

Security & Traceability

David Crooks

Context

- Security incidents are an operational reality
- When security incidents occur, need information about the chain of events:
 - *Who, What, When, Where*
- Well established procedures for current process, practised through SSC events
- Cloud and VM environment presents new challenges to gather and monitor the necessary information, using new tools and methods.

WLCG Cloud Traceability WG

- October 2014 call for volunteers to do practical work
- Face to face meetings at CERN February & June
- Many sites and all main LHC VOs represented, with good UK representation
- Areas of interest identified

Areas of interest

- Syslog
- Quarantine
- Externally observable behaviour
- Log management
- VO logging
- Policy

Syslog

- Logging from inside VMs
- Requires trust relationship between sites and VM providers (VOs)
- Evaluate merits of using job features vs. contextualisation to pass syslog configuration info

RAL, Andrew McNab

Quarantine

- Quarantining of VMs towards investigation of bad actors and forensics.
- Implementation on different cloud platforms
- Volume can be a problem with large image rate

RAL, Glasgow

Externally observable behaviour

- Hypervisor and Netflow
- Potentially strong uses in correlating events
- Might be new for many sites

Raul, David

Log management

- Increasingly high volumes of logs need work to manage appropriately
- Shared issue with “standard” operations
- Elasticsearch

RAL and others

VO logging

- All of this work will require closer links with the VO security teams
- Need to test the information logged by VOs
- SSC challenges

Sven Gabriel

Policy


- Policy evolution tracking work
- Follow up depending upon outcomes of other actions

Dave Kelsey

CERN SOC

- Liviu Vâlsan talked at HEPSYSMAN and elsewhere about the CERN SOC project
- Suite of tools to ingest, analyse and potentially act on a range of data sources - (see http://lvalsan.web.cern.ch/lvalsan/presentations/workshops/UK_HEP_SYSMAN_2015/#/title)
- Telemetry Capture Layer, Data Bus (Transport), Stream Processor, Long-Term Data Store, Real-Time Index and Search, and Visualisation

CERN SOC



Data rates

- Based on CERN SOC work
 - Netflow: ~ 25 GB/day
 - System logs, execution logs, netlogs, application logs: ~ 450 GB/day
 - Logging of HTTP connections: ~ 5 GB / day
 - KDC logs, SSO logs: ~ 2 GB / day


Feeds

- One area of cooperation noted as potentially useful by CERN Security is in intelligence feeds; they intend to subscribe to these and could share with us (except commercial sources)

OpenSOC

- Open sourced by CISCO last year
- “an extensible and scalable advanced security analytics tool”
- Similar to CERN approach - differences are partly down to CERN specific concerns
- Romain Wartel noted that commercial providers converging on OpenSOC + BRO IDS
 - OpenSOC is still immature, considerable work to implement but long term for many sites only sensible option

OpenSOC



OpenSOC

- <https://github.com/OpenSOC>
- Includes a vagrant config for a test setup - currently evaluating this (somewhat complete stack though not entirely)
- In active development, but potentially not packaged for general installation at this time
- Participation welcome!

Site concerns

- Tools & strategies
- Scale
- Engagement with Central IT teams and policies

Summary

- Now is the time to have this discussion as cloud technologies are being more widely used
- Suite of tools needed to cover new environment
- Engagement with VOs critical to success
- More participation in the working group welcome - intending to have meeting before end of year