


# Identity Federation in HEP / WLCG

FIM4R, Frascati, 23-24 April 2014

R. Wartel, CERN





# Background

- We have been working **with** identity federation for 10+ years
- X.509-based infrastructure, policy and accreditations of IdPs
- Very successful!
- But has some limitations from the users
  - Users repeatedly reported X.509 is not easy to manage
  - X.509 for end-users not widely adopted in the industry
  - Multiple accounts to manage for all users (CERN account, home account, X.509 certificate)
- Aim to make some services available to a wider community
  - Including non-X.509 users, services, organisations
- EduGAIN identified as the appropriate forum for CERN and WLCG to reach out to its users and IdPs



# CERN - SWITCHaai

- CERN and WLCG wish to reach out to their users as well as the wider research community, via eduGAIN
- SWITCH is the Federation Operator of SWITCHaai
  - Higher education Fed for Switzerland - one of the first SAML Fed
  - Plays an leading role in enabling new user communities for the eduGAIN interfederation service.
- CERN now participating in SWITCHaai
  - Most documents signed
  - Official announcement expected in the coming weeks
- Technical work has started at CERN with help from SWITCH
  - Goal: open some services to eduGAIN IdPs under **2 conditions**:
    - Signed/opt-in inter-federation access
    - CERN is assured that basic security practices are in effect
      - Discussions with Geant, eduGAIN, and other communities started




# Next steps for WLCG

- Another **pilot**, including realistic workflow:
  - Web based, but involving traditional grid services
  - E.g. Download a “grid” file from a Web browser?
- Aims:
  - Learn what the issues are
  - Straw-man architecture



# A pilot project for WLCG



Identity Federation with the CERN SSO  
**PHASE 1**



Cern Authentication

https://login-dev.cern.ch/adfs/ls/?wa=wsignin1.0&wreply=https%3A%2F%2Fshib2.cern.ch%2FShibboleth.sso%2FADFS&wct=2...

# CERN Single Sign-On

Sign in with a CERN account, a Federation account or a public service account

**ACT NOW! Please change your CERN passwords before 13 May 2014**  
Due to a serious vulnerability named "Heartbleed" affecting many different Internet services, we are taking now more proactive measures and ask you to **CHANGE your CERN passwords**  
[\[ Click to expand \]](#)

## Sign in with your CERN account

*Reminder: you have agreed to comply with the CERN computing rules*

### Use credentials

Username or Email address Password

Remember Username or Email Address [Need password help ?](#)

### Use one-click authentication

 [Sign in using your current Windows/Kerberos credentials \[autologon\]](#)  
Use your current authentication token. You need Internet Explorer on CERN Windows or Firefox on SLC (Firefox help here).

 [Sign in using your Certificate \[autologon\]](#)  
Use a EuGridPMA trusted certificate. Don't forget to first map your Certificate to your CERN Account.

### Use strong two factor authentication [show]

## Sign in with a public service account

 [Facebook, Google, Live, etc. \(DEV\)](#)  
Authenticate using an external account provider such as Facebook, Google, Live, Yahoo, Orange.


## Sign in with a Federation account

- INFN
- SWITCH AAI
- Switch AAI Guest Login
- US ATLAS



Federation-example Site x

← → ↻ 🏠 🔒 https://[blurred URL] ☆ 🛑 ☰

 **This is an example page using Identity Federation**


---

**Authentication type:** Federation  
**Username:** CERN\rwartel  
**CERT Subject:**  
[logout](#)

---



# A pilot project for WLCG



Identity Federation with the CERN SSO

**PHASE 2**





# Benefits

- **Users can access WLCG services without asking for a certificate**
  - Major step forward!
- Possible to reach out and interconnect easily with other research communities
- Many workflow and usability advantage
- However, many open questions!
  - How to choose the appropriate VOMS instance?
  - How to manage the “new” DN of the users and VOMS?
  - Who gets to use identity federation?
  - How to manage the “transition” for all users and avoid multiple DNs?
  - How will we manage traceability, incident handling, etc.?



# Attributes requirements and regulation

- A policy on “Attributes for WLCG”
  - Define what attributes should be **required from users**, and the **conditions to release them (or not)**
    - Persistent user id (random string)
    - Back channel to get back in touch with the user (email address)
    - VO membership and role
    - Real name (not released unless conditions in a security policy are matched)
  - **Lose real name in credential string** (gridmap file, DN)
  - Transfer the Level of Assurance requirements, under some circumstances, **to the attribute providers (VOMS)**
    - Make it easier to user our services (InCommon Basic, etc.)
    - Focus our attention and requirements on Authorization/Attributes
- **HEP/WLCG needs few and simple attributes**
  - But they need to be fully harmonised across administrative domains



# Policies and Trust

- A common policy framework is necessary
  - Especially for **inter-federation work**
  - **EduGAIN security policies insufficient** for “real” operations
  - **Avoid many bilateral agreements** with the IdPs
  - All these agreements will have to be **repeated for each community**
- A lot of work has been done already
  - SCI: Security for Collaborating Infrastructures
  - EGI, OSG, PRACE, EUDAT, CHAIN, WLCG, and XSEDE
  - <http://www.eugridpma.org/sci/>
  - **Can we expand this work to federation and have more communities to join?**
- **IGTF: IOTA Profile** (<http://www.igtf.net/ap/iota>)
  - Lower assurance on ID vetting by CA
  - Key element for identity federation!



# Operational considerations

- Identity federation brings more than implementation issues
  - Affects **security incident handling** and **security operations**
- In the current model
  - Service providers implement user banning & conduct forensics
  - IdPs (e.g. certificate authority) perform (almost) no operational role
- In a federated realm
  - IdPs implement emergency suspension and also collect essential traceability information
  - **IdPs** will therefore have to provide operational capabilities and **actively participate in incident response**
- Providing operational capability is a significant change
  - Requires careful planning to ensure sufficient logging, expertise, communication channels, etc. are in place



# Conclusion

- Pretty exciting time!
  - Interesting window of opportunity
- Feasibility and architecture still being discussed
  - Devil in the details, but they are also many identified challenges
- **Appropriate operational security essential**
  - **Discussion started, everyone welcome!**
- Many different areas to discuss
  - Technical work
  - Attributes
  - Trust issues
  - Roles and responsibility
  - Transition