




Beam Loss Monitor System Reliability and False Signals

Bernd Dehning




Ref: [LHC beam induced quench](#)

Content



- Reliability
 - Overview of system
 - Hardware
 - Software
 - Operational procedures
- False dumps
 - Some system issues
 - Failures of hardware
 - Measurements

Thesis: Reliability of the Beam Loss Monitors System

Quench and Damage Levels




- High dynamic range dynamic
 - Arc: 10^8
 - Collimation: 10^{13} second detector
- Change of the thresholds:
 - As function of loss duration
 - As function of beam energy




Beam Loss Measurement System Layouts

LHC



The BLM Acquisition System




Analog front-end FEE

- Current to Frequency Converters (CFCs)
- Analogue to Digital Converters (ADCs)
- Tunnel FPGAs:
Actel's 54SX/A radiation tolerant.
- Communication links:
Gigabit Optical Links.
- All radiation tested to 500 Gy and $1 \cdot 10^{12} \text{ p/cm}^2$

Real-Time Processing BEE

- FPGA Altera's Stratix EP1S40 (medium size, SRAM based)
- Mezzanine card for the optical links
- 3 x 2 MB SRAMs for temporary data storage
- NV-RAM for system settings and threshold table storage

Ionisation Chamber and Secondary Emission Monitor



- Stainless steel cylinder
- Parallel electrodes distance 0.5 cm
- Diameter 8.9 cm
- Voltage 1.5 kV
- Low pass filter at the HV input


Signal Ratio: IC/SEM = 60000

IC:

- Al electrodes
- Length 60 cm
- Ion collection time 85 us
- N₂ gas filling at 1.1 bar
- Sensitive volume 1.5 l

SEM:


- Ti electrodes
- Components UHV compatible
- Steel vacuum fired
- Detector contains 170 cm² of **NEG St707** to keep the vacuum < 10⁻⁴ mbar during 20 years



Robust and failure tolerant design

Tunnel hardware installation

- Schemes of the **straight section** installation





20/3/2004
AB/BUPM
G. F.

- Schemes of the **ARC** installation: electronics below magnets




- Ionization chambers
- Filter capacitors and resistors are installed in the IC
- Signal cable length up to 600m

Data Processing Overview



Transmission & Tunnel Status Check




At the Surface FPGA:

- CRC-32
 - Error check / detection algorithm for each of the signals received.
- Comparison of the pair of signals.
- Signal Select block
 - Logic that chooses signal to be used
 - Identifies problematic areas.
 - Increases availability
- Tunnel's Status Check block
 - High Voltage, Power supplies
 - FPGA errors
 - Temperature


| Signal Select Table | | | | |
|---------------------|-------|--------------------------|----------|---|
| CRC32 check | | Comparison of 4Byte CRCs | Output | Remarks |
| A | B | | | |
| Error | Error | Error | Dump | Both signals have error |
| Error | Error | OK | Dump | S/W trigger (CRCgenerate or check wrong) |
| Error | OK | Error | Signal B | S/W trigger (error at CRC detected) |
| Error | OK | OK | Signal B | S/W trigger (error at data part) |
| OK | Error | Error | Signal A | S/W trigger (error at CRC detected) |
| OK | Error | OK | Signal A | S/W trigger (error at data part) |
| OK | OK | Error | Dump | S/W trigger (one of the counters has error) |
| OK | OK | OK | Signal A | By default (both signals are correct) |

Settings and Checks from Database to Frontend




- Setting storage in Oracle database (LSA)
- Settings:
 - Threshold values
 - Voltages, currents, phase limits for automatic test
 - Serial numbers for ever equipment in the acquisition chain
 - Software version numbers
- Comparison of frontend settings with database every 12 hours or after every update
 - If positive hardware base beam permit given
 - If negative after retry, manual intervention (no beam permit)

Software Overview, Management of Settings




Safety given by:

- Comparison of settings at DB and front-end
- Safe transmission of settings




Data Base Structure



- Two layers
 - entry layer (stage tables)
 - validated layer (final tables)
- Concept of Master and Applied table
- Comparison of Threshold values (Applied < Master)
 - Master: less frequent changes
 - Applied: change of thresholds possible with user interface

Functional Tests Overview

PhD thesis G. Guaglio




Inspection frequency:

Reception
 Installation and yearly maintenance
 Before (each) fill
 Parallel with beam

Test Procedure of Analog Signal Chain

Modulation Example



Basic concept:

Automatic test measurements in between of two fills

- Modulation of high voltage supply of chambers
 - Check of cabling
 - Check of components, R- C filter
 - Check of chamber capacity
 - Check of stability of signal, pA to nA (quench level region)
- Measurement of dark current
- Not checked: gas gain of chamber (only once a year with source)

Functional checks – Monitoring of drifts


Fault Tree Analysis

- Almost 160 Failure Modes have been defined for the BLMS using the FMD-97 standard.

Three Ends Effects:

1. **Damage Risk:** probability not to be ready in case of dangerous loss.
2. **False Alarm:** probability to generate a false alarm.
3. **Warning:** probability to generate a maintenance request following a failure of a redundant component.

- The probability to have an Failure Mode A, $Pr\{A\}$, is calculated per each Failure Modes of the FMECA, given the hazard rate, the repair rate and the inspection period .



Fault Trees Results

- The probabilities to fail (unavailability) for the BLMS have been calculated.
- Per each End Effects, the major contributors to such probabilities have been pointed out too.

| | Consequences per year | Weakest components | | Notes |
|-------------|---|---|--|--|
| Damage Risk | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ (100 dangerous losses) | Detector (88%) Analogue electronics (11%) | | Detector likely overestimated (60% CL of no failure after $1.5 \cdot 10^6$ h). |
| False Alarm | 13 ± 4 | Tunnel power supplies (57%) VME fans (28%) | | Tunnel power supplies likely underestimated (see sensitivity example). |
| Warning | 35 ± 6 | Optical line (98%) VME PS (1%) | | LASER hazard rate likely overestimated by MIL. |

Hardware Failures

- 1 VME fan-tray; hardware, microcontroller to be identified
- 1 VME (BLETC) card; printed circuit board failure. 1 year of operation.
The card was in the crate that the fan-tray failed
- 1 VME crate power supply. Voltage outside the range (other PS showed same problem).
- 1 VME crate CPU, hardware failure caused by continuously rebooting due to 'persistent data' caused by the timing process (called LTIM).


VME crate failure are under investigation

Noise Level Distributions





■ Procedure:

- require data during nominal operation conditions of LHC
- Choose most sensitive integration intervals
- Set histogram max value to lowest quench threshold level (MB-magnet)

- Overflows are interpreted as false signals



Noise Signal Distribution of LHC 12. September 2008



- Checked:
 - 15 hours in the nights between 12 to 16 September 2008
- Results:
 - 19 channels would have given false signals located on 4 electronics cards
- Conclusion:
 - It is assumed that this channels could have been repaired
 - 2009 checks are foreseen after reinstallation of BLM system

Conclusion

- System constructed aiming for a damage risk of SIL 3 ($1 \cdot 10^{-8}$ to $1 \cdot 10^{-7}$ 1/h, $5 \cdot 10^{-5}$ to $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ 1/year)
 - Audit endorsed system design
 - Audit follow up planned for June 2009 (combined with audit follow up for interlock system and dump)
- Full implementation of foreseen system test procedures to keep SIL level during operation
- False signal generation limited to few channels (<0.5 %), which are assumed to be repairable


Literature

- General Information: <http://cern.ch/blm>
- [Audit](#)
- [Talks and papers:](#)
 - Reliability issues, thesis, G. Guaglio
 - Reliability issues, R. Filippini et al., PAC 05
 - Front end electronics, analog, thesis, W. Friesenbichler
 - Front end electronics, analog-digital, E. Effinger et al.
 - Ionisation chamber, thesis, M. Stocker
 - Secondary emission monitor, thesis, D. Kramer
 - Digital signal treatment, thesis, C. Zamantzas
 - Balancing Safety and Availability for an Electronic Protection System, S. Wagner et al., to be published, ESREL 2008

Threshold & database functional tests

- version 2 threshold table
 - change the master threshold for one, given family:
 - generation of new master
 - sending new master to LSA (hopefully with new application by Javier)
 - we end up with a new version of master (call it 2.01)
 - split existing family into two families with different masters
 - create new family in LSA
 - create new master thresholds for the new family
 - move chosen monitors to new family
 - we end up with a new version of master: 2.02 3.
 - exchange a card (really):
 - stop a crate, change physically exchange one card
 - reconnect channels - change of channel structure
 - introduce changes to MTF (Slava)
 - propagate changes to Layout
 - update LSA from Layout
 - master version 2.03 4.
 - roll-back all the changes in LSA to version 2.00. (eventually changing back the card)
 - measure the time it takes us to perform all the operations

Gain Variation of SPS Chambers



Total received dose:

ring 0.1 to 1 kGy/year

extr 0.1 to 10 MGy/year

- 30 years of operation
- Measurements done with installed electronic
- Relative accuracy
 - $\Delta\sigma/\sigma < 0.01$ (for ring BLMs)
 - $\Delta\sigma/\sigma < 0.05$ (for Extr., inj. BLMs)
- Gain variation only observed in high radiation areas
- Consequences for LHC:
 - No gain variation expected in the straight section and ARC of LHC
 - Variation of gain in collimation possible for ionisation chambers

Reliable component

System Failures

To avoid loss of data

- Frame ID
 - Surface FPGA checks for missing frames
 - Incrementing number included at every transmission
- Optical link is always active
 - 8b/10b encoding sends “commas” when no data
 - Disconnection is detected in max 25ns

To ensure recognition of system failures and beam dump requests

- FPGA Outputs (Beam Dump signals) as frequency
 - At a dump request, reset, or failure the transmitted frequency will be altered
- Beam Permit lines are daisy-chained between cards
 - Custom VME backplane
 - Dummy cards on empty slots to close circuit