

Addendum to the SRM v2.2 WLCG Usage Agreement

To: CCRC'08 Storage Solutions Working Group

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Purpose of this document

This note summarizes the agreed client usage and server behavior for the SRM v2.2 implementations used by WLCG applications. The agreement encompasses the clients:

- FTS
- GFAL
- lcg-utils
- dCache srm clients
- StoRM srm clients

and storage providers:

- CASTOR
- dCache
- DPM
- StoRM

The agreement shall be focused on meeting the LHC experiments' requirements for Grid storage interfaces. The note specifies how the various existing methods and data objects, as they are specified in the agreed v2.2 specification [1], should be interpreted and/or extended in order to meet the LHC



requirements. The outlined WLCG interpretation of the interfaces may suggest sometimes a more restrictive or extended use of the specification than other implementations of SRM client and servers although care is taken to preserve interoperability with the latter.

The document also specifies what is required in the medium-term (May 2008) and what is required in the long-term.

<u>NOTE</u>: This document has been agreed from a technical point of view by the developers of the storage services. Such an agreement does not imply a commitment to implement the following specification. The implementation of the needed feature depends on availability of funds and human resources for development and support. It is up to the WLCG Management Board to address the issues connected to man power.

This document is open for discussions/corrections/comments/addition.

1.1 WLCG requirements

In this section we describe the experiment requirements that took to the definition of this Addendum to the SRM v2.2 WLCG Usage Agreement [5]. The requirements are listed in order of the priority given by the LHC experiments, from the most important and more urgent to implement to the less urgent.

A. Protecting spaces from (mis-)usage by generic users

Some implementations do not allow at the moment to efficiently protect the spaces from mis-usage by generic users. As an example, it is possible that a generic VO user releases the space allocated to a VO. A request to read a file can trigger either a stage operation from tape in pools dedicated to production activities or internal copies between pools with no possibility to control such actions. Some attempt has been made to protect the storage resources but a consistent approach to space protection would be beneficial.

B. Full VOMS-awareness of the SRM implementations

Some SRM implementations are still not VOMS-FQAN aware at the authorization level. Even though authentication takes place at the SRM server level using GSI and recognizing VOMS groups and roles, VOMS-FQANs are not used for authorization. This creates problems in managing the resources allocated to a VO and forces the use of specific proxies to execute certain tasks.

Definition: **Fully VOMS-awareness** is an implemented access control based on VOMS FQANs, including groups and roles.

C. <u>Selecting spaces for read operations in srmPrepareToGet, srmBringOnline, and srmCopy</u> <u>requests.</u>

The SRM v2.2 WLCG Usage Agreement specifies that clients must not specify a token for read operations. However, the document assumes silently that the file will be retrieved somehow in the "right" place. The SRM servers at the moment implements different behaviors: dCache serves the file from the place it was put, interfering with production operations; CASTOR honors the token if passed to select the pool where the file should be





read from. This complicates the task to manage the space and to control the access. The possibility to specify a token for read operations and have the server properly keeping it into account must be given.

D. Correct implementation of srmGetSpaceMetaData

srmGetSpaceMetaData should return information about the space used and available (as defined in [4]) for a given space token. The concept of a default area is not defined in the SRM spec [1]. Some implementations might provide an implementation specific definition of a default that can serve different purposes.

E. Providing the necessary information so that data could be efficiently stored on tapes. It is absolutely important to efficiently store data on tape sets so that data can be retrieved efficiently, minimizing the number of tape mounts to be executed. The SRM interface and WLCG clients should allow applications to pass all necessary information to perform the operations efficiently. Tokens should be passed to the tape backend as well as directory paths and any other useful info.

2.1 WLCG SRM data model interpretation agreement

In what follows, we detail the interpretation of the SRM v2.2 concepts that were found to be controversial during the experience acquired operating an SRM v2.2 based Grid infrastructure.

2.1.1 The SRM space

Definition: An SRM space is a logical view of an <u>online</u> physical space allocation that is reserved for read/write operations on files.

An SRM space is characterized by several properties:

- Retention Policy Information (Retention Policy and Access Latency)
- Owner
- Connection Type (WAN, LAN)
- Supported File Access/Transfer Protocols
- Space Token
- Space Token Description (optional)
- Status
- Total Size
- Guaranteed Size
- Unused Size
- Assigned Lifetime
- Left Lifetime
- Client Networks

In WLCG the concept of the "Owner" of a space is not used.

In WLCG spaces are statically reserved, although support for truly dynamic space reservation can be provided by some implementations.



When a file is removed or purged from a space the space occupied by the file is not accounted against the space reservation and the space occupied by the file can be re-used. There must not be an expectation that the space occupied by that file is immediately released.

<u>NOTE</u>. For this reason, it has been noted that the behavior of the srmRm operation should be rediscussed later on to understand if it is an option to allow for the method to be asynchronous.

Spaces can have other implementation specific properties, such as the "supported operations" in dCache. In order to benefit of possible system optimizations, the client can specify further properties using the TExtraInfo SRM structure in srmReserveSpace, or the service administrator can manually configure the space in the "optimal way".

NOTE: The SRM v2.2 spec does not define a "DEFAULT" space nor implies that concept. An implementation of a DEFAULT space/area could be provided by some storage services. However, it must be clear that this is implementation specific and the resulting functionality might not be the same across implementations. It is up to the service administrator to appropriately configure such a feature in agreement with the experiments.

2.1.2 SRM files, copies and TURLs

Definition: A file is a set of data with the properties defined on pages 17-18 of [1], paragraph 2.25:

- SURL
- Path
- Size
- Creation Time
- Modification Time
- Storage Type
- Retention Policy Info (Retention Policy, Access Latency)
- File Locality
- Array of Space Tokens
- File Type
- Assigned Lifetime
- Left Lifetime
- Permissions
- Checksum Type
- Checksum Value
- Array of Sub Paths (if the file is a directory)

The Retention Policy Info attribute for files is not used in WLCG.

The concept of a file primary copy implied in the SRM v2.2 spec is not used in WLCG.

A file can have several copies in several spaces.

Definition: A *copy* of a file is a logical instance of the file in a given space. It is characterized by the following properties:



- Request ID (of the request generating the copy: srmPrepareToPut, srmPrepareToGet, srmBringOnline)
- Space Token (of the space where the copy resides)
- PinLifetime (the time the copy is guaranteed to be in the online space where the copy resides

 it is defined in the srmBringOnline). The PinLifetime of a copy suggests to the system that
 the copy is needed by the application and therefore such a copy should not be garbagecollected while its lifetime is still valid. At the moment srmPrepareToPut and srmCopy do
 not allow to specify the PinLifetime for the resulting created copy.

A copy has an associated lifetime in the space where the copy resides. However, this lifetime in WLCG is always infinite. A copy is never removed from a space until an explicit srmPurgeFromSpace is issued.

Definition: A *TURL* is the transport URL associated to a copy of a file in an online space. It is characterized by the following properties:

- Request ID (of the request generating the copy: srmPrepareToPut, srmPrepareToGet, srmBringOnline)
- PinLifetime (the time for which the TURL must remain valid)

A TURL is generated by the system after a srmPrepareToGet or srmPrepareToPut request and is associated to the request that has generated it. Multiple TURLs may refer to the same copy of the same file or to different physical copies of the same file.

A TURL has an associated pin-lifetime. A TURL is valid while the associated pin is valid. If one of the TURLs associated to a copy of a file is released, the other TURLs whose PinLifetime has not yet expired will continue to stay valid.

Pins can be treated as advisory by the storage systems or they can be enforced. If a pin is enforced, the storage system will refuse to remove a pinned copy (a copy/TURL with a pin still valid) and therefore abort further requests if the space where the copy is in is full. If a pin is advisory, the storage system might consider as a factor the pin lifetime of a copy when running the garbage collector. However, if new requests for space arrive, the requests are honored removing files with the lowest weight.

3.1 WLCG SRM v2.2 functionality interpretation agreement

In what follows, we detail the interpretation of the SRM v2.2 functionality that were found to be controversial during the experience acquired operating an SRM v2.2 based Grid infrastructure.

3.1.1 srmRm

When a file is removed, the space occupied by the file is not accounted against the space reservation and the space occupied by the file can be re-used. There must not be an expectation that the space occupied by that file is immediately released.

For this reason, it has been noted that the behavior of the srmRm operation should be re-discussed later on to understand if it is an option to allow for the method to be asynchronous.





In order to perform a srmRm operation, the client must have privileges to perform the operation in the SRM namespace, regardless of any restrictions on the spaces in which copies of the file reside.

3.1.2 srmLs

In order to perform a srmLs operation, the client must have privileges to perform the operation in the SRM namespace only.

In WLCG, the return attribute *arrayOfSpaceTokens* is mandatory (CASTOR and DPM to confirm that this is OK).

3.1.3 srmPurgeFromSpace

In WLCG no tape transitions are allowed.

The srmPurgeFromSpace method only removes disk copies of a file from a specified space token.

If a file is in a Custodial-Nearline space and at a given moment the file has a copy on disk and one on tape, a srmPurgeFromSpace operation removes the copy on disk and leaves the copy on tape.

If a file has 2 copies in 2 different Replica-Online spaces, a srmPurgeFromSpace on the first space succeeds while a srmPurgeFromSpace on the second copy fails with the error message SRM_LAST_COPY at the file level. An explicit srmRm is needed to remove the last copy.

3.1.4 srmBringOnline

The current SRM v2.2 specifications are unclear in paragraph 5.3.2, point g). The space in which the file is brought online can have the attribute NEARLINE (as well as ONLINE). In WLCG we have decided to disreguard the Access Latency attribute of a file (which, after a successful srmBringOnline operation would be ONLINE).

3.1.5 srmPrepareToPut/srmPutDone

The current SRM v2.2 specifications do not specify as input parameters of the srmPrepareToPut method the PinLifetime of the copy of the file created after the correspondent successful srmPutDone operation. Such a PinLifetime is set to some system specific default.

The PinLifeTime specified in a srmPrepareToPut call has to be interpreted as the PinLifeTime of the TURL generated after a successful srmPrepareToPut operation. The srmPutDone call for that TURL has to come within the TURL PinLifetime. This is explicitly defined in point 5.5.2k of the SRM v2.2 spec [1].

3.1.6 srmCopy

The current SRM v2.2 specifications do not specify as input parameters of the srmCopy methods the source space token and the destination PinLifetime of the copy.

In order not to change the SRM v2.2 WSDL (this will create major problems with the client tools/applications), in WLCG we decided to use the TExtraInfo structure. In order to pass such parameters, the key names to be used are:

- SourceSpaceToken
- CopyPinLifetime





It is not possible to release copies created by srmCopy based on request ID. It is also not possible to release copies created by srmPrepareToPut/srmPutDone cycle based on request ID.

3.1.7 srmReleaseSpace

In WLCG all files are of StorageType PERMANENT.

From the current SRM v2.2 specs, it is not clear what action must be performed when a space is released and there are last copies of PERMANENT files in there.

Even though, this is a minor case in WLCG, the behavior must be agreed and clarified.

3.1.8 srmReleaseFiles

For the reprocessing task, LHC experiments requires the possibility to specify only SURLs (and not the associated active request IDs) when releasing copies or TURLs of files. Therefore, in WLCG this feature must be implemented by all storage services.

NOTE: Experiments are asked to comment if such functionality is required providing valid use cases for it. Experiment name and contact person requesting such a feature will be noted. If such a functionality is required, how long can the experiments live without it?

4.1 Some background on security

In this section we give some background information on VOMS groups and roles, VOMS FQANs and VOMS FQAN based Access Control Lists. We would also like to point out to the document in [3] where recommendations for changes in gLite authorization are given and suggestions on how to implement security in Storage and Data Management.

4.1.1 VOMS Groups, Roles, and Access Control Lists

Every user is assigned a VOMS proxy when using the WLCG Grid. In the context of this document a simple grid proxy is equivalent to a VOMS proxy with the (single) VO being the only extra attribute (determined from a grid-mapfile). A proxy is first characterized by the Subject Distinguished Name (DN), and can have extensions that define the privileges of the user holding that proxy at a given moment. Please check [2] for details. Example DN:

(1) /DC=ch/DC=cern/OU=Organic Units/OU=Users/CN=flavia/CN=388195/CN=Flavia Donno

To define the privileges of a user at a given moment, groups, subgroups, and roles can be defined. In particular, a user can belong to multiple groups and sub-groups and have a number of roles at a given time. Example of groups and roles:

- (2) /dteam/Role=lcgadmin
- (3) /dteam
- (4) /dteam/cern





An Access Control List (ACL) is a list of entries defining the authorization on a given resource. ACLs can be positive, i.e. defining who is authorized to perform a given set of operations or access a given resource, or negative, negating permission to the service. An example of a DPM positive ACL on a file follows:

- (5) # file: /grid/dteam
- # owner: /DC=ch/DC=cern/OU=Organic Units/OU=Users/CN=flavia/CN=388195/CN=Flavia Donno # group: dteam user::rwx group:: rwx group:dteam/Role=lcgadmin:rwx group:dteam/Role=production:rwx mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:group:rwx default:group:dteam/Role=lcgadmin:rwx default:group:dteam/Role=production:rwx default:group:dteam/Role=production:rwx default:mask::rwx default:mask::rwx

5.1 WLCG proposed extensions

We specify here the properties of the SRM data objects that are being considered for addition to the SRM protocol.

5.1.1 Extensions of space properties

An SRM space is further characterized by the following properties:

• Owner/Group Permission (Release-Space, Update-Space, Read-from-Space, Write-to-Space, Stage-to-Space, Replicate-to-Space, Purge-from-Space, Modify-Space-ACL, Query-Space)

A service administrator is the person who can change the system configuration for a storage service. The service administrator has all rights on all created spaces.

The initial requestor of a space has automatically all rights on the space.

Permissions on the spaces are expressed in terms of DNs and/or VOMS FQANs [2].

ACLs define the set of operations that a user whose FQAN matches the space ACLs can perform on the space. If no match is found for a user proxy in the space ACLs, then the default action is to deny access.

ACLs apply to space tokens and <u>not</u> to space token descriptions.

The set of possible operations are:



- <u>**Release-Space**</u> : specifies which users/groups can release the space. The Purge-Space right is not needed to release spaces.
- <u>Update-Space</u>: specifies which users/groups can update the space, such as modifying its size, lifetime, etc.
- <u>Read-from-Space</u>: specifies which users/groups can perform srmPrepareToGet, srmCopy, and srmBringOnline operations on this space. The operation succeeds if it does not imply/trigger a staging request from tape or an internal disk-to-disk copy. In fact, for this last case, the user/group must also have the Replicate-to-Space permission on the space where the original copy of the file resides together with the Write-to-Space permission on the space where he/she would like to read or bring online the file from.
- <u>Write-to-Space</u>: specifies which users/groups can perform srmPrepareToPut and srmCopy operations or srmPrepareToGet and srmBringOnline with a token operations to this space.
- <u>Stage-to-Space</u> : specifies which users/groups can perform srmPrepareToGet or srmBringOnline operations that imply a tape recall to this space.
- <u>Replicate-to-Space</u>: specifies which users/groups can replicate a file from the space where the ACE applies to another space, where the user has Write-To-Space permissions. This operation is not associated to any of the SRM requests but enable internal disk-to-disk copies.
- <u>*Purge-from-Space*</u> : specifies which users/groups can perform srmPurgeFromSpace operations from this space.
- <u>Modify-Space-ACL</u>: specifies which users/groups can modify the ACLs on the space. The syntax and semantic of the modify operations must be specified.
- <u>Query-Space</u>: specifies which users/groups can perform srmGetSpaceMetadata operations on the space.

Only the following operations are mandatory in WLCG:

Read-from-Space, Write-to-Space, Stage-to-Space, Replicate-to-Space, Purge-from-Space

The following operations are optional:

Release-Space, Update-Space, Modify-Space-ACL, Query-Space

Only the primary FQAN should be considered when matching ACLs. (Experiments must comment on this assumption).

ACLs can be positive or negative. Positive ACLs are meant to grant access while negative ACLs specify who should be negated the authorization to the resources the ACLs apply to.

The proposed syntax and semantic to follow is based on NFSv4 [6].

Management tools must be available to the resource administrator to manipulate ACLs directly and change the internal resolution of proxies. The set of allowed management operations must be agreed on.

5.1.2 SRM ACLs on spaces

The syntax and semantic proposed for SRM ACLs for spaces are based on NFSv4 minor version 1 draft 21.





An Access Control Entry (ACE) is a record associated with space reservation. Each ACE is defined as following:

aceType, subject, subjectType, accessMask

where

aceType can be ALLOWED_ACE or DENIED_ACE;

subject can be DN or FQAN. The reserved name EVERYONE is interpreted as ANY;

subjectType specifies if the subject is a DN or FQAN;

accessMask is a list set of actions associated with this ACE. The valid actions

are:

RELEASE_SPACE	(D)
UPDATE_SPACE	(U)
READ_FROM_SPACE	(R)
WRITE_TO_SPACE	(W)
STAGE_TO_SPACE	(S)
REPLICATE_TO_SPACE	(C)
PURGE_FROM_SPACE	(P)
QUERY_SPACE	(Q)
MODIFY_SPACE_ACL	(M)

TODO:

Each SpaceManager operation has to be associated with a corresponding access mask. Some 'read' operation can be in reality 'write' (like srmPrepareToGet).

Access control list (ACL) is an ordered array of ACEs. Only ACEs which have a subject that matches the requester are considered. Each ACE is processed until all of the bits of the requester's access have been ALLOWED. Once a bit has been ALLOWED by an ALLOWED_ACE, it is no longer considered in the processing of later ACEs. If a DENIED_ACE is encountered where the requester's access still has ALLOWED bits in common with the accessMask of the ACE, the request is denied (in other words: to ALLOW all bits have to be checked, while for DENY one matching is sufficient). When the ACL is fully processed, if there are bits in the requester's mask that have not been ALLOWED or DENIED, access is denied.

The following syntax can be used to set/display ACLs:

subjectType:subject:accessMask:aceType





Example:

production write, admin all, regular user read, others - deny

fqan:dteam/Role=production:RSWQP:ALLOW
fqan:dteam/Role=lcgamin:DURWSPQM:ALLOW
fqan:dteam/Role=NULL:RSQ:ALLOW
fqan:EVERYONE:DURWSPQMC:DENY

read, no stage:

fqan:EVERYONE:R:ALLOW fqan:EVERYONE:S:DENY

power user:

dn:/O=GermanGrid/OU=DESY/CN=Tigran Mkrtchyan:S:ALLOW
fqan:EVERYONE:RQ:ALLOW
fqan:EVERYONE:S:DENY

where accessMask is: **D'** for RELEASE_SPACE **'U'** for UPDATE_SPACE **'R'** for READ_FROM_SPACE **'W'** for WRITE_TO_SPACE **'S'** for STAGE_TO_SPACE **'C'** for REPLICATE_TO_SPACE **'C'** for PURGE_FROM_SPACE **'Q'** for QUERY_SPACE **'M'** for MODIFY_SPACE ACL

While we do not have ONWER and DEFAULT ACL, all newly created reservation will have *de facto* default:

dn:<Creator DN>: DURWSCPQM:ALLOW fqan:EVERYONE:DURWSCPQM:DENY dn:EVERYONE:DURWSCPQM:DENY

What should we use for administrators and the creator of the space?

5.1.3 SRM spaces management methods

In what follows we list the new SRM space management functions that would offer an interface to the requested new functionality.





5.1.3.1 srmReserveSpace

This function is used to reserve a space in advance for the upcoming requests to get some guarantee on the file management. Asynchronous space reservation may be necessary for some SRMs to serve many concurrent requests.

<u>**Please note</u>**: The proposed change implies modification of the current SRM v2.2 WSDL. We do not propose to change the WSDL at the moment. However we list the needed modification for supporting dynamic space reservation in the future with the requested permissions on spaces.</u>



enum	TSpaceRequest	RELEASI UPDATE READ-FF WRITE-1 STAGE-1 REPLICA PURGE-I MODIFY	-SPACE, ROM-SPACE, TO-SPACE, TO-SPACE, XTE-TO-SPACE, FROM-SPACE, -SPACE-ACL,
enum	AceType {	QUERY-S ALLOWED_A DENIED_ACE	CE
enum	SubjectType {	DN FQAN}	
typedef	struct { AceTy String Subjec TSpace } TAccessCont	tType eRequestType[]	Type, Subject, SubjectType AccessMask
Parameters			
In: string string TAccessCont TRetentionPo unsigned long unsigned long int	olicyInfo g		nDescription, <u>Info,</u>



unsigned long [] TExtraInfo[] TTransferParameters	arrayOfExpectedFileSizes, storageSystemInfo, transferParameters	
Out: TReturnStatus string int TRetentionPolicyInfo unsigned long unsigned long int string	<u>returnStatus,</u> requestToken, estimatedProcessingTime, retentionPolicyInfo, sizeOfTotalReservedSpace, sizeOfGuaranteedReservedSpace, lifetimeOfReservedSpace, spaceToken	// best effort

5.1.3.2 srmGetSpaceMetadata

This function is used to get information of a space. Space token must be provided, and space tokens are returned upon a completion of a space reservation through *srmReserveSpace* or *srmStatusOfReserveSpaceRequest*.

<u>**Please note</u>**: The proposed change implies modification of the current SRM v2.2 WSDL. We do not propose to change the WSDL at the moment. However we list the needed modification for supporting in the future the requested permissions on spaces.</u>

Additional Data Types

string	anaaaTakan
	<u>spaceToken</u> ,
TReturnStatus	status,
TRetentionPolicyInfo	retentionPolicyInfo,
TAccessControlEntry[]	ACLs,
string	owner,
unsigned long	totalSize, // best effort
unsigned long	guaranteedSize,
unsigned long	unusedSize,
int	lifetimeAssigned,
int	lifetimeLeft
pace	
	TRetentionPolicyInfo TAccessControlEntry[] string unsigned long unsigned long unsigned long int int

Parameters

In: string

authorizationID,





string[]	arrayOfSpaceTokens
Out:	
TReturnStatus	<u>returnStatus,</u>
TMetaDataSpace[]	arravOfSpaceDetails

5.1.3.3 srmPurgeFromSpace and srmChangeSpaceForFiles

It has been agreed that

- since space tokens can be specified on SRM Get operations
- since the concept of the file primary copy is not used in WLCG
- since no tape transitions are allowed in WLCG

the method srmChangeSpaceForFiles does not need to be provided. The same functionality can be reached invoking srmBringOnline or srmPrepareToGet with a token (specifying the new space) and srmPurgeFromSpace.

5.1.4 SRM get methods

The definition of the srmPrepareToGet/srmStatusOfGetRequest, srmBringOnline/srmStatusOfBringOnline, and srmCopy/srmStatusOfCopy request remains unchanged with respect to what has been specified in the SRM v2.2 specification [1]. The only difference is that now clients can pass a storage token that has to be honored in the calls. A copy of the file associated to the list of SURLs specified must be retrieved in the space specified if the user making the request has sufficient privileges on the specified space token and namespace entry.

<u>NOTE</u>: When serving a srmPrepareToGet request without a token on a file that has multiple online copies in several spaces, the copy served to the user must be one for which the user has read permission on the correspondent space. In case many of these exist, the system can choose one of them.

5.1.5 SRM directory methods

No modifications are required for srmLs with the exception that if there are multiple copies of a file in several spaces, the fileLocality parameter must reflect the status of all copies. Therefore if there is a copy on tape only in a CUSTODIAL-NEARLINE space and at the same time there is a copy on disk in a REPLICA-ONLINE space, the resulting fileLocality must be NEARLINE_AND_ONLINE.

5.1.6 Tape usage optimization

It has been noted that all implementations provide at the moment space token [or space token description] and directory information to the tape callback mechanisms so that appropriate tape selection and migration policies can be defined in the system.

All relative SRM calls have the extra parameter TExtraInfo[] defined as follows:

typedef struct {

string <u>key</u>,





string value
} TExtraInfo

TExtraInfo is used wherever additional information is needed. Some system might honor extra information provide through this structure by the clients. Therefore, no extra functionality needs to be implemented.

6.1 Time estimation to implement the proposed features

6.1.1 CASTOR

6.1.2 dCache

6.1.3 DPM

6.1.4 StoRM



Short-Term Implementation Specific Solutions

2.1 CASTOR

Editor: Shaun De Witt, Flavia Donno

2.1.1 To be expected in the next three months

Basically a well developed and well tested srmPurgeFromSpace. Get and BringOnline with space tokens is already supported. I will make sure srmChangeSpaceForFiles is deprecated (returning SRM_NOTIMPLEMENTED or whatever the correct return code is.

CASTOR implements already a quite complete set of Access Control Lists on Service Classes implemented through the so-called white and black lists. However, as of today they are based on Unix UID/GID. In the next three months an administrative interface will be made available for CASTOR administrators to easily set white and black lists.

2.1.2 Later

Once CASTOR becomes VOMS aware, implement Full VOMS awareness in SRM. While I don't think this is too difficult for the SRM, I suspect the implementation in CASTOR may take some time without additional resources. The CASTOR roadmap can be found in [8].

2.2 dCache

Editor: Patrick Fuhrmann

These are the issues which according to Flavia's and my understanding would solve the most pressing issues for the experiments in order to survive the first 12 months of LHC data taking e.t.c.

2.2.1 Space Tokens for operations other than 'write'

This modification would need large parts of dCache to be refurbished and therefore we would prefer to find alternative solutions.





Use Case

The purpose of tokens in 'read' and 'bring online' primarily is to steer data streams or better to steer the location of files. The space reservation aspect of tokens is of minor interest. An example is that the same dataset may be needed by the reprocessing system as well as for FTS export or user analysis. It would be envisioned that this file is served to the various competing processes by different locations in the system mainly not to interfere or slowdown expensive reprocessing.

Proposed alternative Solution

A solution already available in dCache would be to use the IP number or the requested protocol to find an appropriate pool. This would require that either IP or protocol differ between the different processes requesting the same file. To our current understanding this is not possible in all cases. Therefore a particular key-value pair within the TExtraInfo of the bring-online and prepare-to-get would allow the dCache decision engine to find the appropriate area to stage the file or to serve the file from. Other implementations would just ignore this extra info so that it can be provided to all implementations (resp sites). Other systems may use different key value pairs to achieve the same purposes. It seems that the LCG tools already provide the possibility to forward this information to the SRM calls, though FTS doesn't do this yet. The difference between using the TExtraInfo instead of space tokens is that space tokens require proper space calculation and reservation which is actually not really required assuming that there is enough space to store the reprocessing data.

2.2.2 Protecting "Write Space Tokens"

Space Tokens in dCache can be created dynamically by the appropriate SRM function calls. Though, while the creation of a token is protected by some very basic mechanism, the usage and the release of the token are not. It is clear to us that this is a security issue which we would like to address.

Proposed Solution

We would propose to protect two operations on write tokens only: the 'write into a token' and the 'release token'. It is not yet clear how detailed the ACL system needs to be in order to satisfy the experiment requirements. Our current assumption is that a simple one will do.

2.2.3 Protecting expensive operations (Restore from tape robotics or pool to pool copies)

There is the concern that uncoordinated access to expensive resources, e.g. the Tape System may be misused by inexperienced or malicious users. A plan often discussed is to disallow triggering tape operations by regular VO users. Therefor protecting those resources would be envisioned. In dCache, it would be possible to allow or disallow the access to the tape system for particular DN's or FQAN's. Here as well the details have not been discussed yet. We would try to keep the ACL mechanism simple and only the 'tape restore' and 'pool to pool transfers' would be protected.

2.2.4 Replacing T1D1 by T1D0 using pins.

For dCache, T1D1 can be perfectly replaced by T1D0 plus a pin on the file. "Hard pins" can already be set to files in the T1D0 storage class through the prepare-to-get or the bring-online SRM operations. One essential requirement for this approach would be the possibility to 'release' the pin without knowing the SRM request ID of the initial prepare-to-get or bring-online operation. dCache would try to do the 'pin release' based on the DN or FQAN of the requester. Here as well, details still need to be discusses.



2.2.5 Estimate on the time is takes to implement the changes in dCache. To be done.

2.3 DPM

Editor: David Smith

In short I'd say that for the DPM the alternate proposal is that we're covering the issues highlighted by the experiment requirements already.

2.3.1 Space protection

Spaces in DPM belong to a group (or possibly a user, but usually a group) and to be able to write into a space a user has to belong to the space's group. In that respect the space is protected. The requirement's example of generic users triggering staging is not a concern for DPM for the WLCG.

2.3.2 VOMS Awareness

DPM has full voms-awareness. There are access controls on pools, spaces and the namespace. Of course only the namespace is posix, the others are somewhat simpler lists, but they do take VOMS FQANs into account.

2.3.3 Tokens on Get operations

It is true that for disk based copies (i.e. what concerns the WLCG) DPM will not use the space token provided for get/bringonline. However the requirement seems to be concerned with staging a file back from tape into the right area. Do we need to add the implied disk replication to satisfy the experiments' needs?

2.3.4 Space statistics

We have the srmGetSpaceMetaData call available.

2.3.4 Space statistics

For WLCG, DPM is disk based only, so there is no issue with us providing information to the tape system.

2.4 StoRM

Editor: Luca Magnoni, Flavia Donno

The release plan for StoRM can be found in [9].

2.3.1 Space protection Spaces in StoRM can be protected already via sophisticated ACLs. Wildcards are also allowed.

2.3.2 VOMS Awareness StoRM has full voms-awareness.

2.3.3 Tokens on Get operations StoRM will use the space token provided for get/bringonline.

2.3.4 Space statistics

We have the srmGetSpaceMetaData call available.





2.3.4 Space statistics For WLCG, StoRM provides only 2 types of spaces: REPLICA-ONLINE and CUSTODIAL-ONLINE. [...]





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