

All status report

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Outline

- 1 News since last workshop
- 2 The future
 - A solution for DHCP
 - New features

Stabilization

- Lots of feedback from users
 - Thanks!!
- Plenty of bug fixes
- New hooks
 - Anaconda hooks
 - For Kickstart
 - NBP hooks
 - For status changes

User hooks

- Many contributions, you may find something interesting on CVS

Tainted mode

- Nobody complained
- Ill-formed profiles won't force All to do unexpected things
- Tainted mode doesn't protect against everything
 - We might be vulnerable to symlink attacks
 - We'll switch to use `CAF::FileWriter`.

User complains

- Filesystem creation is slow
 - I'm working on it, there will be news after 1.4 is out.
- aii-dhcp still around
 - Performs DNS requests instead of checking the profile
 - Fetches a profile, anyways
 - Slows down aii-shellfe
 - Doesn't fit with v2's philosophy

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aii-dhcp or ncm-dhcp?

- aii-dhcp configures a daemon
 - That's what NCM components do
- DHCP can be used for assigning IPs to nodes not managed by Quattor
 - Currently, we edit the configuration by hand
- The Quattor server would be managed by itself
 - Chicken-egg problem?

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Dropping privileges

- All runs user-provided code
 - There may be security flaws in it
- There is no real need for All running as root
 - We can work out the edition of `/etc/dhcpd.conf`
- Avoids apache user having to use sudo on `aii-installack.cgi`
- Makes it easier to develop a SELinux policy for All
 - Anyone tried to write a SELinux policy that allows sudo?

Dropping privileges

Technical proposal

- aii-shellfe running as user aii, group aii
- /osinstall owned by aii:aii
- apache user member of aii group
- aii group allowed to write only to /osinstall/nbp/pxelinux.cfg
- sudo used at most to restart dhcpd
 - No need for a SELinux policy in this case

Dropping privileges

Additional requirements

- Upgrade must be transparent
 - User should only edit `/etc/sudoers`
- RPM scripts must set all permissions

Thanks to...

In alphabetical order:

- Stijn De Weirdt
- David Groepp
- Michel Jouvin
- Marco Emilio Poleggi
- Ronald Starink
- Serge Vrijaldenhoven