they are obtained by methods that do not contemplate 'beliefs'.

"The celebrated Monsieur Leibnitz has observed it to be a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the operations of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations."

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\Rightarrow still very true after \approx 300 years!

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"The type of critical reasoning which was required for the discovery of this central point was decisively furthered, in my case, especially by the reading of David Hume's and Ernst Mach's philosophical writings."

[And, in a different writing,]

. . .

"It is to the immortal credit of D. Hume and E. Mach that they, above all others, introduced this critical conception." (Albert Einstein)