

Industrial Control at CERN

Academia-Industry Matching Event on the Mutual Impact of
Industry 4.0 and High-Energy Physics

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Objectives

- Overview the **CERN organization** towards efficient Industrial controls
- Give a overview **Industrial Controls technologies** and their applicability to some **industrial control systems**
- **Advanced automation & Industry 4.0**



CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire, 1954)

Yearly Budget

~1100 MCHF (~ 1000 MEUR)

Experiments financed externally.

22 Member states

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Check Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italia, Hungary, Holland, Israel, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.



Personnel

2500	Staff
1800	Fellows & Ass, Students
13000	Users
2000	External companies

5 Observers states

EC, USA, Russian Federation, Japan, UNESCO

3 Candidate states

Serbia, Cyprus and Slovenia (pre-stage of membership)

3 Associate states

Turkey, Pakistan, Ukraine and India





CERN instruments

Accelerators
Detectors



LHC
27km length
100m underground
> 1600 **Superconducting** magnets (1.8×10^9 km of superconducting filaments)
Ultrahigh vacuum: 10^{-13} atm
10x moon vacuum
Coldest place in Universe: **-271° C**



ATLAS Detector
7000 tonnes, ~100 million read-out channels, 3000 km of cables
Contains 11 sub-detectors of different technologies in layer structure
Built and operated by collaboration of >3000 physicists



Industrial Control challenges

One of the CERN goals: maximize uptime of the instruments (accelerators, detectors,...) in order to optimize **physics data** availability

This objective implies the maximum **availability** and optimal operation of all the auxiliary/utilities systems (e.g. cryogenics, cooling, HVAC, gas, motion, interlocks,...) -> the correspondent **control systems** must ensure this.

What is uncommon at the CERN accelerators control systems?


- Environment (radiation areas)
- Large systems (highly distributed and/or interconnected)
- Complexity (control logic)
- Precision (measurements)
- Performance (regulation)
- Data (number and frequency)



BE-ICS (Industrial Control & Safety Systems)

A **central group** for industrial controls serving the whole CERN community


- Development of frameworks
- Development of control systems
- Support basic technologies




Control Systems at CERN



Cooling & Ventilation



Vacuum



Detector Controls



Electric Grid



Cryogenics



Gas Distribution



Environment & Radiation




Interlocks and Safety

LHC Cryogenics (or the coldest place in universe! -271°C)


helium storage



Pt 5



liquid nitrogen storage



compressor stations



liquid helium storage



cold boxes



LHC cryogenics control: Use case



WinCC OA HMI in the CCC

- 27 km of decentralized instrumentation and control
- 50k I/O, 11k actuators, ~5k feedback control loops
- Control: ~100 PLCs (Siemens, Schneider), ~40 FECs (industrial PCs)
- Supervision: 26 SCADA servers : 1.5 million TAGS




Electro-pneumatic positioner, SIPART PS2




Instruments	Range	Total
TT (temperature)	1.6- 300K	9500
PT (pressure)	0-20 bar	2200
LT (level)	Various	540
EH (heaters)	Various	2500
CV (Control Valves)	0- 100 %	3800
PV/QV (On Off Valves)	--	2000

Tunnel Instrumentation



RadTol in-house electronics for signal conditioning and actuation


Logging DB Gb/day



- UNICOS
- JCOP
- FESA (BE-CO)

Industrial Controls Architecture

SUPERVISION
CONTROL
FIELD



OWS: Operator Workstation
EWS: Engineering Workstation
FEC: Front-End Computer: IPC

TN or EN (Technical network)


600 SCADA Applications
400 Industrial PCs
10 RAC Oracle Servers
200 TB stored per year

600 PLCs
200 OPC UA Servers
90 FECs

Hundreds of PS
Hundreds of Fieldbuses
Thousands of intelligent instruments
10 M Hardware I/O



Industrial Controls Technologies



SUPERVISION, Visualization and programming

- WinCC OA (PVSS) SCADA (standard)
- Legacy systems: PCVue32, FactoryLink, WinCC

CONTROL

- SIEMENS, Schneider (standards)
- Industrial PCs: SIEMENS IPC, Kontron

FIELD LAYER

- Industrial instrumentation: Sensors, actuators
- Industrial customized actuators: Profibus PA positioners
- Home made electronics: ELMB, Signal Conditioners (CRYO), Power supplies


COMMUNICATIONS

- Fieldbuses: Profibus, WorldFIP, CAN, Profinet, Ethernet/IP
- In house developments: White rabbit
- OPC




Industrial Controls: Standards & Frameworks

- Off-the-shelf components (COTS) whenever possible
- Standardization (ISA, IEC)
- Frameworks
 - **JCOP**: A homogeneous way to build the detector control systems
 - **UNICOS**: A unified way to build process control systems
- **Homogenization**
Cryogenics, Vacuum, HVAC, Electricity...



JCOP (JOINT CONTROLS PROJECT)

- Started in 1998
- Collaboration between the Experiments and the central controls team (nowadays BE-ICS)
- Major subprojects:
 - WinCC OA based framework
 - Experiments' Gas Control Systems
 - Detector Safety Systems



The DCS of the four LHC Experiments is done in common in the frame of the **JCOP**

Courtesy of F. Varela

Industrial Partners & Collaborations

(some examples...)

Integrators

- **GTD Systems**: LHC cryogenics project (initial budget ~ 6 MCHF)
- **Assystem**: Industrial controls support contract

Suppliers

- Siemens, Schneider,: PLCs; *ARC Informatique*, ETM (Siemens): SCADA; *Empresarios Agrupados*: Industrial modeling and simulation.

Academia

- **UVA** (University of Valladolid, Spain): modelling & simulation, PLC embedded controllers (MBPC)
- **BME** (Budapest University of Technology and Economics), **EPFL** (Lausanne): Formal methods applied to PLC code verification

HEP Institutes

- GSI, ITER, ESO, SOLEIL, MPI...



Industrial controls & Industry 4.0

- Mostly relevant to discrete products and their manufacturing – assembly lines, machines, and robots. In a process plant : **processing equipment**
- **Additional sensors** deployed to enable online **monitoring** of **equipment** ('things')
- The Industrial Internet of Things (**IIoT**): industrial-strength networks and cyber-physical security.
- **Analyze the raw data**: process monitoring or **anomaly** detection: **Big data**.
- **Information exchange** over the entire lifecycle of a product: convergence of OT and IT.
- **Digital twins** fostering fabrication and performance

- Industrial controls and drives: The future will bring more effective industrial controls and drive technologies that will **reduce process variability** while ensuring **safety** and **security**

OT and IT convergence (Project Life cycle)


Databases (Assets, Layout Controls conf.)

Versioning (SVN, GIT)

Verification, Simulation, Test (Continuous Integration)

Deployment & Monitoring



Maintenance Analytics



Applied formal methods



- **Formal verification** of PLC code: **PLCVerif**
 - Mathematically sound methods to check the correctness of plans / implementations. E.g. Model checking
 - Tool reengineering project started (funded by CERN [KT](#))
- **Used in real-life projects** (to complement testing)
 - At CERN: [SM18](#) projects, [B311 Switchboard](#), [AWAKE](#)
 - Outside of CERN: [ITER](#) interlock masking ([HIOC](#))
- **Collaborations**
 - TU Budapest, EPFL
 - Siemens US (Openlab)



PLCverif — Verification report

Generated on 2016-09-01 12:34 | PLCverif v2.0.3 | (C) CERN BE-ICS-PCS | [Show/hide expert details](#)

ID: INTLCK-01

Name: Restart disallowed if interlock is not acknowledged

Description: If the interlock is not acknowledged and restarting the object is not allowed in the presence of an interlock, then the "restart allowed" output should be false.

Tested: `if InterlockNotAcknowledged=true AND RestartAllowedDuringInterlock=false is true at the end of the PLC cycle, then RestartAllowed = false should always be true at the end of the same cycle.`


Testing the verification results: 552 ms

	End of Cycle 1	End of Cycle 2
RestartAllowed	FALSE	FALSE
RestartAllowedDuringInterlock	TRUE	FALSE
RestartAllowedDuringInterlockNotAcknowledged	FALSE	TRUE
RestartAllowedDuringInterlockNotAcknowledged	TRUE	TRUE
RestartAllowedDuringInterlockNotAcknowledged	FALSE	TRUE

Courtesy of D. Darvas



IIoT (Industrial IoT)




IIoT equipped sensors

Cryogenics instrumentation electronics cards design (high precision)


IIoT architectures

Fully integrated within industrial fieldbuses (e.g. Profinet)


- Profinet RT for control purposes (engineering values)
- OPC-UA for sensor diagnostics (data analytics)



IloT (Industrial IoT)



Data analytics



Evaluate system performance




Post-mortem analysis

› Root-cause analysis and fault prediction


Anomaly detection

1. Detect anomalous oscillation:

- Control system stability
- Increased communication load
- Maintenance (use of actuators)
- Performance (Physical time)




2. Detect system/hardware malfunctions



Data Processing




Anomaly detection



CERN cloud computing

Web Reporting



CERN

worker

3

Courtesy of F. Tilaro (Openlab)



Increase SECURITY



Cybersecurity at CERN relies on three principles

- Device registration, inventory and traffic auditing.
- Network segregation : Separate networks for production, development and major experiments.
- Device isolation through control sets: PLC devices are only allowed to speak to trusted equipment (SCADA servers, monitoring equipment...)

Robustness of PLCs, IoT devices and other equipment

- CERN collaborated with *ANSSI (FR) / **BSI (DE) on an open-source initiative for an ISA-99 compliant robustness fuzzing platform (implemented by AMOSSYS). The platform will be released to the public domain early 2018 Q2.



ANSSI | Agence nationale de la sécurité
des systèmes d'information




* Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (France)

** Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Germany)


Courtesy of B. Copy

Increase SAFETY

Safety Instrumented Systems engineering




AWAKE Plasma cell



Safety Instrumented Function Loop

AWAKE Plasma cell (viewports)



Safety Instrumented Function architecture





Standards



Modeling & Simulation: Digital twin

CERN developed a cryogenic library with the commercial simulation software **EcosimPro** (*Empresarios Agrupados*): Cryogenic equipment modelled by DAEs. (Differential-Algebraic Equations)

Under a special Spanish programme of industry support to Science the library was the object of a **technology transfer** to EA International (2011)



Adopting the **Virtual Commissioning** concept reduces installation launch time and increase the control system quality by testing, validating, and debugging the system before physical commissioning

HIL: Hardware in the loop



Conclusions

- Sound base of standardized industrial control systems
 - Large installations usually well instrumented
 - Extensive experience with fieldbuses
 - Already large experience OT & IT convergence
 - Large amount of data available
 - Valuable partners identified
-
- But LHC will be there for 20 more years...
 - Evolution will naturally integrate Industry 4.0 concepts
 - A exciting period in front of us!

Acknowledgements & Credits

Material extracted from several sources:

- CERN documentation
- BE-ICS group (Industrial Controls & Safety Systems)
- CERN equipment groups (e.g. Cryogenics, QPS...)
- CERN LHC experiments
- JCOP project
- UNICOS project



CERN, 2018



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