

# Business Continuity at DESY

... a collection of themes and thoughts

... covering among others measures, procedures and dependencies

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# General DESY risk assessment

- > DESY performs a general, yearly risk assessment
  - This is a formal process
  - Risks from all possible fields, including financial and other external ones
  - Also covers IT
  
- > Risk assessment performed by separate DESY entities
  - E.g. administration, machine control, ...
  - Not always formal process
  - Written/Oral reports from units to directorate after incidents
  
- > “DESY is an experiment-oriented laboratory” translates into “IT is second in priority for e.g. power and cooling after accelerators and experiments”
  - Does not mean that IT is neglected!



# ISO 27001 certification

- > Background: DESY project management office is asked by funding agencies to certify that its procedures and infrastructures conforms to ISO 27001
  - Includes IT ... which is most of central IT
- > External consultant first evaluating status and estimating work and costs of such a certification
- > So far interviews with all relevant groups within IT
- > First impression is that many requirements concerning setup and workflows are met, but formal documentation of processes should be enforced



# Network and IDS

- > Scanning networks and testing ports
  - Get to learn who does what -> “Who is running https server? HeartBleed”
  - See differences, e.g. when malware listens on ports
- > Efforts to separate different networks
  - Or define relations between networks
  - Incident containment
- > Investigations into flow monitoring
  - Checking for unusual patterns in network traffic
- > Network interventions and glitches have huge impact
- > Linux: Dedicated intrusion detection software on (most) systems
- > Windows: No dedicated IDS, anti-virus also catches some intrusions



# CC operation and Communication to users

## > Operational aspects

- Control room, workdays 8:00-20:00 with operator-on-duty
- On-call operator all other times

## > User Consulting Office (UCO)

- Generates user documentation
- Handles first level requests and trouble shooting
- Organizes communication with users in disaster situations

e.g. also by pinning paper information about network outages to entry doors of buildings...




# Computing Center and Power

- Three independent power lines to HH campus  
two used by IT in room 1 & 2 (same building)
- These two lines shared with other groups on campus
- Two independent lines with generally good and stable quality
- Have battery powered UPS – but mainly to flatten out voltage fluctuations or very short interruptions (~20 minutes)
- ~2 years ago, we had disturbances in internal power distribution system – complete black-out ... other independent power feeds would not have helped



# Cooling

- Climate (also in CC) not under IT control
  - ... The same for power distribution
  - More communication with infrastructure groups needed to make them understand our needs for separation and decoupling (which is more expensive)
- Cooling redundancy: Cold water ring
  - On HH campus, 8.4 MW total, 2 MW for IT
  - Two inputs: overhauled HERA cooling and new highly efficient PETRA III cooling
  - Currently ring not closed – more like a bus
- Cooling redundancy: Distribution in the CC
  - Recent incident: Work on increasing redundancy of in air cooling for room 1 resulted in cascade of short-circuits that stopped cooling of water-cooled racks in room 2
  - (Some) water-cooled racks react very fast to cooling disturbance because of small amount of air



# General comments on cooling and power

- > IT depends on other DESY departments for climate and power
  - ... recall “DESY is an experiment-oriented laboratory”
  - Generally good service and fast reaction
  
- > Climate and power: Historically grown infrastructure
  
- > Chasing single-point of failures?
  - We will discover unknown single-point-of-failures
  - Probably better to accept this fact and concentrate on optimizing reaction handling





# One event we failed to prepare against (7/2013)


- > One of our two lines was cut
- > Transformer on second line overheated
- > On batteries for ~20 minutes ... power came back in last second
- > No set procedures, but the whole crew reacted well – we survived!
- > ... and we were lucky: The helium line above was not in use ...



# High-Availability, Server and service redundancy

## High-Availability & Redundancy :

- Whenever possible, set up systems in high-availability mode
- Using VMware + Cisco UCS to build infrastructure for mission critical applications
  - ... spread over Computer Rooms 1&3 (~500m apart)
  - ... e.g. for EDMS, Person management systems, Mail, ...
- Classic Cold/Warm/Hot standby
- Load-Balancer with fail-over: F5 & Poise (own development, advanced metrics)
- Fail-Over cluster etc. whenever necessary and possible



# Configuration management

- > General tendency towards common and widespread tools
  - WDS/WSUS for Windows well established
  - Migration to Puppet for Linux (actually consolidation of Quattor/Salad+WBOOM/FAI)
- > Introducing version control management in configurations puppet
  - Enables roll-back, auditing, ...
- > Automate configuration as much as possible
  - Fast reinstall with guaranteed results
- > Make secret handling processes (pw, keys, certs,...) auditable
  - See Sven's talk
- > Using vanilla distributions with only minimal changes
  - E.g. discontinue HEP ENV / HEP X11



# Backup & Archive & Tapes

## > Backup & Archive & Tapes:

- For TSM backups data is saved redundantly in two locations (HH and ZN)
- For selected archive data sets two copies are held: one online in silo, other offline in former atomic shelter
- Other methods of redundant data keeping are considered, e.g. cloud storage syncing: although this is not backup it might help users with broken notebooks

## > Disaster recovery

- of notebooks&desktops: TSM backup methods are sufficient (or not needed: \$HOME on network FS)
- of RAID-Arrays without copy/backup: Very rare, rapid escalation to external data rescue experts ... costly but usually successful





# Human Continuity \_ 1

- as workload is high, for some services we do not have  $n+1$  ( $n=1$ ) redundancy
  - even when desirable, budgets won't allow for it
- absence or exit of colleagues can leave holes
  - illness
  - leaving DESY usually before new recruitment has finished
  - spreading tasks over remaining staff will only work for limited time
- standardization, use of widespread tools and products
  - Allows for hiring external fire-fighters



# Human Continuity \_ 2

- > past cases have raised awareness of importance of up-to-date documentation
  - In disaster situations
  - Knowledge transfer after changes in personnel
- > and even more of the independent check that this documentation is understandable and complete
  - many minor details are taken as common knowledge (by the author...)
- > unfortunately, this also increases workload
  - but can well be built into operating procedures



# ... being a Scientific Computing Center

- > In the end, our mission is to serve Scientists and enable Science

## **Need to find a balance between**

- > **Stable, well documented infrastructures and workflows**
- > **Flexible environment to ad-hoc**
  - Deploy non-standard hardware and software
  - Bypass procedures in case of needs from scientists
  - ... and later include in standardization and documentation

**This is what distinguishes us from commercial hosters**

