




LCG Security

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LCG Security environment

- The players






The Risks

- Top risks from Security Risk Analysis
 - <http://proj-lcq-security.web.cern.ch/proj-lcq-security/RiskAnalysis/risk.html>
 - Launch attacks on other sites
 - Large distributed farms of machines
 - Illegal or inappropriate distribution or sharing of data
 - Massive distributed storage capacity
 - Disruption by exploit of security holes
 - Complex, heterogeneous and dynamic environment
 - Damage caused by viruses, worms etc.
 - Highly connected and novel infrastructure



Policy – the LCG Security Group



<http://cern.ch/proj-lcg-security/documents.html>



Authentication Infrastructure

- Users and Services own long-lived (1yr) credentials
 - Digital certificates (X.509 PKI)
 - European Grid Policy Management Authority
 - “... is a body to establish requirements and best practices for grid identity providers to enable a common trust domain applicable to authentication of end-entities in inter-organisational access to distributed resources. ...”
 - www.eugridpma.org covers EU (+ USA + Asia)
- Jobs submitted with Grid Proxy Certificates
 - Short-lived (<24hr) credential which “travels” with job
 - Delegation allows service to act on behalf of user
 - Proxy renewal service for long-running & queued jobs
- Some Issues...
 - Do trust mechanisms scale up ?
 - “On-line” certification authorities & Certificate Stores
 - Kerberized CA
 - Virtual SmartCard
 - Limited delegation




Authorization Infrastructure

- User Registers
 - Accepts Usage Rules
 - Provides personal/contact data
 - Request to join VO
 - VO managers add to VO servers
 - Certificate Identity (DN) captured
- Submits jobs
 - Creates short-lived proxy using long-lived certificate
 - Proxy 'travels' with the job
- Resources authorize access
 - Checks certificate validity
 - Trusted CAs and revocation lists
 - Checks user authorization
 - Downloaded from Registration/VO servers
 - Maps certificate DN to a local account
 - Runs job





User Registration (2003-4)





User Registration (? 2004 -)

- Some Issues
 - Static user mappings will not scale up
 - Multiple VO membership
 - Complex authorization & policy handling
 - VO manager needs to validate user data
 - How ?
- Solutions
 - VO Management Service - Attribute proxy certificates  XYZ VO
 - Groups and Roles - not just static user mapping
 - Attributes bound to proxy cert., signed by VO SerManager 
 - Credential mapping and authorization
 - Flexible policy intersection and mapping tools
 - Integrate with Organizational databases, but ...
 - What about exceptions ? (the 2-week summer student)
 - What about other VO models: lightweight, deployment, testing



Audit & Incident Response

- Audit Requirements
 - Mandates retention of logs by sites
- Incident Response
 - Security contact data gathered when site registers
 - Establish communication channels
 - maillists maintained by Deployment Team
 - List of CSIRT lists
 - Channel for reporting
 - Security contacts at site
 - Channel for discussion & resolution
 - Escalation path
- 2004 Security Service Challenges
 - Check the data is there, complete and communications are open



Security Collaboration

- Projects sharing resources & have close links
 - Need for inter-grid global security collaboration
 - ? Common accepted Usage Rules
 - ? Common authentication and authorization requirements
 - ? Common incident response channels
- LCG – EGEE – OSG - ?
 - **LCG Security Group** is now **Joint Security Group**
 - JSG for LCG & EGEE
 - Provide requirements for middleware development
 - Some members from OSG already in JSG



LCG Security

Thank you.