

Setting up a Security Team

► The CERN CERT as an example

Dr. Stefan Lüders (CERN Computer Security Officer) Openlab Summer Student Lectures, July 8th 2013



Attackers vs. Defense

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There is no 100% security.

Security is as good as weakest link: Attacker chooses time, place, method Defender needs to protect against all...



theguardian

PlayStation Network hack: why it took Sony seven days to tell the world

Sony's company blog says forensic analysis of the PlayStation Network hack took 'several days' to complete and extent of intrusion wasn't understood until Tuesday







WE DID IT



Frederic J. Brown / AFP-Getty Images

Anonymous Hacked Justice Dept., FBI Sites

So much for staying Anonymous. The hacking group has admitted to crashing the Justice Department and FBI websites, after federal officials took down the popular file-sharing site Megaupload. Seven executives from Megaupload were indicted Thursday for disobeying copyright laws and protection, though the site's attorney denied the charges. Hours later, the websites of the Justice Department and Universal Music and the FBI's homepage all malfunctioned. Anonymous didn't steal any information from the sites—the attacks were meant to flood the pages with more traffic than they could handle and were targeted at the Stop Online Piracy Act. The founder of an online think tank

Attackers vs. Defense

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- ► There is no 100% security.
- Security is as good as weakest link: Attacker chooses time, place, method Defender needs to protect against all...



- Targeted attackers (+APTs) are focused and keen, have better skills/networks, are better financed/resourced
- The untargeted/stupid attackers might be caught...

"Anonymous is a handful of geniuses surrounded by a legion of idiots." Cole Stryker

Automatisms, at least, can be fought.

Defense usually lacks money/resources/networks.
 (International) Law is always a step behind.



Attackers vs. Defense







🏉 eBay - New & used electronics, cars, apparel, collectibles, sporting goods &	t more at low prices - Windows Internet Explorer
	- + X ascii Q -
😭 🏟 eBay - New & used electronics, cars, apparel, coll	
	Buy Sell My eBay Community Help
Welcome! Sign in or register.	Live help Site Map
All C	Categories - Search Advanced Search
Categories Motors Stores Deals	eBay Security & Resolution Center

Quiz: Which URL leads you to www.ebay.com ?

- http://www.ebay.com\cgi-bin\login?ds=1%204324@%31%33%37%2e%31%33%38%2e%31%33%37%2e%31%37%37/p?uh3f223d
- http://www.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn
- http://scgi.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?RegisterEnterInfo&siteid=0& co_partnerid=2&usage=0&ru=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ebay.com&rafId=0 &encRafId=default

http://secure-ebay.com







1. Understand your environment & security footprint.



Do you know your environment?






Academic Freedom at CERN

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CERN's Users:

- Infrom 100s of universities worldwide
- Pupils, students, post-docs, professors, technicians, engineers, physicists, …
- High turn-over (~10k per year)
- Merge of professional and private life: Social Networks, Dropbox, Gmail, LinkedIn, …

Distribution of All CERN Users by Nation of Institute on 9 January 2012



Academic Freedom in Research:

- ► No limitations and boundaries if possible
- Free communication & freedom to publish
- Difficult to change people, impossible to force them
- Trial of the new, no/very fast life-cycles, all-time prototypes
- Open campus attitude: I consider CERN being an ISP!



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Do you know your security foot-print?





CERN Sectors of Operations

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
CD stack with 1 year LHC data ≈ 20 Km Mt Blanc 4.8 Km




Office Computing Security Computing Services Security

Grid Computing Security Control Systems Security











2. Assess your threats!



Do you know your threats?





Under Permanent Attack

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CERN is under permanent attack... even now.

Servers accessible from Internet are permanently probed:

- ...attackers trying to brute-force passwords;
- …attackers trying to break Web applications;
- ...attackers trying to break-in servers and obtain administrator rights.

Users are not always aware/cautious/proactive enough:

- …attackers trying to harvest credentials outside CERN;
- …attackers trying to "phish" user passwords.

Security events happen:

- Web sites & web servers, data-base interfaces, computing nodes, mail accounts, ...
- The office network is very liberal: free connection policy and lots of visitors. Thus, there are always devices being infected/compromised.





Under Permanent Attack

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
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
work is very liberal: free connection policy and lots of visitors.




Phishing (1)




Data Leakage (1)



Data Leakage (2)



Suboptimal configuration (1)




Suboptimal configuration (2)



Suboptimal configuration (3)

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CERN

Break-Ins (1)

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220-<<<<>>==< Haxed by A¦0n3 >==<>>>>> Unpatched oscilloscope 220- ,,ø¤°°^°°¤ø,,,,ø¤°°^°°¤ø,,,,ø¤°°^° (running Win XP SP2) 220-/ 220-| Welcome to this fine str0 Today is Thursday 12 January 220 - 12006 "In March Windows computers were compromised...The initial compromised host was scanning the ... network and several compromise attempts succeeded due to MS-SQL servers (port 1433/tcp) with no password for the 'sa' account... ...Analysis indicated that the [THIRD PARTY SOFTWARE] 001 installation left the password empty by default..." Undocumented feature in SCADA application

Break-Ins (2)

● ● ●	Detectory	Lack of input validation & sanitization
26/11/09 ZeuL's Connect B Dumping Ar Connec	Terminal — ssh — ttys000 — 80×24 ssh 3200K 3250K 3300K 3350K	96% 11.49 MB/s
	<pre>3400K</pre>	(running LX)









What would be your strategy?





CERN Security Paradigm

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Find balance between "Academic Freedom", "Operations" and "Computer Security"

"Academic Freedom" means "Responsibility"

► (I, as Security Officer, decline to accept that responsibility)



If they don't feel ready, they can pass that responsibility to the IT department using central services.

Change of culture & a new mind set:

► Enable users to fully assume this responsibility.

► Make security integral part of the overall.

(Plus a Defense-In-Depth approach, still.)



CERN Security Paradigm

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Permanent Mitigation Cycle





Examples for "Prevention"?





Permanent Mitigation Cycle (1)

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Prevention:

- Definition and communication of security policies
- Security Baselining for systems & services: Contract between owner & Security Officer
- Assessments & reviews
- Training for secure coding & configuration practices
- Provisioning of static code analyzers
- Detection ► Vulnerability scanning: 🛒 🐑 w3af 🚞 skipfish w3af/Wapiti/Skipfish (Web apps), Nessus/nmap (hosts), John the Ripper (passwords), "Prodder"-scans (e.g. for Open Shares, MyPhpAdmin)...
- "Credential hunts" (e.g. unprotected clear text passwords on AFS) Plus:
- Deployment of an integrated identity management system, AuthZ & AuthN
- Central PC management & immediate patching
- Active research (e.g. Siemens/CERN openlab collaboration)



Examples for "Protection"?





Permanent Mitigation Cycle (2)


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Protection:

- "Defense-in-Depth", in particular for control systems
- Tightened outer perimeter firewall with life-cycle, scanning & opening approval
- Awareness raising: Dedicated awareness sessions, Introduction sessions for newcomers, Leaf sheets & posters

Plus:

- Segregated networks for dedicated purposes[®]
- Inter-network filtering and access control
- Deployment of local firewalls
- Centralized anti-virus software (on IT managed Windows PCs & servers)



Cybercriminals are trying to trick you!

Examples for "Detection"?





Permanent Mitigation Cycle (3)

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Detection:

- Statistical analysis of network flows: e.g. number of peers (→ P2P), multiple SSH/SNMP/Web connections, infected devices (ports 137/tcp, 139/tcp, 445/tcp)
- ► Analysis of DNS queries (→ Conficker worm)
- Packet inspection IDS: ~12k rules from VRT and ET for detection of e.g. IRC, ...



- "SSH receipts" for remote connections from "strange" locations
- Training of users to report phishing emails

Plus:

Centralized anti-virus software (on IT managed Windows PCs & servers)



How to do "Response"?





Permanent Mitigation Cycle (4)

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Response:

- Provisioning of CSIRT/CERT, and WLCG Grid Security Officer
- Containment
- Impact analysis / classification / prioritization
- Incident forensics (above a certain impact)
- ► Interaction with third parties: e.g. universities, SWITCH
- Recovery (i.e. usually reinstallation)
- Application of lessons learned
- Costing

Plus:

Business continuity planning / Disaster recovery planning

Verification: Annual Security Challenges inside the WLCG Grid







What makes a good Security Team?





A good Security Team

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A good Security Team is mainly facilitator and enabler, sometime enforcer, and (hopefully) rarely punisher.

Members of the Team cover all social and technical aspects: (see Belbin Team Role Inventory)


- "Resource Investigator" to reach out into the environment;
- "Co-ordinator" to manage the Team and its priorities;
- "Evaluator" to develop and deploy security policies;
- "Team Worker" to run security audits and provide consulting;
- "Implementer" to maintain the infrastructure;
- "Specialist" to dig into the forensics and deal with challenging technicalities.

Of course,

any key function can be assumed by anyone anytime!



CERN Computer Security Team



▶ incl. coordination of external efforts (Web services, comp'g clusters, ...)



CERN Computer Security Team









However, security events happen and will continue to happen






Lot's of **efforts on** *prevention* & *protection* while maintaining good *detection* & *response*




Enable users assuming responsibility. Provoke a Change-of-Mind!!!










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...and, of course, there are plenty of (good) books on computer security!!!

