





# The LHC Main Magnet Electrical Interconnections:


the Subtle Size of Superconductivity

Lucio Rossi

**CERN** 


Thanks to:

F. Bertinelli, P. Fessia, L. Lebrun, H. Prin, L. Tavian, JP Tock, D. Tommasini, A. Verweij, L. Williams




### The two rings Large Hadron Collider 🔼 🎏









### LHC SC Magnets in the tunnel



LHC Tunnel 26.7 km E<sub>beam</sub>=7 TeV

 $I_{beam} = 1 A$ 

 $E_{beam} = 350 \text{ MJ}$ 

1.9 K cryogenics 130 tonnes He (100 t in LHC)

First massive use of HTS CL 1.5 MA I<sub>power conv</sub>





1232 Twin dipoles 2 x Ø56 mm  $B_0 8.3 T - 15 m long$ ~ 30 ton cold mass 7 MJ energy each 154 series dipoles ~ 1100 MJ/circuit

392 Main Quadrupoles 2 x Ø56 mm B<sub>peak</sub> 6.85 7 m long unit: SSS = 1 Quad + HO & corretors


>100 special Quads  $B \sim 6.5 - 8 T$ Also in long units with correctors


17 Sept 2009





































### Dipole closed








#### **Construction and QA**



- 3 companies made main quads
- 1 the main quads
- 4 companies the special quads
- The companies were charged to carry out
  - A full set of electrical tests in all conditions
  - To certify the conformity of operation to CERN design
- Each test reported on the electronic MTF (2 big paper folder/magnets)
- Acceptance of a magnet upon extensive power test at CERN (release of the conformity certificate for payment). Two year warranty






# Cryostat, Magnet test, preparation, Installation by CERN (staff+temp.)



Foto SMI2 Paul






# **Experience and validation of system behavior: Magnet Strings**



#### **STRING-1** (1994-1998)

- One half LHC cell:
  - 3 MB (10 m) + 1 MQ
- Validation of:
  - Cryogenics (6 CD's)
  - Vacuum
  - Quench (172) and protection
  - Powering and energy extraction






#### **STRING-2** (2000-2004)


- One full LHC cell
  - 6 MB (15 m) + 2 MQ + correctors
- Validation of:
  - · Cryogenics,
  - Vacuum
  - Quench and protection
  - Powering
  - Accelerator relevant operation (e.g.tracking of MQ and MB)


Courtesy of Marta Bajko




# LHC: approval end 1994 and end 1996 for commissioning 2005










## 2004: problem of QRL (cryoline) (and: DFBs, IT Quads, Bus Bars...)





Large team of CERN to cope with QRL issues. Only 10 months delay at the end, but magnet installation started 18 month delayed. Good part of Interconnection team —and magnet and vacuum teams - were devoted to QRL issues



### LHC start up fixed on 8 Sept 2008 (Inauguration 21 Oct.2008) EUCAS 2017








LHC first beam: 8 Sept 20008 Great success!!

However 2 out 8 sectors had been test only at injection energy (0.54 T).Hardware commissioning actually resumed a few day later.




#### The LHC interconnections





- LHC has about 10,000 13 kA SC joints in the arc interconnects: about 3.300 on the MB circuits and 6700 on MQ circuits.
  - 10,000 main junctions more are inside the main magnets
- These joints have been performed using soldering machine based on induction technology. The soldering material is the Sn96Ag4. Not mechanically clamped
- The interconnection activities started in May 2005

   18 months late and ended in November 2007.
   The last joint was soldered in July 2007.
- Max production rate of 250 joints/weeks. Only 0.1% re-worked.



#### The LHC interconnection - cont.



#### **LHC PROJECT**

- 55,000 junction of 600 A done via u.s. welds
- A few hundreds 6 kA splices via soft soldering
- 40,000 orbital TIG welds for junctions
  - most for HEII vessel, other for beam UHV.
  - Only 0.4% leak rate; all repaired in a reasonable time (vacuum section: 100m)
- Observation about 3-4 sector (Oct06-Jul07):
  - the interconnection activity in this sector experienced among the worst working conditions in the whole project, with low temperature and high humidity in the tunnel
  - progress was particularly slow in January 2007 with low productivity of the industrial contractor's staff, as a consequence of uncertainties in the contracting policy of the company.
  - These effects could have detrimentally impacted on the overall quality of the work, but no direct evidence has been found of this.
- e.m. interference was preventing data acquisition on induction soldering. All was left to machine interlocks.





#### The 2008 LHC Cable Junction Box



#### Joint components before soldering

Superc. cables

Superc. cables

Superc. cables

U-shaped copper profile

Bus bar well reconstituted after soldering


Cross section of the joint joint, entirely file


Copper stabilizer Superc. \_\_\_\_\_ Superc. \_\_\_\_

0.6 n $\Omega$  max specified 0.2-0.4 n $\Omega$  regularly achieved

17 Sept 2009


L. Rossi - CERN @ EUCAS





### LHC Main Dipole and Main Quads Bus-bar joint by induction technique








**Good Junction** 


Bad Junction still with good electrical and mechanical properties: 3 tonnes






## An on-line QA: U.S. introduced very late- results not always clear









Used extensively only in last sector; one defect intercepted.

Courtesy: Lloyd Williams




### **Electrical Circuit and QP scheme** of 8 x 154 dipoles in series (sector) EUCAS 2017





When a quench is detected (100 mV for 10 ms), Quench Heaters are activated, increasing resistance in 50-100 ms to pass the diode threshold voltage of 7 V. After 300 ms current is virtually zero in the magnet. But it flows in the bus bar, where current decrease with 105 s time constant (0.9 kV is the voltage limit). Bus Bar  $V_{thr} = 1 \text{ V}$ .



# The 2008 incident: sequence of events of Friday 19<sup>th</sup> September




- Last ramp to 6.5 T in the dipoles of the last sector before giving the machine to operators. The limit
  of 6.5 T (vs nominal 8.3 T) was due to "discovery" of symmetric quench during HWC.
- A fast discharge on the dumping resistors was activated by a sudden resistance rise in the magnet line at about 8700 A (6.2 T).
- Some 100 ms later a quench was detected on the bus bar (including interconnection joints).
- Almost immediately QDS detected many magnet quenches
- The discharge was abnormally fast and the circuit sectioned in various two branches (shorts).
- Very soon we lost control of the sectors and then the general power was lost in the sector.
- For one day we could do nothing. Oxygen deficiency signals triggered.
- Saturday afternoon firemen could go down with oxygen bottles and diving suite: oxygen level was coming back to almost normal everywhere.
- Sunday firemen went back with two our engineers (F. Bertinelli and V. Parma). Long line of magnet displaced, almost falling down or aside, opening of the cryostat, tunnel **frost on hundred meters**



### A resistive joint of about 220 $n\Omega$ with no contacts with the stabilizer






The value of 200  $n\Omega$  was find from electrical model (set up later) and independently confirmed by HeII calorimetry (see later)

Extensive measurements on various type of defects later on confirmed that a joint badly done is less than 10 n $\Omega$  (even without solder). The faulty joint was not heated. The joint melted away generating a low voltage high power arc fed by the magenta c energy stored in the magnets.


A worst joint,  $\sim m\Omega$  would have been easily detect at 1 kA.

The lack of continuity in the stabilizer of course **left the bad joint unprotected**: during IC works was noticed gaps between bus bar and flat copper profile 1-5 mm, filed when >1-2 mm; **however nobody thought of possible voids inside bus bar.** 




## **Current decay in dipole circuit from 8.7 kA**






Courtesy of M. Bajko, N. Catalan, G. de Rijk, G. Kirby, S. Le Naour



#### **Energy balance in dipole circuit**





Energy	MJ	%		
Stored in the magnets	595.0	100		
Dissipated in UJ33	71.0	12		
Dissipated in UA43	104.8	18		
Dissipated in cold mass	144.4	24		
Dissipated in electrical arcs	274.8	46		

N. Catalan, S. Le Naour

A task force was set to analyze the event, to understand cause and propose remedies. Lead by Ph. Lebrun, Head of AT department



#### Heavily damaged zone extended over 3 subsectors



Α,	В,	C	=
dip	ol	es	

quadrupole


P3 ←—	Q17	A18	B18	C18	Q18	A19	B19	C19	Q19	A20	B20	C20	Q20	A21	B21	C21	Q21
Cryostat CM Longi CM Vert CM Rad	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	<2 ? ? ?	\2 \2 \2 \2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2
	Q21	A22	B22	C22	Q22	A23	B23	C23	Q23	A24	B24	C24	004	A25	B25	C25	Q25
Cryostat CM Longi CM Vert CM Rad	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	-/ -20 <2 <2	<2 -65 -6 0/10	<2 -104 -5 11/8	<2 -141 -4 7/3	-18/ -2 -2 -2 -2	<2 -186 -4 15/3	<2 -127 -5 8/13	£2 -70 113	Q24 <1 <1 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 2 <2
	Q25	A26	B26	C26	Q26	A27	B27	C27	Q27	A28	B28	C28	Q28	A29	B29	C29	Q29
Cryostat CM Longi CM Vert CM Rad	<2 <2 2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 5/ -5 2/<2	<2 108 -5 8/9	<2 168 -4 3/15	474 -38 -26 22	-4 232 58/-7 20/<2	<2 188 -7/-5 <2/12	<2 145 -8/33 16/6	11 95 12 <2	<2 /0 -5 <2	<2 35 <2 <2	<2 3 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2
	Q29	A30	B30	C30	Q30	A31	B31	C31	Q31	A32	B32	C32	Q32	A33	B33	C33	Q33
Cryostat CM Longi CM Vert CM Rad	<2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 19 <2 <3	<2 81 -5 3/6	<2 146 -4 10/17	188 <2 <2 <2	<2 141 -11/-5 -3/6	<2 102 -6/-5 6	<2 63 -5 6/<2	5 10 3 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2	<2 <2 <2 <2 <2
	9		m barrier			ass displa		*		al interru	•		Disconn		=	Electrica	al canton
>0 [mm] ?	Values	up, cente are in mi asured ye	m	XYZ	Open in	t displac terconne cones		**		ircuit (di ally dama		XYZ	Remove Reinstal No char		Date cted	02/12/20 J	008 Ph Tock

Overpress ure in the cryostat with conseque nt cryomagnet movement made the big damage

#### Through:


- Mechanics
- Secondary arcs


Picture reworked from: J.-Ph. Tock



#### Electrical arc between C24 and Q24










## Collateral damage: magnet displacements with further arcs





#### Collateral damage: magnet displacements and mechanical damage







### Collateral damage: magnet displacement



QBQI.27R3 Bellows torn open **EUCAS 2017** 

QBBI.B31R3 Extension by 73 mm





## Collateral damage: ground supports not enough robust








### Beam vacuum pipe was perforated in a few points: contamination all along 3 km sector!!




Beam Screen (BS): The red color is characteristic of a clean copper surface

BS with some contamination by super-isolation (MLI multi layer insulation)


BS with soot contamination. The grey color varies depending on the thickness of the soot, from grey to dark.







Fortunately we were not near to Experiments



**LHC PROJECT** 


## Bad electrical diagnostic: but we ignored cryogenic signals (installed for other scope...)

Electrical very difficult to see with the old system: QPS on bus

 $V_{thr} = 1 V$  $V_{sens} = 0.1-0.3V$ 

bar too weak:


(later sensitivity improved to 0.3 mV!)



Precursor (a posteriori): temperature drift @ 7 kA current flat top (15.09.08) In the bad subsector the ΔT increase was 40 mK, double than normal

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
This technique led to discovery of very bad internal connections escaping the QA test of magnet test




# But ... later a more subtle joint failure mode was evidenced




- Splice SC-SC can be good (or acceptable, < few  $n\Omega$ ), however the stabilizer may be not continous and not in contact with the cable.
- (Enhancing) Voiding bus bars solder due to excessive heating durign (good) joint



#### Defective interconnetion-bus bar transition γ-ray picture (left) and scheme (right)






## This failure mode is more frequent for under- or overheating during melting

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
After the incident, simple Copper Stabilzing Resistance Measurement introduced: very effective. Most attention shifted from the  $n\Omega$  of SC splice to Cu  $\mu\Omega$ 





#### Fault tree of 19 September 2008 incident [1/3]









#### Fault tree of 19 September 2008 incident [2/3]








#### Fault tree of 19 September 2008 incident [3/3]








### Revision of MCI for electrical arc



Before the incident the MCI was set at 2kg/s of LH2 flowing into the vacuum vessel.


- Incident: peak at 20 kg/s
- New MCI: 40 kg/s






# Additional evacuation ports on dipole vacuum vessel






Now we have >1 DN200 to evacuate each 100 m. evacuate each 15 m.



F. Bertinelli & L. Tavian



# Reinforced anchoring of SSS (quads) with vacuum barrier




- Withstand longitudinal load of 240 kN (3 bar inner pressure)
- Implemented on 104 SSS with vacuum barriers in 8 sectors






Magnets preparation and replacement






### The LHC repairs in detail






43




## Repairing all over the ring






- New pressure release ports fitted
- Upgrade of magnet protection system
- Cleaning ofvacuum beam tube
- Dipole and quadrupole magnets replaced and electrical interconnections
- LHC ring



# Bad stabilization in joints: effect on running LHC




- A badly stabilized joint with a good SC-SC splice is dangerous: the splice can quench because the nearby magnet has quenched (warm helium wave); or by beam irradiation...
- It takes 5-15 seconds, meanwhile current decays very little
- Computation of maximum acceptable defect as a function of current level and discharge time was set up via th. – e.m. model (A. Verweij)
- Running at lower current/field/beam energy: monitoring, acceptability for certain defects, reduced discharge time ⇒ reduced risk!
- Decision 2009: not to open all machine. Measure as much as possible, repair what could be done to run LHC at 50% field/beam energy (25% magnet energy!) in 2010-11. In 2012 60% field (8 TeV c.o.m.)




# Machine restarted on 23 November 2009 on 13 December 2009 energy record:2x1.18 TeV On 30 March 2010 we collided p-p at x3.5 TeV






4 July 2012 : Higgs boson discovered! With 2x4 TeV p-p collisions



# Meanwhile LHC was running the final fix was studied and carefully implemented




Consolidated dipole magnets bus splice

Consolidated electrical insulation system

Task Force to set the fix:
F. Bertinelli, P. Fessia,
J.Ph. Tock
SMACC project to fix
during a long shutdown of
2 years (led by J.Ph.
Tock)

**EUCAS 2017** 

Splice quality improved dramatically! (not really clamped)



4 top shunts

4 bottom shunts (2 not v

**LHC PROJECT** 

consolidated splices (6.6 μΩ)



### CERN

#### The main 2013-14 LHC consolidations

1695 Openings and final reclosures of the interconnections

Complete reconstruction of 3000 of these splices

10170 leak tightness tests

Consolidation of the 10170 13kA splices, installing 27 000 shunts Installation of 5000 consolidated electrical insulation systems

300 000 electrical resistance measurements

10170 orbital welding of stainless steel lines

Consolidation of the

main electrical feed-


13 kA circuits in the 16



It took a huge campaign in 2013-14!

2010-12 preparation

But then we could run LHC nearly nominal energy



Improvement in QPS and we could measure all Continuity Copper Stabilizer at 20 K: elimination of silent killer!

replaced

15 dipole magnets to be

18 000 electrical

Quality Assurance tests

3 quadrupole magnets

to be replaced

Installation of 612

to bring the total to

pressure relief devices




### Lesson learnt: observation



- LHC had a technical failure in a relatively low tech part
- All high tech parts
  - SC cable with all properties constraints
  - SC Magnets
  - HTS current leads
  - 1.9 HEII cryogenics
  - Collimation
  - Precision High Current Power Converters
  - ...
- Have worked successfully.
- Especially the SC part went really on time and on budget which is a success of applied superconductivity and shows its industrial maturity.


- The incident **itself** was primarily due to a single failure, a mistake.
- However it has evidenced deficiencies in various areas:
  - Basic design of IC splice
  - Lack of robustness of manufacturing process w.r.t. series production and vs. real situation (Cu terminals not perfect)
  - Not complete analysis of the process, especially induction heating (good but vulnerable to mishap)
  - Not careful, complete analysis of the system: JOINT + BUS BAR
  - Not a complete analysis of the consequence of an accident in the interconnections, betting on zero failure
  - Diagnostic was not adequate.
  - Even improbable the worst thing may happen: mitigation measurement were not appropriate.



### Lesson: conclusions 1/2



- LHC PROJECT
  - In SC devices, everything has to do with superconductivity! Inject more science (study) in the engineering.
  - The electrical joints should have been treated like a SC Magnet. Any part in a SC device, especially with large energy must be regarded with "respect". ICs weren't "sexy"...
  - Scientists should work more with system engineers. Lack of integration (and adequate risk analysis) may cause large damage to SC parts, unexpectedely.
  - Do not underestimate mistakes and signals even in early stage: they reappear...
    - Magnet had problems in splice during construction and in the STRING2 (terminated by a burned splice incident of different nature and cause, still...).
  - Safety is more important than schedule: everybody agrees but at the end of large projects (inevitable problem of budget and schedule) the pressure to take shortcuts is strong.
  - Never spare on risk analysis (<u>by competent people</u>) and take mitigation measurements.
     Whatever might go wrong, <u>it goes</u>! What is important is to survive and limit damage (mitigation measurements).
  - Diagnostics and measurements are key: but important is to select what really matters, to avoid to be overwhelmed by un-important Non-Conformities. QA effectiveness vs. paper QA. But what you measure look at it! Data always say something – to non-biased mind.



### **Lessons: conclusion – 2/2**



- Test as much as can!!!! But You cannot test whole system before final commissioning. And risk zero is not an option (€€\$\$££...).
- But large stored energy requires prudence.
- **Staged approach**: going by step, and taking the time to understand the SYSTEM (which is more than a just the sum of components: non-linear effect!)
- And in Operation (that is always more than commissioning)
  No hunting for faulty people: team up and is cople that had experience. Management is there has been and to create panic.
  Learning from mistake: a CERN has been and to create panic.
  Even mechanically clamped an up stabilized to the commissioning.
- - Even mechanically clamped an un-stabilized joint would have caused the damage.
  - After appropriate analysis defects can be intercepted (Resistance vs. complex diagnostics)
  - Take the proper time to train people: as (more) important than QA. Take direct responsibility.
  - Superconductivity is a subtle system requiring GLOBAL APPROACH. A detail can be a killer.













## Any burning question?



