


# DAQ control system for multi-beamline simultaneous experiments at SACLA


Takashi SUGIMOTO

Japan Synchrotron Radiation Research Institute  
(JASRI/SPRING-8)

# SPring-8 and SACLA

# SPring-8: Light source complex





BL3 and BL2 are in operation. BL3/BL2 fast-switched XFEL distribution has just started in FY2015.


BL1 is under commissioning.

Operation time is 7,000 hour/year.

MOM305, HOSODA et al.,  
 "A Control System for a Dedicated Accelerator  
 for SACLA Wide-band Beam Line"


# Overview of SPring-8 Campus Network

# SPRING-8 Campus Network




# SPring-8 Campus Network

Defense-in-depth oriented network system (2010-)




# SPring-8 Campus Network

Defense-in-depth oriented network system (2010-)



3rd (CS)<sup>2</sup>/HEP, 2011, Grenoble






# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (1of3)



Internet

In early days of SPring-8 (1997-1998), the experimental network is a part of office network without any access control.




# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (1of3)



Internet


In early days of SPring-8 (1997-1998), the experimental network is a part of office network without any access control.

In 1990s, number of network-connected PCs increased. Anyone (with/without evil intention) in office can control experimental instruments.



# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (2of3)

In 1998, the experimental network is segregated using firewall(s).




# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (2of3)



In 1998, the experimental network is segregated using firewall(s).

However, because of such historical reason, the experiment network have [internet connectivity](#).



# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (2of3)




In 1998, the experimental network is segregated using firewall(s).

However, because of such historical reason, the experiment network have **internet connectivity**.

With internet connectivity, recent VPN technologies can **pass through the firewalls**.


(Unmanaged VPNs: e.g. *TeamViewer*, *splashtop*, ...)



# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (3of3)



We installed “next-generation firewall” in 2010, to block such unmanaged VPNs.




# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (3of3)



We installed “next-generation firewall” in 2010, to block such unmanaged VPNs.

When malware infected PC is connected to the experiment network, the NG-FW can block the C & C traffic.






名前: Suspicious.Gen Command And Control Traffic  
 ID: 13716  
 内容: This signature detects Suspicious.Gen command and control traffic.  
 重大度: CRITICAL


#### 上位攻撃者

	攻撃者の IP	攻撃者のホスト名	攻撃者	セッション
1	54.230.124.83	server-54-230-124-83.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		11 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
2	54.230.124.50	server-54-230-124-50.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		10 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
3	54.230.124.12	server-54-230-124-12.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		8 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
4	54.230.124.87	server-54-230-124-87.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		7 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
5	54.230.124.80	server-54-230-124-80.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		6 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
6	54.230.124.41	server-54-230-124-41.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		5 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
7	54.230.124.38	server-54-230-124-38.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		5 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
8	54.230.124.32	server-54-230-124-32.nrt52.r.cloudfront.net 		3 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>
9	54.192.235.210	server-54-192-235-210.nrt12.r.cloudfront.net 		1 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>

#### 上位の被害者

	被害者 IP	被害者ホスト名	被害者	セッション
1	<span style="background-color: black; color: black;">[REDACTED]</span>	<span style="background-color: black; color: black;">[REDACTED]</span> .spring8.or.jp 		56 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>


#### 上位攻撃国

	攻撃者の国	セッション
1	 United States	56 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>

#### 上位の被害者国

	被害者国	セッション
1	JP_SP8_OA-LAN	56 <div style="width: 100%; height: 10px; background-color: #ccc;"></div>

# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (3of3)




We installed “next-generation firewall” in 2010, to block such unmanaged VPNs.


When malware infected PC is connected to the experiment network, the NG-FW can block the C & C traffic.

Why do we install such a expensive firewalls?

Experimental network must have **internet connectivity** to transfer data to office and/or other institutes. (Historical reason)



# History of SPring-8 Experiment Network (3of3)



We installed “next-generation firewall” in 2010, to block such unmanaged VPNs.


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
It is difficult to catch up the newest technologies and vulnerabilities.

→ We made **tight security policy at the SACLA.**



# SACLA Network System


# SPring-8 Campus Network



## SACLA Experimental Network Policy

1. No internet connectivity
2. Segregate LANs based on purpose
3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit, to perform multi-beamline experiments
4. Physically segmented by beamlines to guaranty DAQ performance


# 1. No Internet Connectivity



At first, we decided to have **no internet connectivity** at the SACLA network systems. **Dedicate servers** take charge of data transfer to other institutes.


By segregating network systems from the Internet, experimental systems are prevented from recent vulnerabilities which utilize the internet.

# 1. No Internet Connectivity







# 2. Segregate LANs based on purpose




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
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
# 2. Segregate LANs based on purpose



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Experimental users send control message to BL-Master. (e.g. start DAQ, sample change, open shutter...)

BL-Master is accountable for DAQ system and movers. (e.g. sample change)

BL-WS is accountable for X-ray optics

If instrument belongs to SACLA Control, BL-Master forward control message to BL-WS. (e.g. open shutter)


# 2. Segregate LANs based on purpose

Direct access from User-WS to BL-WS is forbidden.

The reason are

1. To ensure control system consistency, such as status.
2. Single UI provided by BL-Master for controlling all experimental instruments.


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


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




Each beamline passing several experimental hutches (EHs).  
By dividing EHs, experiments and preparation will be performed simultaneously.



BL3 is the first beamline, which delivers XFEL to users. (2011)




# History and Current Status of SACLA Beamlines

BL3 is the first beamline, which delivers XFEL to users. (2011)

BL2 is in operation. (2014)

Fast-switched XFEL distribution to BL2/BL3 is started. (2015)



# History and Current Status of SACLA Beamlines


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**BL1** offers more experimental opportunity to users, especially from EUV to soft X-ray FEL. (2016)

EH: Experimental Hutch



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
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Under such circumstance, multi groups perform experiments and preparations, simultaneously.

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
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


Under such circumstance, multi groups perform experiments and preparations, simultaneously.

→ Security issue occurred

# Security Issue: wrong shutter operation


During machine time of group-A, shutter closed suddenly.



# Security Issue: wrong shutter operation

During machine time of group-A, shutter closed suddenly.

Trouble source is **control message from EH5 to BL-Master**.



# Security Issue: wrong shutter operation


During machine time of group-A, shutter closed suddenly.  
 Trouble source is control message from EH5 to BL-Master.

Another situation:

People are in EH2 to check instruments.

**It might be a radiation accident.**

*(This situation does not occurred actually.  
 People are protected by interlock system.)*






# Problem: Network Segment


All of EHs shared one network segment. (This design is same as SPring-8 experiment network)

Since IP address of User-WS/carry-in PCs was arbitrary, the BL-Master can not distinguish message authority: “where this message come from?”




# 3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit

In 2014, we divided network segments corresponding to each EHs.



# MADOCA2 Message Routing with ACL

WEPGF107, MATSUMOTO et al.,  
 “Multi-host Message Routing in MADOCA II”



object name	management method	account@hostname
sr_ms_serve	MS	*@*
sr_ms_manage	MS	control@localhost
object_fwd1	MS:host-1	*@*
object_fwd2	MS:host-1,host-2	*@*
object_ip1	MS	*@172.24.12.15
object_ip2	MS	*@172.24.12.0/24


We can use IP/subnet as ACL keys

# 3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit

In 2014, we divided network segments corresponding to each EHs.

Using MADOCA2, the **BL-Master distinguish message authority**, like these:

BL3-Master: **Accept** message from **BL3-EH2** “drives motor in **BL3-EH2**”



# 3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit

In 2014, we divided network segments corresponding to each EHs.

Using MADOCA2, the **BL-Master distinguish message authority**, like these:

BL3-Master: **Accept** message from **BL3-EH2** “drives motor in **BL3-EH2**”


BL3-Master: **Discard** message from **BL3-EH5** “open shutter of **BL3-EH1**”

BL3-EH5

BL3-EH4

BL3-EH2

BL3-EH1



# 3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit


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BL3-Master: **Accept** message from BL3-EH5 “drives motor in BL3-EH5”



# 3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit


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Using MADOCA2, the BL-Master distinguish message authority, like these:

BL3-Master: Accept message from BL3-EH2 “drives motor in BL3-EH2”

BL3-Master: Discard message from BL3-EH5 “open shutter of BL3”

BL3-Master: Accept message from BL3-EH5 “drives motor in BL3-EH5”




Firewall offers more essential filters.

“Drop packets from BL3-EH5 to BL2-Master”

# 4. Physically segmented by beamlines

Each beamline occupies dedicated physical network from detector frontend to Tier-1 storage.

The data-handling servers are used for buffering (several seconds). In addition, on-the-fly low-level filtering are performed using the data-handling servers.






# Summary

## SACLARA Experimental Network Policy

1. No internet connectivity
2. Segregate LANs based on purpose
3. Logically segmented by experimental area/unit, to perform multi-beamline experiments
4. Physically segmented by beamlines to guaranty DAQ performance



We are ready to perform multi-beamline simultaneous experiments at **BL1 / BL2 / BL3** (and BL4/BL5 in the future).