
The Ubiquitous Edge Platform



Lincoln Bryant
Rob Gardner

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Ubiquitous & Easy “CI Substrate”

- Pioneer a new phase of advanced cyberinfrastructure deployment, allowing sites to flexibly evolve and sustain both on-premise and commercial cloud-based infrastructure
- Hosted services, such as CEs, data caches, squid, etc., could be centrally deployed onto “CI substrates” within a trusted CI zones and remotely operated, upgraded, and optimized for performance
- Extend to shared, opportunistic university clusters and cloud resources


Motivation

- Coordination and operation efforts take a considerable amount of people time
 - Configuration, new versions, vulnerability patching, site-specific peculiarities
- Simplify site deployment across the WLCG
- Provide a framework for other science communities and future applications

Distributed Virtualized Data Centers

- Reduce IT footprint and ops burden
 - Centralize deployment & ops; reduce local admin cost
- Explore virtualized data center frameworks
 - E.g. container management over bare metal or VMs
- “Blue sky” goal
 - Establish a “trusted pattern” for a “CI substrate” on sites
 - Create distributed virtualized data center(s) overlaying the fabric substrate


Canonical SciDMZ




CI central ops console:

```
$ slate install osg-squid.3.3 --sites SiteA SiteB SiteC
```

SuperDMZ



Edge container hosting zone on premise



Deploying research software at the edge



perfSONAR



Hardware specification

- Produce a reference specification for edge container platform
- Allows support team to focus on software curation rather than hardware troubleshooting and optimization
- Initial focus on low-cost, single node deployment
- Could potentially be used to ‘seed’ a larger, multi-node infrastructure


Software underpinning

- Exploring a number of options for container runtime and base operating system
 - Docker, LXD, CoreOS, SmartOS, etc
- Trying to find a happy medium between platform features and ease-of-use for local site administrators
- Web interface and RESTful API
 - Requires development work, out-of-the-box options are scarce

Application deployment

- Containerized applications created, vetted, maintained by central operations team.
 - Pushed by operators down to subscribed sites
 - Or, depending on use case, pulled by local site admins without interaction with central.
- Built-in monitoring/analytics
 - Every service should get its own set of applicable collectors
 - Leverage our existing monitoring expertise

Containerizing Services



Example: Frontier Squid - Dockerfile

```
FROM lincolnbryant/osg-base-3.3-el6
MAINTAINER Lincoln Bryant <lincolnb@uchicago.edu>
# See https://twiki.grid.iu.edu/bin/view/Documentation/Release3/InstallFrontierSquid

RUN yum install -y frontier-squid initscripts

VOLUME ["/var/cache/squid"]

COPY customize.sh /etc/squid/customize.sh
RUN chown squid: /etc/squid/customize.sh && chmod +x /etc/squid/customize.sh

EXPOSE 3128 3401

CMD /sbin/runuser -s /bin/bash squid /usr/sbin/fn-local-squid.sh start && tail -f
/var/log/squid/*.log
```

Example: Frontier Squid - Launching

- The container can be launched on another machine, or via Docker's remote API to a cloud resource

```
$ docker run -p 3128:3128/tcp -p 3401:3401/udp -ti -e IP_BLOCKS="10.0.0.0/8 192.170.226.0/23" -e MEMORY_MB=2048 -e CACHE_MB=32768 lincolnbryant/osg-squid-3.3-el6
```

Generating /etc/squid/squid.conf

Initializing Cache...

2016/01/21 20:45:07| Creating Swap Directories

Starting 1 Frontier Squid...

done

...

The screenshot displays the SDC Operations Portal interface. The top navigation bar includes 'SDC Operations Portal', 'DATACENTER UCHICAGO', 'ANALYTICS', 'USERS', and a user profile for 'Admin User admin'. The left sidebar lists navigation options: 'COMPUTE' (Dashboard, Virtual Machines), 'Servers', 'Images', 'Packages', 'INFRASTRUCTURE' (Networking), 'Jobs', and 'Services'. The main content area shows a 'RUNNING' container named 'osg-squid' with ID '47f9fdae-f231-497e-9fa5-a3823ff43974'. A table lists container details: Name, Memory & Swap (2048 MB / 2048 MB), Disk (32 GB), IP Addresses (192.170.227.30), Image (docker-layer e5af4319b4da), Server (78-2b-cb-76-53-ee), Package (atlas-small 1.0.0), Created (21 January, 2016 20:47:16 UTC), and Last Modified (21 January, 2016 20:47:25 UTC). Below this is a 'Network Interfaces' table with columns for NETWORK, IP, NETMASK, MAC ADDRESS, and TAG. One interface is listed: 'external PRIMARY' with IP 192.170.227.30, NETMASK 255.255.254.0, MAC ADDRESS 90:b8:d0:98:de:66, and TAG 'external'. A '+ Add New NIC' button is at the bottom.

| NETWORK | IP | NETMASK | MAC ADDRESS | TAG |
|---|----------------|---------------|-------------------|----------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> external PRIMARY | 192.170.227.30 | 255.255.254.0 | 90:b8:d0:98:de:66 | external |

Automation efforts

- It should be possible for me to stand up and destroy a site in a completely automated way.
- Many points where human interaction is currently needed.
- Can we separate approvals (requiring human interaction) from configuration?
 - OIM, AGIS, and equivalents
 - Certificate registration
 - etc

Benefits for WLCG

- Could potentially deploy CEs, SEs, caching proxies, etc all within “the box”.
 - Best known versions and configurations get automatically pushed to downstream
 - Updates should be atomic, so rollbacks are easy.
- Containerization effort putting more eyes on existing documentation and builds
 - Example: Patches submitted for GUMS to build on EL7
 - <https://github.com/opensciencegrid/gums/pull/27>

Summary

- Platform for “edge” services on Science DMZs with well-defined reference hardware.
- Container-based applications, maintained by a central team
- Built-in service discovery, configuration, and monitoring
- Flexible, adaptable to the needs of other projects.

Thank you!
Questions?

Extra slides / Open questions

Security concerns

- Who has root on the machine?
- Can trusted users allocate resources and start containers remotely?
- Is Docker secure enough to be used? Many claims of a busted security model.
 - User namespaces and unprivileged containers seem to be semi-working in new kernels? (Affects OS choice!)
- Ultimately: What is the correct privilege separation between owner and operator?

Other considerations

- What does the networking configuration look like?
 - Do standard installers cover the majority of network configurations for initial bootstrapping?
 - Private control channel / VPN?
 - Require public IP(s)?
- Can we use this platform as a testbed for things like SDN?
- What does it look like when we have multiple nodes per site?