

POCPA Workshop

Trieste, May 2008

# Reliability of Static Var Compensators

**Karsten KAHLE**


**CERN, Electric Power Distribution Group**

# The Static Var Compensators for SPS in 2008


1. What is a Static Var Compensator (SVC)?
2. The electrical network for Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS)
3. Reliability studies for LHC electrical distribution network
4. Overview of SVC3 project
5. Reliable design and operation of Static Var Compensators
6. SVC3 performance measurements
7. Conclusions

**What is a Static Var Compensator (SVC)?**

# Static Var Compensator SVC3 for SPS



# Harmonic filter design



Impedance diagram  $Z = f(f)$


## The performance of SPS Static Var Compensators

		without SVC	with SVC
reactive power compensat.	reactive power	70 Mvar	0...10 Mvar
harmonic filtering	THD(U) (18 kV)	20 %	0.75 %
voltage stabilization 18 kV	$\Delta U$ (18 kV)	- 14 %	$\pm 0.5 \%$ $\pm 1.5 \%^{*1}$

\*1) for very fast transient changes (ramp-down)

**The electrical network**  
**for Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS)**

# Electrical Network for Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS)





# BE substation configurations (3 transformers, 3 SVC's)

SPS continues operation in case of one failure:


Failure of transformer EHT1

or transformer EHT2


or SVC3

or SVC2


# BE substation configurations




# BE substation configurations



# BE substation configurations




# BE substation configurations



INDICE	DATE	NOM	ZONE	MODIFICATION
11				
10				
9				
8				
7				
6				
5				
4				
3				
2				
1				

SPS	COULE	NOM	DATE
Principle pulsed distribution	DESSEINE	P.La logs	12/03/00
S/Station BE	CONTROL		
	VAL		
	DOSSIER	L0188	
	REPLACE		


# BE substation configurations



**Reliability studies for electrical distribution system  
of Large Hadron Collider (LHC)**

# Reliability studies for LHC electrical distribution system

## Computer model



**ZW-Transformator**

Parameter | Grenzwerte | Regelung | Erdung | SIMPOW-Regler | Info

Zuverlässigkeit | Weitere... | Benutzer-Daten

Zuverlässigkeitsdaten des Elements

Element ideal

Datentyp: Trafo HS (400/66kV und 66/1) ... Typ entfernen


Ausfallbereich: 0 (0 = keiner)

Typdaten (Komponente)

Typ ideal

	H 1/a	Prob -	T h
Unabhängiger, stochast. Ausfall, kurz:	0,00461		2,29
Unabhängiger, stochast. Ausfall, lang:	0,07217		31,516
Determinierte Abschaltung, kurz:	0		0
Wartungsabbruch, kurz:	0		0
Determinierte Abschaltung, lang:	0		0
Wartungsabbruch, lang:	0		0
Handabschaltung, verzögert:	0		0
Handabschaltung, unverzüglich:	0		0
Erdschluss (isol./komp. Netze):	0	0	0


## Input data for each component




## Quantification of reliability data (results)




# Reliability studies for LHC electrical distribution system



Computer model




Calculated reliability data for each load




Calculated reliability data for each load

# Reliability studies for LHC electrical distribution system




Probability of interrupted power



Statistical duration of each interruption

## Overview of SVC3 project

# Overview of SVC3 project



# Overview of SVC3 project



Thyristor controlled reactors (TCR) and thyristor valve

# Overview of SVC3 project



18 kV busbar system for TCR and 72 kV circuit breaker

# Overview of SVC3 project



8 Harmonic filters in total

## Overview of SVC3 project



18 kV outdoor installation  
(attention to thermal expansion of bars!)





# **Reliable design and operation** **of Static Var Compensators**

(example: SVC3 project)

# Reliability of auxiliary power





Auxiliary supply for 400kV station at CERN:  
Two redundant systems with automatic coupling



Distribution chassis with two independent sources,  
via diodes

For critical installations:  
Two redundant sources of auxiliary power

# Thermal expansion of busbars



$\alpha$  coefficient ( $\times 10^{-6}/K$ )

Copper: 17


Aluminium: 23

Delta T:  $-25^{\circ}C \rightarrow +75^{\circ}C$  = 100 Kelvin

Length of busbar = 100 m

**Thermal expansion of Al bars = 23 cm**

# Reliability of power connections (bad examples)



Connection of two conducting elements should ideally have only one connection point, max. two



# Reliability of power connections (good examples)




# Redundancy and modular design for easy repair



- Two redundant computers (hot stand-by)
  - \* automatic switch-over without SVC trip
- One spare computer for each unit,
  - \* plug-in connections,
  - \* spare computers fully commissioned,
  - \* detailed instructions how to replace,
  - \* automatic start-up of new computers,
  - \* can be replaced by operator without computer knowledge (within 2 hours)

# Reducing cabling errors by design



Example: protection relays:

- in factory: Chassis cabled and fully tested
- on site: standardised cabling connections via BURNDY connector
- time reduction for commissioning (time reduced by 50%)
- reduction of cabling errors (less than 1 error per 10 HV feeders found during commissioning)

## Auxiliary systems might strongly influence reliability



Example: Air-conditioning unit in SVC control room  
(without A/C, temperature in control room rises above 40°C and computers shut down)



# Reliability of earthing connections





Example: earthing of fences  
(attention to choice of materials!)

# Infrared imaging and thermal optimisation

<b>LHC Project ID</b>	<b>Sub ID</b>
Static VAR Compensator SVC3 (BEQ3) For SPS	Rev.: 1.0 (Draft) Date: 2007-02-08

## 2. IR RESULTS AND COMMENTS

### 2.1 IR PICTURE 01



Filename	IR_0343.jpg
Date	05/02/2008
Image Time	15:54:20
Emissivity	0.97
Max. Temperature	60.9 °C
Min Temperature	-1.4 °C
Sp1 Temperature	15.2 °C
Ar1 Max. Temperature	60.9 °C
Ar1 Min. Temperature	1.3 °C

**E.U.T. Ref:**  
TCR reactor L2.3

**Comments:**  
TCR reactors have temperature class F (140 degr. C, hot spot 155 degr C).

**OK.**

### 2.2 IR PICTURE 02

Filename	IR_0344.jpg
Date	05/02/2008
Image Time	15:55:36
Emissivity	0.97
Max. Temperature	62.8 °C
Min Temperature	-18.5 °C
Sp1 Temperature	0.6 °C
Ar1 Max. Temperature	40.8 °C
Ar1 Min. Temperature	-12.3 °C

**E.U.T. Ref:**  
TCR reactor L2.3



**Comments:**  
TCR reactors have temperature class F (140 degr. C, hot spot 155 degr C).

**OK.**

SVC3\_IR-Report\_2008-02-05\_Commissioning\_rev1.doc Page 6 of 34

<b>LHC Project ID</b>	<b>Sub ID</b>
Static VAR Compensator SVC3 (BEQ3) For SPS	Rev.: 1.0 (Draft) Date: 2007-02-08

### 2.21 IR PICTURE 21



Filename	IR_0363.jpg
Date	05/02/2008
Image Time	16:18:20
Emissivity	0.97
Max. Temperature	*125.2 °C
Min Temperature	*-21.6 °C
Sp1 Temperature	7.6 °C
Ar1 Max. Temperature	54.9 °C
Ar1 Min. Temperature	-13.5 °C

**E.U.T. Ref:**  
Arrival of cables in TCR park.

**Comments:**  
No hot spots discovered.

**OK.**

### 2.22 IR PICTURE 22

Filename	IR_0364.jpg
Date	05/02/2008
Image Time	16:18:45
Emissivity	0.97
Max. Temperature	77.5 °C
Min Temperature	*-22.5 °C
Sp1 Temperature	2.2 °C
Ar1 Max. Temperature	59.6 °C
Ar1 Min. Temperature	-5.5 °C

**E.U.T. Ref:**  
Arrival of cables in TCR park.

**Comments:**  
No hot spots discovered.

**OK.**

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IR imaging is part of the preventive maintenance programme

# Reliability and operation of HV installations

SVC3 Event report No. 7  
K. Kahl

Short description: Error in transmission of analogue data points to CEREN SCATE X

Date - time: 9.5.2008

Downtime statistics:  
a) SVC3 was not stopped, no downtime  
b) Interventions: Georges Bardet (TS-EL-CO control section)

Event No. 1: SVC3 MACH Alarm, reported to ABB per email dt: Tue 15.4. 20:31  
 event No. 2: SVC3, reported to ABB per email dt: Wed 16.4. 9:17  
 event No. 3: OWS measurement page, reported Wed 16.4. 14:32  
 event No. 4: See this email below  
 event No. 5: 26.4.2008 False Trip In, Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC, incorrect time synchronization, incorrect event description  
 event No. 6: 8.5.2008 / 9.5.2008 Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC  
 event No. 7: 9.5.2008 Error in transmission of analogue data points to CEREN SCATE X

Event No. 7 description  
 (CEREN industrial specialist for communication and SCADA: Georges Bardet georges.bardet@cern.ch)

The analog type Data Point related to the Cooling Plant (of BEQ) are not at SCATE X.  
 As shown in the attached file, the values were correctly transmitted during performed with ABB in February 2008.

We saw that the values are displayed on the OWS synoptic related to the CEREN.

We checked the statistics about communication with the application installed when no transmission errors.

We re-launched the IEC communication between GWS and our FES90 (old name SCADA, SCATE X)

Questions to ABB:  
 - Which kind of diagnostic we could run to point the error?  
 - Are there symptoms linked to the synchronization error between OWS and CEREN previously reported?

SVC3 Event report No. 8  
K. Kahl

Short description: False SCADA alarm SEPAM 'EMD117BE NCG Test combiflex' (responsibility CEREN)

Date - time: 12.5.2008

Downtime statistics:  
a) SVC3 was not stopped, no downtime  
b) Interventions: Patrick Galley (TS-EL-OP stand-by section)

Event No. 1: SVC3 MACH Alarm, reported to ABB per email dt: Tue 15.4. 20:31  
 event No. 2: SVC3, reported to ABB per email dt: Wed 16.4. 9:17  
 event No. 3: OWS measurement page, reported Wed 16.4. 14:32  
 event No. 4: See this email below  
 event No. 5: 26.4.2008 False Trip In, Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC, incorrect time synchronization, incorrect event description  
 event No. 6: 8.5.2008 / 9.5.2008 Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC  
 event No. 7: 9.5.2008 Error in transmission of analogue data points to CEREN SCATE X  
 event No. 8: 12.5.2008 False SCADA alarm SEPAM 'EMD117BE NCG Test combiflex' (responsibility CEREN)

Event No. 8 description  
 (CEREN contact: Y. Courrigan)

> -----Original Message-----  
 > From: Patrick Galley  
 > Sent: Tuesday, 12 May 2008 9:17 AM  
 > To: Karim Kahl  
 > Cc: Jean-Francois Lattagat; Gerard Cuesi  
 > Subject: Appel paquet vers alarme test combiflex normal vers alarme  
 >  
 > Bonjour,  
 >  
 > Nous avons eu un appel paquet lundi 10/05 vers 10h avec le message d'alarme suivant:  
 > "EMD117BE 805 Test combiflex normal vers alarme"  
 > Sur place, aucun alarme.  
 > Possibilités de nous donner vos avis éclairés sur cette alarme?  
 > En ce qui concerne par avance.  
 > Cordialement.

Next steps:

SVC3 Event report No. 9  
K. Kahl

Short description: Induced currents in earthing system (responsibility CEREN)

Date - time: 15.5.2008 13:30 - 15:45

Downtime statistics:  
a) SVC3 was stopped, downtime 2h 15 min  
b) Interventions: P. Galley, M. Lesjoe, P.P. Lattagat, K. Kahl, D. Demassis

Event No. 1: SVC3 MACH Alarm, reported to ABB per email dt: Tue 15.4. 20:31  
 event No. 2: SVC3, reported to ABB per email dt: Wed 16.4. 9:17  
 event No. 3: OWS measurement page, reported Wed 16.4. 14:32  
 event No. 4: See this email below  
 event No. 5: 26.4.2008 False Trip In, Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC, incorrect time synchronization, incorrect event description  
 event No. 6: 8.5.2008 / 9.5.2008 Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC  
 event No. 7: 9.5.2008 Error in transmission of analogue data points to CEREN SCATE X  
 event No. 8: 12.5.2008 False SCADA alarm SEPAM 'EMD117BE NCG Test combiflex' (responsibility CEREN)  
 event No. 9: 15.5.2008 Induced currents in earthing system, melted fence

Event No. 9 description:  
 The CCC was called by contractor of SOTEB working in the vicinity of SVC3 main busbar around the fence close to earthing switch EMC101. The CCC site TS-EL-OP stopped the SVC3.

Immediate inspection by TS-EL-OP, K. Kahl, D. Demassis, and the following:  
 - fence (metal) partially melted,  
 - both holding the diagonal support bar for the fence completely melted,  
 - fence (metal) touching the earthing bar of EMC101 partially melted,  
 - two C-connections of the earthing cable of the fence were also found having a temperature. This needs to be monitored.

The damages were caused by currents circulating in the earthing system (main earthing busbar) had been installed by CEREN during the SVC3 commissioning phase. The following actions were taken:  
 - replacement of damaged fence (metal),  
 - removal of diagonal support bar. The stability of fence is assured without this installed during next winter shutdown.

Conclusions: Avoid closed loops in the earthing system!

Follow up:  
 - Re install diagonal bar during next winter shutdown.  
 - Monitor temperature of two C-connections of fence earthing cable around the yard.

SVC3 Event report No. 10  
K. Kahl

Short description: Incorrect SCADA alarm Beyonville BE1 1310 and KTS59 (responsibility CEREN)

Date - time: 15.5.2008

Downtime statistics:  
a) SVC3 was not stopped  
b) Interventions: Y. Courrigan, Tel. 168475

Event No. 1: SVC3 MACH Alarm, reported to ABB per email dt: Tue 15.4. 20:31  
 event No. 2: SVC3, reported to ABB per email dt: Wed 16.4. 9:17  
 event No. 3: OWS measurement page, reported Wed 16.4. 14:32  
 event No. 4: OWS, both MACH systems ACTIVE HDLC and HDL alarm of card P5K30-SUP  
 event No. 5: 26.4.2008 False Trip In, Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC, incorrect time synchronization, incorrect event description  
 event No. 6: 8.5.2008 / 9.5.2008 Card P5K30-SUP Alarm HDLC  
 event No. 7: 9.5.2008 Error in transmission of analogue data points to CEREN SCATE X  
 event No. 8: 12.5.2008 False SCADA alarm SEPAM 'EMD117BE NCG Test combiflex' (responsibility CEREN)  
 event No. 9: 15.5.2008 Induced currents in earthing system, melted fence  
 event No. 10: 15.5.2008 Incorrect SCADA alarm Beyonville BE1 1310 and KTS59

Event No. 10 description:  
 From: Dominique Derouze  
 Sent: Friday, 16 May 2008 6:07 PM  
 To: Yvan Courrigan  
 Cc: Karim Kahl  
 Subject: RE: Bay controller 1


Code	Description	Actual state	State 0	State 1
LQM31/BE_1310	Cable OH SVC3 par PCC Interlock	0	pas de Cc0 visible	Cc0 visible
EMQ31/BE_KTS59	Cc01 pas de diag	0	OK	ALARM1, DES 4 PHEMILITEURS SUR OFF

voir en rouge ci-dessus le message de 1310 et de KTS59  
 je ne sais pas si les 2 lignes de touches sont jaunes mais pour nous EMQ31 ou EMQ31 cable ne sont rien dire

Cordialement et bon week-end  
 Dominique

## Follow-up procedure for all alarms and observations

# Reliability and operation of HV installations: The human factor



Clear instructions for:

- operation,
- fault finding and corrective maintenance,
- preventive maintenance

Training of operators

Systematic follow-up of all alarms and observations

Keep detailed statistics of downtime and failure causes!

# Spare parts management

- Define spare parts policy,
- example: spares management of CERN's Power Converter Group (F. Bordry),
- bar code identification for each item in stock and central data base,
- maintenance of spares in stock
- technical data sheets,
- re-test spares, if necessary,
- keep inventory up-to-date, replace spares when used.

## Example of overheating due to induced currents in a closed earthing circuit



Burned fence




Cause:  
unwanted interconnection  
of two earthing circuits

Melted bolt M10




## SVC3 performance measurements

# Static Var Compensator SVC3






# Harmonic filtering performance



Calculated THD (18kV)  
0.58 %



Measured THD (18kV)  
0.49 %

(e.g. for pulse 450 GeV FT 3s)

# SVC3: Simulations of dynamic response (University of Belfast UK, University of Aberdeen UK)




Figure 2a. SPS active and reactive power for a 400GeV cycle, with the existing SVC compensation.





Figure 2b). 18kV bus voltage for a 400GeV cycle, with the existing SVC compensation.

1.5%

-1.5%

Active and reactive power  
(pulse larger than 450 GeV FT 3s)

18 kV voltage response  
(simulated)




-2.5%

18 kV voltage response  
(measured)


Close correspondence  
Simulations - Measurements

# SVC3 (450 GeV FT 3s)



Active and reactive power


# SVC3 (450 GeV FT 3s)



Current of SMD's (450 GeV FT 3s)

# SVC3 (450 GeV FT 3s)


Phase-to-phase RMS voltage



18 kV voltage response

# SVC3 (450 GeV LHC pulse)


## Active and reactive power




# SVC3 (450 GeV LHC pulse)

18 kV voltage response (450 GeV LHC pulse)

Phase-to-phase RMS voltage



# SVC3 (450 GeV LHC pulse) – with regulation error




SVC3 regulation error: 18 kV network voltage response (is now repaired)



# European 400 kV network RTE during 450 GeV FT 3s pulse

voltage response 400 kV



# Summary

Reliability covers all aspects of the life cycle of an electrical installation:

- design,
- specification of components (thermal rating, voltage rating),
- choice of materials,
- workmanship of installation,
- preventive and corrective maintenance,
- operation and follow-up of observations,
- operational procedures, documentation and instructions,
- spare parts management.

**Questions ?**

Thank you.