

Intrusion Prevention and Detection in Grid computing - The ALICE Case

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Outline:

- › Introduction
- › Threat model
- › Intrusion prevention
- › Intrusion detection
- › Summary

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
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Introduction: ALICE Grid

- > 70 sites
 - > 30 countries
 - >45000 CPU cores
 - > 50PB of storage
 - > 1000 users
-
- Arbitrary code execution by design
 - Huge amount of computational power and organization reputation, a goal for adversaries
 - Focus on HEP → data is public but integrity is important



Grid Threat model

The adversary may have one or more goals:

- **Modify** experiment data
- **Attack** experiment infrastructure -> **online-offline 2018**
- **Abuse** Grid resources

- **Steal** sensitive data
- **Compromise** users' machines
- **Denegation** of service
- **Damage** the organization reputation




Project main goals

Improve computer security in the GRID by:

- Intrusion prevention
- Security by isolation
- Intrusion detection
- Analysis of Job behavior
- Machine learning



Specific Grid issues we want to address




- No separation between different levels of privileges
- Job execution environment not properly enforced
- No multi user execution
- Sensitive resources not isolated
- No automatic way of preventing and detecting intrusions




Objectives: Intrusion prevention

- › We want to run the payloads in an isolated environment
- › The Pilot Job would have unrestricted access to containers
- › Anything running inside the container should be isolated




Objectives: Security by isolation

- › All components run as unprivileged users
- › Root emulation inside the container
- › The Jobs run with less privileged Grid user
- › Unprivileged Isolated Multi User Pilot Jobs
- › Use containers to achieve isolation



Containers



- › Lightweight, fast, disposable
- › Virtual environments
- › Boot in milliseconds
- › Just a few MB of intrinsic disk/memory usage
- › Bare metal performance is possible



Containers vs Virtual Machines: Security


Virtual Machines:

- › More layers of protection
- › Huge surface of attack
- › Alone, it does not solve our requirements!


Containers:

- › The kernel is directly exposed
- › Less mature technology
- › Reduced surface of attack
- › Attenuation of kernel exposition possible
- › Less time to update (kernel bugs)
- › Fine-grained control

Virtual Machines



Containers




Containers: Reducing the surface of attack

- Again: Use unprivileged user and containers!
- Use **Seccomp-bpf** to filter available system calls
 - **Sandboxes**
 - Tor
 - Firefox
 - Chrome
 - Use LSM technologies like Apparmor
 - **Optionally**: use Grsecurity Linux kernel patch
 - **Optionally**: use containers over VMs



Objectives: Intrusion detection

- **Measure Job behavior**
- **Raise alarms** on possible attacks
- **Adapt** to dynamic environment
- Several metrics:
 - Job and system logs
 - System calls sequence
 - Common monitoring data



Intrusion detection: Machine learning

- Common IDS use **fixed** rules
- Machine learning methods can help to generalize
- Analyze **“normal”** behavior vs **“malicious”** behavior
- **Train** AI algorithm
- Specific algorithm under research



Project steps

Done

- AliEn grid running in a single machine
- Framework modified to execute Jobs inside an unprivileged container

Todo

- Create a custom site for security testing - 2015
- Modify Alien/JAlien to fully execute Jobs in containers - 2015
- Research on Machine Learning for IDS – 2015/2016
- Develop a complete prototype - 2016



Challenges

- Security vs performance
- What if we consider private data
- What if we consider external attacks
- How to analyze the huge amount of trace/logs data generated in a efficient way
- How to share information between several components of the Grid
- Reduce the amount of false positives and negatives



Summary

- Job execution environment in the Grid has to be hardened
- Containers provide security by isolation among the Grid components and the underline machine
- We have to detect intrusions coming from Jobs
- Even if a new attack method is used





Thank you!

Questions?

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