

# High Intensity Beams and Radiation Issues

Session 3 of ATOP Days 2009

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# Presentations of Session 3

- Review of the machine protection system in the SPS  
*J. Wenninger, BE-OP*
- Review of the machine protection system in the PS complex  
*K. Hanke, BE-OP*
- RF limitations while running at high intensities in the injectors  
*E. Jensen, BE-RF*
- ISOLDE radioactive air handling  
*R. Catherall, EN-STI*
- Status of RAMSES and ARCON radiation monitoring systems  
*M. Widorski, DG-SCR*
- Supercycles in the SPS – towards full ppm operation and impact on the equipment  
*J. Wenninger, BE-OP*
- Where do we stand 3 years after the recommendations from the BLRWG  
*S. Gilardoni, BE-ABP*

# Review of the Machine Protection System in the SPS


Bubble = BIC module

All SPS Machine Protection issues are handled together with the LHC in the (LHC) Machine Protection Panel (MPP)  
 -> Coherent approach


1 Ring beam permit loop, 2 extraction interlock systems based on BIC modules (same hardware as in LHC)

SPS Hardware Interlock Systems:  
 experience with the new interlock hardware is excellent

SPS Software Interlock System:  
 experience with SIS is excellent




Clients (= interlock providers) connect in each BA.  
 The interlock summary (beam permit) is carried over a loop to the beam dump system in BA1.



Clients (= interlock providers) are connect according to the transfer line.  
 The interlock summary (extraction permit) is forwarded to the extraction kicker.

# ZS Ripper (2007)


BLM thresholds



This BLM was changed from ring type (20 ms) to extraction type ( $\mu$ s) after the event. When the BLM triggered the event was over.

Electrostatic septum (ZS1) wires cut by slow extracted beam ( $\sim 9 \times 10^{12}$  p).

- Cause: controls 'problem' turned a slow into a fast-slow extraction.
- MPS issue: **BLMs too slow / threshold too high** (slow extraction).



# Review of the Machine Protection System in the SPS - Recommendation

- CNGS and LHC transfer lines MPS: in good shape
  - about 50% of the SPS hardware interlocks are concentrated in those TL
  - interlock coverage is very good but not yet ideal

## Recommendations:

- SPS ring and TT20:
  - Require significant improvement of the protection system:
    - New BLM electronics (faster and multiple thresholds and integration times)
    - Fast BPMs for vertical plane
- Simulations required to redefine BLM thresholds, integration times and optimum position/coverage
- Install additional BLMs to increase coverage

# Review of the Machine Protection System in the PS complex

- LINAC 2, PS, AD: Interlocks work well
- Booster issues in 2008:
  - ISOLDE beam with destination DUMP sent into the PS
  - Beam to ISOLDE while Request OFF
  - Access interlock of floor -3 during beam operation (stair + elevator)
- ISOLDE:
  - Broken belt in ventilation system triggered radiation (!) alarm in CCC
  - Wrong beam received; now interlock through new VISTAR






# Review of the Machine Protection System in the PS Complex - Recommendation

- Study to prohibit full NTOF beam into East Area for parasitic cycles
- Implementation of new ISOLDE and LINAC2 watchdog systems to be carefully prepared (BI/CO/OP collaboration)
- Clear procedures to be provided to operation for new interlocks (PSB elevator, ISOLDE ventilation alarm, interlock during Linac4 construction)
- Extensive testing of failure scenarios for new equipment connected to interlock system or after control system changes required

# RF limitations while running at high intensities in the injectors


- High intensity beams will confront RF systems with a number of stability limits (or will approach machine instability thresholds).
- PSB:
  - CO4 power limitations (air-cooling; issue for faster machine cycling)
  - Instability at low CO4 voltage and high BL
  - “Ring 4 problem” (transverse plane)
    - Maybe due to increased impedance
    - Saturation of transverse damper due to additional power demand
  - CO2 beam loading in view of Linac4
    - Intensity limit of  $\sim 1.65 \cdot 10^{13}$  per ring with Linac4?





# RF limitations while running at high intensities in the injectors

- PS:
  - Phase drift at low voltages due to beam loading
  - Over-current at  $\gamma_{tr}$  crossing with high beam loading (tube protection was modified in 2008)
  - Beam losses at  $\gamma_{tr}$  (large excursions of MRP too fast for radial loop; additional fast PU has been installed)
  - Insufficient transient beam-loading compensation for an asymmetrically filled machine
  - Coupled bunch instabilities above  $\gamma_{tr}$  for LHC beams (use C10 as long. kicker in feedback loop; works up to nominal intensity)
  - Bunch lengthening due to residual impedance of 40 and 80 MHz cavities




# RF limitations while running at high intensities in the injectors

- SPS:
  - 200 MHz system: Siemens (28 tetrodes) and Philips (72 tetrodes)
    - ageing tetrodes (more wear with CNGS operation; 16 tubes broken in 2008!)
    - power couplers: ceramics upgraded, but still limited (transition coupler – cavity)
    - coaxial lines limited to 750 kW
  - 800 MHz system: essential at high intensities to cope with dominant coupled bunch instability
    - The system is dying! (klystrons, transformers)
    - Was ‘just’ possible to supply required 800 MHz in 2008
    - ✓ System renovation underway; completion in 2013
  - Maintenance work had to be reduced from 2005; increased number of interventions


# RF limitations while running at high intensities in the injectors - Recommendations

- **PSB:**
  - Study feasibility of water-cooling for PSB Co4 system to prepare a possible 900 ms cycle operation
  - Clarify if Co2 needs upgrade for Linac4 operation or prove that new digital LL RF system could improve situation (LL RF loops)
  - Implement power upgrade of PSB transverse damper (in white paper)
- **SPS:**
  - 200 MHz: Tubes are consumables. For reliable operation, purchase a sufficient number of tubes annually and keep a healthy stock
    - The exact needs are a function of CNGS 'statistics'
    - Allow for a regular 4 months annual maintenance (mandatory for reliability)
    - Improve the connections between power coupler and the 200 MHz cavities

# ISOLDE radioactive air handling




## Air activation levels over 3 years as measured in chimney




# Modification of the Ventilation System

- Why modify the ventilation system after 14 years of operation? (during 2007/2008 shutdown)
  - Increase delay time of activated air in target area
  - Sealing of holes to reduce air flow out of target

GPS neutron fluence [  $1 / \text{cm}^2 / \text{primary}$  ] between  $z = -2.5 \dots 2.5$  [ cm ] ( Level of the beam:  $z = 0$  [ cm ] )



HRS neutron fluence [  $1 / \text{cm}^2 / \text{primary}$  ] between  $z = -2.5 \dots 2.5$  [ cm ] ( Level of the beam:  $z = 0$  [ cm ] )




# Results from 2008

Release of short-lived gases				
Year	P on target (10 <sup>19</sup> )	Measurement (TBq)	Prediction (TBq/10 <sup>20</sup> p)	Released radioactivity (μSvy <sup>-1</sup> )
2004	7.78	5.52	7.1	1.6
2005	9.67	6.76	7.0	2.0
2006	7.9	7.03	8.9	2.04
2007	6.3	11.1	17.6	3.23
2008	5.3	5.48	10.3	1.6

- 2μA was available for each separator as from July 2008
  - Tests showed that at 2μA, a maximum of 520kBqm<sup>-3</sup> was being released
  - No gate monitor alarms triggered
- The reason for the increase in 2007 is not completely understood but probably due to the opening of cable passages between the hall and the target area.

# Recommendations

- All activities exceeding operational limits as defined at ISOLDE start in 1993 need Radiation Safety and Radiation Protection assessment and approval. Same principle will be applied to other CERN installations
- Radiation Safety and Radiation Protection studies similar to SPS, CNGS and LHC are required as part of HIE approval procedure






# Status of RAMSES and ARCON radiation monitoring system

DG-SCR operates two different radiation monitoring and alarm systems:

- ARCON for the injector chain and experimental areas
- RAMSES for LHC, CNGS, CTF<sub>3</sub>

Aim:  
replace ARCON by  
RAMSES  
1<sup>st</sup> step: remove HP  
server





# Status of RAMSES and ARCON radiation monitoring system

- Extension of RAMSES to whole LHC injector chain on good way, Finance Committee approved to increase the envelope of the initial contract
- HP server supervision replacement close to be finalised

## Recommendations:

- Clear procedures to be prepared for operation to prepare for ARCON failures
- Clarify fast access to RAMSES from CCC

# Supercycles in the SPS - Towards 'full' ppm operation


- Remove link between supercycle and cycle to increase flexibility
- Ensure cycles can be interchanged using a standard setting at start and end
  - *The ring will use a fixed base momentum of 13.5 GeV*
  - *Injection no longer coincides with time = 0 for FT and CNGS beams*
  - *TT10 PC functions must be started in advance (~2000 ms); PC crate needs to be triggered on different timing event*
  - *Machine offset between CPS and SPS will change by -200 ms*
- *No special recommendations*

# Where do we stand 3 years after ...

## PS radiation issue of Route Goward

*Tunnel built at ground level, not enough shielding in some locations ....*

*50% irradiation from CT extraction. ~ 0% with MTE  
50% directly from beam injection*



Improvements:

MTE extraction  
LHC BLMs installed  
Matching  
PSB-BT-BTP-PS study  
Trajectory study  
Alignment  
measurements BT-BTP-  
PS


To be done:  
MC simulation of  
injection loss  
Alignment BT-BTP-PS

# Where do we stand 3 years after ...

## Surface area on top of TT20

Area on top of TT20 needs to be classified as radiation area

- Fence around surface area located on top of TT20 beam line encloses :
  - Water pit DP 523
  - First and second series of splitters
  - Building 898 (ventilation building with direct connection to beam line)



# Where do we stand 3 years after

## Conclusions

- Recommendations status:
  - MTE commissioning will end in 2009: less radiation @ route Goward, no radiation in SS31, losses concentrated at extraction septum
  - radiation @ route Goward: injection studies ongoing
  - No additional air activation studies for TT10 in 2008 due to other priorities. Postponed to 2009
  - Surface area on top of TT20 has been fenced
  - TT10 PGC1 shaft shielding has been renovated
  - Air sniffing system in BA80 installation started but, due to other priorities, work will be finished in 2009
  - SPS-BLM readout device for residual dose rate measurements testing started
- Operation always attentive to reduce as much as possible beam losses
- Other steps taken to reduce/understand losses: machine alignment, renovation of beam loss monitor system, cross-check between radiation survey and BLMs data...

# Where do we stand 3 years after - Recommendations

- Perform BT/BTP line alignment as early as possible (+BTM and BTY alignment)
- Install remote TCC2 device for visual inspections and dose rate measurements
- Publish BLRWG report and revive BLRWG (or similar) for regular inspection of beam and radiation conditions