

Overview of the Air Management System in the ESS Accelerator tunnel

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www.europeanspallationsource.se

6th October 2015



Main topics addressed

- **Current design** of the Accelerator HVAC system during normal operation...
- Overview of a **concept of fire control** in the tunnel...
- Safety approach against **Oxygen Deficiency Hazard** in the tunnel...
- On-going and foreseen **safety studies**...
- **Planning** for the Accelerator HVAC system...

Accelerator Air Management System


Introduction - ESS Project

Energy: 2 GeV
Current: 62.5 mA
Average power: 5 MW
Pulse: 2.86 ms
Frequency: 14 Hz



Accelerator Air Management System Introduction

ESS Organization chart (simplified)



① **Specifies the Safety requirements** for the design of the HVAC system (e.g. fire control philosophy, minimum air renewal for workers, minimum air flush before access, etc.)


② **Specifies the performance requirements** for the design of the HVAC system (e.g. temperature and humidity control) and **provides support for the mitigation of the safety issues** (e.g. CFD simulations, hazard analysis, etc.)

③ **Designs the HVAC system according to the requirements** provided by the Accelerator and ES&H Divisions

Accelerator Air Management System

Introduction

Overview of the Accelerator areas



Main requirements

- ❑ **Maintain a negative pressure** with respect to the outdoors and the klystron gallery
- ❑ **Provide necessary fresh air** for occupants during maintenance
- ❑ **Control the smokes** in case of a fire
- ❑ **Control the helium releases** in case of a discharge


Accelerator Air Management System

Current design





4 Ventilation modes

- ① « Beam mode »
- ② « Flush mode »
- ③ « Access mode »
- ④ « Fire mode »

+ Fire suppression system




Air exhaust system



Accelerator Air Management System

Current Design

① BEAM MODE




Air inlet: 6300 m³/h (0.5 ACH)
Air outlet: 12 600 m³/h (1 ACH)
Estimated air leaks: 6300 m³/h (0.5 ACH)

ΔP vs Klystron Gallery = -120 Pa and -140 Pa (currently under discussion)
ΔP vs outdoors = between -120 Pa and -140 Pa (currently under discussion)

Accelerator Air Management System

Current Design

② FLUSH MODE



Accelerator Air Management System


Current Design

③ ACCESS MODE


25 200 m³/h

Air inlet: 25 200 m³/h (2 ACH)
Air outlet: 25 200 m³/h (2 ACH)

ΔP vs Klystron Gallery = no under pressure required (currently under discussion)
 ΔP vs outdoors = no under pressure required (currently under discussion)




25 200 m³/h



Accelerator Air Management System

Fire control concept in the tunnel

Preliminary design





Accelerator Air Management System

Fire control concept in the tunnel

Fire event

≈ 135 m between 2 emergency exits



- Step 1:** a **fire occurs** in the tunnel
- Step 2:** the **fire is detected** by the smoke detection system
- Step 3:** the **fire alarm is sent**, the **fire damper of the air supply closes**, the **proton beam stops** and the **fire suppression system triggers** (opening of the control valve) upon detection of the fire and melting of the fusible alloy ($O_2 \downarrow$ and dynamic confinement preserved)
- Step 4:** if the filter gets clogged or the maximum operative temperature is exceeded, the **fire damper of the air exhaust closes**

Accelerator Air Management System

Fire control concept in the tunnel



Pre-action system


Main aspects:

- **No standing activated water** in the tunnel
- **Double security** regarding unwanted activation
- Very well known and **reliable system** (e.g. pipe integrity monitored (air tightness))
- **Low amount of water** in case of a fire (600 l)
- Sectioned into **8 smaller subsystems**
- **Fairly low cost** → €270.000

Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Overview of the helium inventory in the tunnel



Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Overview of the helium inventory in the tunnel

Component	Quantity	Maximum helium mass [kg]			
		Per item		In total	
		at nominal operation	at transient mode	at nominal operation	at transient mode
CDS	1	266 (315 [*])	605 (686 [*])	266 (315 [*])	605 (686 [*])
Elliptical CM	30 (44 ^{**})	34	29	1014 (1488 ^{**})	882 (1293 ^{**})
Spoke CM	13	21	18	277	240

* including additional distribution line


** including all contingent cryomodules




Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Preliminary design

1 ODH scanner per stub (27)



-  Fire damper
-  O2 analyzer
-  Sniffer




No ODH probes in the accelerator tunnel

Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

ODH event during Access Mode



If a Helium discharge occurs, **it will be partly handled by the ventilation system...**



Lesson learnt from CERN visit (2 July 2015)


→ air speed from the ventilation should not exceed 1 m/s to facilitate evacuation

Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Open issue for evacuation


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS



Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Open issue for evacuation



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : N.GAZIS


Accelerator Air Management System

Oxygen Deficiency Hazard in the tunnel

Failure scenarios (during access)

Scenario


Rupture of the power coupler's window or beam line



Loss of the content of 1 High-Beta* cryomodule (28,4 kg)

Discharge of GHe through the 2 ruptured disks located on the LHe line

Max. mass flow rate = 15,2 kg/s (current)



the triggering of the fast valves in-between cryomodules

Accelerator Air Management System

On-going Safety studies



ODH Control Measures

Simple a

Homoge
atmosph

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respect t

→ Lowest

$f =$

According to the ODH process, depending of the complexity of the case the Cryogenic Safety Committee can require a further ODH analysis (e.g. Computation Fluid Dynamics) and/or additional control measures.

ODH Class	0	1	2	In place?	
				Yes	No
Technical Safety measures					
Warning signs	X	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ventilation		*	*	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Area (fixed) Oxygen Monitoring	*	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Organizational Safety measures					
Medical approval as ODH qualified		*	*	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ODH traning (e-learning)	X	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Personal oxygen monitor		X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self-rescue mask		*	*	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Presence of minimum 2 persons			X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Administrative Safety measures					
Access restricted to authorized personnel only		X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Emergency procedure		X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Working procedure	X	X	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

* to be evaluated case by case

EUROPEAN SPALLATION SOURCE

actor*

Time needed to reach 18% O2

Always above 18%

31,2 s

22,3 s

11,5 s

Objective: Provide help to Conventional Facilities (CF) in the design of the HVAC system

Responsibility: Accelerator Division

Time frame: finalized

5	135 m	1 smoke extractor	After 30 s	50,5 s
6	135 m	2 smoke extractors	After 30 s	40,9 s

Accelerator Air Management System

On-going Safety studies


CFD simulation of Helium discharge

- ① Temperature and O₂ concentration need to be evaluated locally (close to the He discharge points) as well as pressure rise
- ② Assessment of human evacuation (pathway, time) in case of a helium release
- ③ Help in the decision-making to CF for the design of the ventilation system
- ④ Help in the definition of the access procedure to the LINAC (warm-up, cool-down, steady-state)

Objective: Provide help to Conventional Facilities (CF) in the design of the HVAC system

Responsibility: Accelerator & EIS Divisions

Time frame: first results expected end October



Accelerator Air Management System

On-going Safety studies

<https://ess-ics.atlassian.net/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=46137511>

HVAC risk analysis

- ❑ Identification of the failure modes that could lead to exposure to ionizing radiation or conventional hazards (e.g. ODH, fire)
- ❑ Identification & classification of the safety functions → SSM requirement

FROM ESS GSO			FROM SSM
ESS Safety Objectives			Current
Operating conditions	Workers limit (effective dose)	Public limit (effective dose)	Public limit
Normal operation - H1	10 mSv/year	0,05 mSv/year	0,1 mSv
Incidents – H2 $F > 10^{-2}$ <i>Ex : loss of external power or target cooling</i>	20 mSv/event	0,05 mSv/occurrence	0,1 mSv
Unexpected events - H3 $10^{-4} < F < 10^{-2}$	50 mSv/event	0,5 mSv/occurrence	1 mSv
Design Basis Accident – H4 $10^{-6} < F < 10^{-4}$	50 mSv/event	20 mSv/occurrence	20 mSv
Highly improbable events – H5 $10^{-7} < F < 10^{-6}$ <i>Ex : plane crashes, major earthquake</i>			100 mSv

Recommendation from CERN experts during their visit on July 2nd

Objective: Provide help to Conventional Facilities (CF) in the design of the HVAC system
Responsibility: CF & Accelerator Divisions
Time frame: final version expected December

Id	Safety function	Failure mode Hazardous event	Phase	Causes	Consequences	Control measures (Preventive and Protective)	Severity	Further measures suggested	Remarks
01	Prevention of the radiation dose to workers and the public	Uncontrolled release of radionuclides from the ventilation system	Normal operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exposure of workers to ionizing radiation Exposure of the public to ionizing radiation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) 	
02	Prevention of the radiation dose to workers and the public	Uncontrolled release of radionuclides from the ventilation system	Normal operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exposure of workers to ionizing radiation Exposure of the public to ionizing radiation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) 	
03	Prevention of the radiation dose to workers and the public	Uncontrolled release of radionuclides from the ventilation system	Normal operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Insufficient activation of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exposure of workers to ionizing radiation Exposure of the public to ionizing radiation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring of the differential pressure between the ventilation system and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room Monitoring of the differential pressure between the clean room and the clean room 	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) Need for a redundancy of the pressure monitoring system (Pressure to be monitored) 	

Accelerator Air Management System

On-going Safety studies


HVAC



Objective: The main objective is to ensure that the necessary actions can be taken in order to avoid or minimize the consequences of the different scenarios in the accident analysis. The study only takes into consideration the main safety interlocks.

References:
- M.Kelfve - PID of the Accelerator Air Management System

*: devices considered as secondary detection
X: main safety interlock
*: devices considered as secondary detection
X: main safety interlock
X: primary detection device
x: secondary detection device



BEAM MODE

Failure scenarios

Loss of the dynamometer

Failure scenarios

Fire ignition (reference)


Accidental release of the beam

FLUSH MODE

Failure scenarios

Loss of the dynamometer

Failure Scenario	ODH	Evacuation Alarm	Fire Extinguishing	Actions Interlock	Actions Operation
Loss of the dynamometer		X	X		X
Fire ignition (reference)	X	X	X	X	X
Loss of the dynamometer (Flush Mode)		X	X		X



Calculation

Type of ventilation

- I
- II A
- II B
- III A
- III B
- IV

pressure
Responsibility:

Type of ventilation	Foreseen radioactive contamination	Organization of the ventilation systems and filtration unit
Non-contaminated areas		
T I	Pc: Not significant Ac: Low	
T II A	Pc: Not significant Ac: Medium	
T II B	Pc: Not significant Ac: High	

Non-contaminated areas
classification

C1


C2

C3

C4*

C4**

C4***



* It is the amount of contamination that will result in the Annual Limit of Intake (ALI) for reference conversion factors


Accelerator Air Management System

On-going Safety studies

Releases of activated air: Linac (5000 hr irradiation)

Rationuclide	Released activity (Bq/y)	Maximum effective dose [#] (Sv/y)		
		Västra Odarslöv	Hypothetical Critical Group	Östra Torn
H-3	8.18E+07	8.34E-13	1.77E-12	7.16E-13
Be-7	4.50E+05*	4.55E-13	9.68E-13	3.92E-13
Be-10	3.27E-02	1.10E-18	2.33E-18	9.42E-19
C-11	2.64E+12	1.91E-08	4.07E-08	3.78E-08
C-14	2.20E+07	1.06E-10	2.24E-10	9.13E-11
N-13	6.77E+12	4.20E-08	8.73E-08	9.27E-08
O-14	4.71E+11	1.82E-09	3.20E-09	8.62E-09
O-15	3.98E+12	9.67E-09	2.03E-08	3.49E-08
O-19	2.99E+08	2.97E-14	4.40E-14	2.53E-12
Ne-23	7.70E+08	2.86E-14	5.80E-14	3.74E-13
Ne-24	2.29E+08	4.67E-13	9.87E-13	1.25E-12
Na-22	6.22E+04	1.57E-10	3.33E-10	1.35E-10
Na-24	1.34E+08	3.03E-10	6.45E-10	2.65E-10
Na-25	1.34E+09	4.66E-13	9.73E-13	3.08E-12
Mg-27	2.08E+09	1.61E-10	3.41E-10	1.69E-10
Mg-28	1.95E+07	1.87E-10	3.98E-10	1.61E-10
Al-26	3.16E-01	1.31E-15	2.79E-15	1.13E-15
Al-28	8.95E+09	7.03E-10	1.49E-09	1.14E-09
Al-29	4.41E+09	4.30E-11	8.95E-11	8.38E-11
Si-31	1.87E+09	4.82E-11	1.03E-10	4.19E-11
Si-32	6.86E+02	1.52E-14	3.24E-14	1.31E-14
P-30	1.30E+06	6.61E-15	1.42E-14	1.51E-14
P-32	1.55E+04	4.97E-12	1.06E-11	4.29E-12
P-33	8.04E+03	3.38E-13	7.20E-13	2.92E-13
P-35	9.00E+05	2.99E-14	6.34E-14	1.30E-13
S-35	3.93E+03	1.19E-13	2.54E-13	1.03E-13
S-37	3.09E+06	4.85E-14	9.61E-14	1.03E-13
S-38	1.70E+05	2.48E-14	5.27E-14	2.38E-14
Cl-36	2.15E+01	8.86E-13	1.88E-12	7.63E-13
Cl-38	3.32E+10	1.05E-09	2.20E-09	1.28E-09
Cl-39	3.82E+10	1.40E-09	2.96E-09	1.67E-09
Cl-40	1.34E+10	8.01E-11	1.51E-10	3.38E-10
Ar-37	1.09E+08	5.64E-19	1.20E-18	4.86E-19
Ar-39	1.22E+05	2.39E-18	5.09E-18	2.06E-18
Ar-41	9.15E+11	8.64E-09	1.80E-08	1.69E-08
K-38	5.60E+09	2.13E-10	4.49E-10	3.17E-10
K-40	2.04E-04	3.92E-18	8.32E-18	3.37E-18
Total	1.49E+13	8.57E-08	1.79E-07	1.97E-07

* Filter effect (0.03%) # three age groups considered (SSM 13-3285, 2014)



HVAC parameters:

Vol_{tunnel} = 12600 m³

Function	Vent. Rate** (m ³ /hr)	Stack diameter (m)	Exhaust speed (m/s)	Hepa filter	Controlled exhaust
Tunnel on-line vent	12600	1.8 - 1.9	12	On main stack	yes
Flush mode >1/2 hr cool down	31500	1.8 - 1.9	12	On main stack	yes
Tunnel access	25200	1.8 - 1.9	12	On main stack	yes

** M. Kelfve, CF

Critical group	Distance ⁺ (m)	Azimuth ^{##} (°)
Västra Odarslöv	660	0
Hypothetical	650	90
Östra Torn	330	180

+ from the release point
degrees from North




ESS Accelerator Design objective: 0.03 mSv/y
ESS General Safety Objective: 0.05 mSv/y

Accelerator Air Management System

Milestones

HVAC timeline



Any Questions...?

Back-up slides