



GridPP

UK Computing for Particle Physics

Security: Review and Plans

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- Review
 - Recent activity: CSIRT, SVG, SPG, EUGridPMA
- Plans
 - Communications Challenges
 - Certificate Banning Tests

- EGI CSIRT
 - 2 incidents
 - Compromised EGI FedCloud virtual machine - CESNET [EGI-20150514]
 - Weak root pw
 - Elasticsearch - Glasgow/Edinburgh [EGI-20150611-01]
 - Exploited through open firewall / lack of updates
 - 1 critical vuln - CVE-2015-3245 libuser
 - Vulnerability tickets
 - July 10 new cases 10 cases closed
 - August 95 new cases 85 cases closed
- Intention to run SSC against all FedCloud sites
 - Verification CSIRT (?if any) capability
 - Training for endorsers and operators

- SVG (from Linda Cornwall)
 - “Critical”
 - CVE-2015-1815 Setroubleshoot (Mar 2015)
 - CVE-2015-3456 VENOM (May 2015)
 - CVE-2015-3245, CVE-2015-3246 RedHat libuser (July 2015)
 - ~25 other reports including VM/cloud enabling
 - New vuln. handling procedure (see OMB slides) :
 - <https://indico.egi.eu/indico/conferenceDisplay.py?confId=2378>
- SPG (from Dave Kelsey)
 - Refreshing policy set
 - AUP, VM Endorsement, Long Tail of Science, Data Protection
 - Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI)
 - joint meeting with GEANT SIG on Information Security Management in October 2015, working with PRACE and EUDAT
 - Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity (SIRTFI)
 - defining best practice and trust mark of Federated Identity Providers (with AARC and REFEDS).

- EUGridPMA / IGTF
 - Business as usual -
 - auditing existing, reviewing candidate CAs (e.g Kenya)
 - CERN WebFTS service, hidden, “on-the-fly” certs using CERN SSO/EduGain + VO membership db for identity
 - Diversity of Credential Issuers & Identity Providers
 - How do Relying Parties decide to trust?
 - Level of Assurance generalisation
 - Separating Level of Assurance from (PKI) Technical Implementation
 - <http://wiki.eugridpma.org/Main/IGTFLoAGeneralisation>

- UK run of SSC6 (used for some CMS sites last summer [2012])
- Tested 11 UK sites
- Uses SSC framework developed by EGI Security Drills Group
 - Aram, Oscar, Sven, Carlos
- Attempt to make realistic within constraints
 - Payload Pinky_packed.sh, does “stuff” but ...
 - No exploit dropped, single job/site, no external attack/dos
- Test for communication as well as technical response
 - EGI Incident Response Procedure
 - Measured times: Ack., “Malware” connection, DN ban, Report

- **Common Issues and Recommendations (from John Green)**

“Wide range in responses and approaches, key defensive actions were taken on all sites”

- **Security contact information and acknowledgement**

“A number of sites included their University CERT team ... valuable at smaller sites ... recommended as standard practice at all GridPP sites.”

- **Banning**

“A considerable number of sites were unsuccessful at banning ... on their first attempt ... Once fully deployed Argus is intended to provide

- **Forensic first responder training**

“... Some sites were able to recover deleted files ... no sites demonstrated the use of more technical forensic tools ...”

- **Network monitoring**

“No sites demonstrated any network monitoring from their sites. ... ”

- Security contact information and acknowledgement
 - Communications “challenges”
 - Send a ticket then wait for ack. - can use EGI ticketing
 - Issues?
 - Want to really test CSIRT address but without raising alarms
 - How often?
 - Once or twice a year, repeated
 - ~15 sites -> ~30 challenges (automate it!)
 - Then make it more interesting.
- Banning
 - Ewan’s 2014/15 banning tests
 - Sites: 6 OK + 6 Some + 6 NOK
 - Repeat
 - Monitoring central Argus
 - Supplement with local banning tests

- Forensic first responder training
 - Hepsysman training days
 - Make use of EGI training and SSC activities
 - Image and VM forensics
- Network monitoring
 - Survey (and share) existing (best) practice
 - Interest in “Security Operations Centre”
 - IPv6 security best practice
- Misc
 - GridPP5 - risk analysis
 - Always documentation “freshness”

Of course something unplanned might happen



PILOT JOB TRACEABILITY

- gLExec
 - use OS to enforce pilot/payload separation (or logging-only)
 - call-outs to check banning (Argus)
 - logging
- WLCG MB meeting May, 2013 + Sec. Technical WG
 - “...decided that the deployment of gLExec shall be ramped up for all WLCG sites”
 - <https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/LCG/GlexecDeploymentTracking>
 - http://research.cs.wisc.edu/mist/glexec/vuln_reports/
- WLCG now -
 - “.. production: that would be the next step, foreseen for this autumn.”
- GridPP Dirac now multi-VO pilot?
 - Adds potential for cross-VO access