

# ***Kerberos and GSI Collaboration***

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*CERN, November 18-19, 2002*

## *Kerberos*

- provides means for entity authentication and establishment of shared keys*
- conventional (symmetric) cryptography*
- trusted third-party model (Key Distribution Centre - **KDC**)*
- KDC maintains a database of all principals and their secret keys*
- version 5 standardized by IETF RFC 1510 (message format, protocols)*
- krb5 implementations available:*
  - \* MIT, Heimdal*
  - \* Microsoft Windows 2000*

## *Kerberos – Basic Principles*

- based on the use of *tickets* issued by KDC
- tickets can be viewed as certificates binding an entity identification with a session key; tickets are signed by KDC
- a ticket can be read only by a service principal that it was issued for

*ticket = {client\_id, server\_id, session\_key, lifetime}<sub>server\_key</sub>*


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## *Kerberos vs. GSI*

- *symmetric vs. asymmetric cryptography  
(CPU overhead for PKI)*
- *both support a simple mapping/authorization mechanism  
(\$HOME/.k5login, GSI gridmap-files)*
- *Kerberos requires on-line available KDC*
- *security of users' credentials  
short krb5 passwords can be remembered, GSI private keys are stored on disks*
- *better scalability of PKI  
(heterogenous solutions combining both the mechanisms)*

## *Kerberos and GSI Interoperability*

### **Applications development**

- *for our purposes **portability** = a means of writing and running application so that they can use multiple security mechanisms without (or with minimal) changes of source code (ssh daemon).*
- *how to easy develop and maintain portable applications?*

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- *a user is using one type of credential (GSI proxy) and wants to obtain another type (Krb5 ticket) by means of the the first credential.*



## *Kerberos and GSI Interoperability*

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
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- *various “**transformation mechanisms**”*

## ***Portable Applications Development – GSS-API***

- IETF RFC 2743 (API specifications), IETF RFC 2744 (C-bindings)
- powerful tool for the development of mechanism-independent applications
- the goal should be a source code without any functions of any particular security mechanism



## *Development of Portable Applications – GSS-API Extensions*


- some areas are not covered by GSS-API and must be solved by applications via krb5 or GSI API.  
(functions for storing and reading credentials to/from a disk, credential delegation at any time, mapping of GSS-API identities to local ones)*
- GGF GSI Security WG produced the GSS-API Extension draft addressing these issues*
- the only thing not solved by the GSS-API Extension draft is mapping of GSS names to local uids*
- implementations of GSS-API Extensions are available for Globus (GSI) and for Heimdal*

## *Running of Portable Applications*

- GSS-API and GSS-API Extensions enable the development of reasonably portable applications*
- almost no changes in the source code are needed to port an application to another security mechanism (ID mapping)*
- it's sufficient to either re-link (static) or just re-start (dynamic) the binary with appropriate GSS-API library*
- multiple binaries (each supporting a different mechanism) for one application are still needed  
(separate starting scripts, cannot share some resources – e.g. must run on different TCP ports, application must be able to run parallelly)*

## Running of Portable Applications – Mechglue

- Sun Microsystem, open-source, part of the MIT Kerberos5 distribution
- an abstract GSS-API implementation, instead of implementing a real mechanism, it creates a layer between an application and real GSS-API libraries available on a system.



- when mechglue is used it's possible for an application to support multiple mechanisms at once (in one binary)
- it's no more needed to maintain more binaries, application can run on one TCP port, etc.

## *Running of Portable Applications – Mechglue*

- the original implementation suffer from several drawbacks (support of GSS-API version 1 (obsoleted), obviously not really tested with multiple mechanisms, doesn't support GSS-API Extensions)*
- a patch is available fixing the above problems (Jim Basney, Doug E. Engert, Daniel Kouril)*
- mechglue is supported by current GsiSSH (maintained by NSCA ); a mechglue-enabled CVS server has been running for 2 months for our WP1, internal Cesnet repository and another Grid project*

## *Credentials Transformations*

- *a user has one type of credential and wants to access a service requiring another type.*

### **Kerberos v5 ticket → GSI proxy**

- *kCA (server) + KX.509 (client)*

### **GSI Proxy → Kerberos v5 ticket**

- *SSLk5*  
*expansion of MIT Kerberos5 with SSL authentication in the initial stage (contacting of KDC) by Doug Engert; mainly for Globus, current status ?*
- *PKINIT*  
*endeavour of IETF Kerberos WG of adding PKI to the Kerberos v.5 protocol, still draft (but hopefully close to RFC)*

### **Another types**

*OTP → Kerberos, AFS aklog using GSI proxy by Doug Engert*

## PKINIT

- *change of the first two authentication exchanges of the Kerberos5 protocol (between client and KDC), rest of the protocol is not changed*
- *doesn't use SSL, only X.509 certificates*
- *implementation available for Microsoft Windows 2000 (unfortunately according to draft 9, which is incompatible with current version)*
- *implementation for Heimdal:*
  - \* *Client support of Win2k KDC (Heimdal client can authenticate to a Win2k KDC via PKINIT)*
  - \* *smartcard support*
  - \* *support of GSI (clients can use GSI proxy certificates, KDC is able to read gridmap-files)*
- *<http://meta.cesnet.cz/software/heimdal/>*