

# Machine Protection Issues

#### M. Zerlauth

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# Outline

- LHC Machine Protection System today
- Challenges for Machine Protection in view of HL-LHC and crab cavities
  - New ultra fast failures due to crab cavities
- Possible mitigation strategies
- Conclusions



#### LHC Failure scenarios and their mitigation

- Three classes of failures considered for LHC protection
  - Ultra Fast failures (single beam passage during e.g. beam transfer, injection,...): passive protection with collimators and absorbers
  - Fast failures (few LHC turns following beam losses, certain fast powering failures,...): active protection with BLMs and dedicated protection systems
  - 'Slow' failures (powering failures, feedback, RF,..): Protection through equipment monitoring, ...



## **Machine Protection Architecture**





# Failure detection time @ LHC today



#### best failure detection time = $40\mu s$ = half LHC turn



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# **Machine Protection Response time**



- Current MPS architecture cannot protect against failures where damage potential is reached within <= 3 turns</li>
- Todays fastest failure is powering failure of nc separation dipole D1 (>10 turns before damage)



# Protection Challenges for HL-LHC



HL-LHC will have a <u>factor two</u> more stored beam energy than the nominal LHC and about a <u>factor five</u> more than experienced so far.

- Re-visit damage studies in view of HL-LHC beam parameters.
- New failure scenarios: due to proposed optics changes and new equipment e.g. crab cavities.

High Luminosity LHC

## Failure classifications of crab cavities

#### Slow/fast (external) failures

- Power cut
- Cryogenic failures
- Mechanical changes (tuner problem)
- ...

#### Timescales > 15 ms.

# for the slow of th



## New ultra fast failures due to Crab Cavities

- Little experience with ultra-fast CC failures - KEKB case suggests possibility of single-turn failures (true magnet quench?!)
- (Worst case) tracking simulations predict orbit distortion of 1.5σ\* within the first turn (1.7σ after 3 turns)
- Orbit distortion modulated by βtron tune.







3 CCs/IP and beam, 3.3 MV/module, instantaneous drop of in single CC

#### Expected energy lost due to $1.5\sigma$ beam shift

 Measurement in LHC showed beams with overpopulated tails (2% of beam outside 4σ) [F. Burkart, CERN Thesis 2012 046]





Tracking studies show that ~1/3 of this beam is lost within the first 3 turns (see previous talk)

Potentially > 2MJ of beam impacting on collimators → above (current) damage limit

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# Possible mitigation strategies 1/2

- 'Passive' protection through more and weaker crab cavities per side of IP
- Avoid correlated failures (mechanical/cryo/electrical separation)
- Compensation with fast LLRF control
- Partial depletion of transverse beam tails ( $1.5\sigma$ outside of primary collimators)
  - Hollow electron-lens, tune modulation, excitation of halo particles with AC dipole,...







See next talk.

**Reduced detection** time budget and redundancy in BLMs (depends on halo).





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# Possible mitigation strategies 2/2

- Improvement of MPS architecture
  - Direct dump links from CCs to IR6
  - Accept (more) asynchronous dumps with risk of local damage
  - Additional disposable absorbers
  - More abort gaps?!
- Investigate use of fast failure detection mechanisms as redundancy to LLRF
  - RF field monitor probe
  - Diamond beam loss detectors
  - Head-tail monitors
  - Power transmission through input coupler









# Towards integration of CCs in MPS

- Determine realistic worst-case failure scenarios and time-scales of (chosen) crab-cavity design during SM18 and SPS tests
- SPS test as first occasion to validate (new) failure detection mechanisms
- Measure transverse beam tails with 25ns (2015)
- Revisit damage studies with above input and final optics to derive protection requirements





# Conclusion

- Multi-fold redundancy for detection of critical failures has proven vital for safe LHC operation during run1.
- New ultra-fast failure modes expected due to crab cavities
  - In combination with overpopulated tails this cannot be safely protected today
  - Mitigation methods (halo depletion) may have knock on effect for detection of other failures via beam losses
- (Urgently) need experimental confirmation of CC's worst case failure scenarios for development of functional requirements to machine protection backbone
  - Active protection will require complex combination of LLRF, redundant failure detection, halo depletion + interlocking -> Detrimental to dependability of overall system & performance!





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# Machine Protection during SPS test

- To avoid LHC extraction (firing of kicker) CC out position must be interlocked with TT40 extraction
- Beam position vs beam loaded power (extraction bump, orbit oscillations after injection,...)
  - Interlocking in SIS only at end of cycle
  - Requires CC internal protection (+ current measurement on correctors?) connected to SPS BIS
- Detailed loss studies as for LHC



#### Courtesy: A.Macpherson

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# CCs in the SPS

#### **Closed Orbit**

- LHC beam: 450 GeV, Cavity Voltage: 3 MV
- Observe: Closed orbit transverse position at 900 phase advance from CC
- Global scheme in deflecting mode: ~1mm offset, no amplitude growth.



Head Tail: see R. Steinhagen 4th LHC CC workshop

#### • Head Tail

- LHC beam: 450 GeV, Cavity Voltage: 3 MV.
- Observe: transverse beam centroids at SPS HeadTail monitor
- Crabbing Mode: Expect broadening of head-tail centroids
- Deflecting Mode: No significant change in head-tail centroids





## **SPS Extraction Interlock**





## **SPS Extraction Interlock - BIS**





## **Beam Interlock System**



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PLC Workshop @ ESS