
Interlock modification of SPS extraction interlock to mitigate TED limitation for LIU/HL beams

V. Kain SPS-OP



Introduction (1)

- TED: transfer line beam stopper
 - Designed to absorb ultimate beam
 - In air
 - 4.3 m TED connected to Y-chamber. Can be moved into beam.




- Two TEDs per 3 km LHC transfer line.
 - One shortly after the SPS extraction point. One close to the LHC injection point.



Introduction (2)

 With the TEDs, part of the line can be studied without the downstream equipment necessarily available



- Interlocking philosophy: If a TED is in beam the interlocks of the downstream equipment are ignored.
- If TEDs are moving, extraction is never permitted. Only if in or out
- This is true for any intensity to be extracted from the SPS



TED with LIU beams

	p ⁺ /bunch	ε [μm]	brightness $\left[\frac{10^{11}}{\mu m}\right]$	N_b
Standard	1.2×10^{11}	2.6	0.46	288
Ultimate	1.7×10^{11}	3.5	0.49	288
HL-LHC	2.32×10^{11}	2.1	1.1	288
BCMS LIU	2.0×10^{11}	1.3	1.54	288

- The current TED design cannot withstand more than 144 LIU intensity bunches.
 - Graphite goes beyond stress limits

o Proposal:

- Keep current design
- Limit intensity to max. 144 LIU bunches to be extracted from the SPS with TEDs in the line



Result from Simulations

Conclusions

R. Esposito

All the beams, half intensity (144 bunches):

ACCEPTABLE

Simulations also done for continuous extractions over 30 minutes

HL-LHC 2.32e11 ppb * 288 bunches: RISK OF CRACKS IN GRAPHITE FOR A SINGLE PULSE

BCMS 2e11 ppb * 288 bunches: HIGH RISK OF CRACKS IN GRAPHITE FOR A SINGLE PULSE

BCMS 2.32e11 ppb * 288 bunches: HIGH RISK OF CRACKS IN GRAPHITE FOR A SINGLE PULSE








Functional specification for interlocking sent for approval


Comments received.

 In the process of implementing comments...





- The TEDs are EIS for the SPS and LHC
 - TT40 SPS chain 2, TT60 TED SPS chain 4,
 - TEDs TI2 and TI8 LHC safety chain
- TBSEs are same design as TEDs
 - TBSE TI8 SPS chain 3
 - TBSE TI2 SPS chain 5





Safety file: LIU SPS Safety-Package: SPS Ring and Transfer Lines SPS-L-SF-0006

Quote:

 The robustness limitation with LIU beams does not reduce the safety provided by the TED/TBSEs for personnel, as even in the event of cracking of the core the beam is stopped by the device. No catastrophic failure is expected even in case of impact of 288 bunches.

Scenarios 1:

- Intrusion into LHC zone 8 while filling high intensity beam
 - LHC access chain and SPS chain 3 open
 - LHC injection EIS interlocked no beam can be injected into LHC
 - TI8 EIS interlocked no beam can be transmitted to downstream part of TI8
 - TED.87765 (EIS) automatically moves to "IN BEAM" position (slow movement ~60 seconds)
 - TBSE in TI8 automatically moves to "IN BEAM" position (slow movement ~60 seconds)
 - SPS LSS4 extraction inhibited by BIS system (via non-maskable inputs TED/TBSE moving, TI8 downstream, LHC beam permit, LHC injection BIC, ...) no beam can be extracted from SPS LSS4



Scenario 2:

- Intrusion into another LHC access zone while filling high intensity beam
 - LHC access chain open
 - LHC EIS interlocked no beam can be injected into LHC
 - TED.87765 (EIS) automatically moves to "IN BEAM" position (slow movement ~60 seconds)
 - SPS LSS4 extraction inhibited by BIS system (via non-maskable inputs TED/TBSE moving, LHC beam permit, LHC injection BIC, ...) no beam can be extracted from SPS LSS4

For the other uses cases, see safety file



Conclusion in safety file:

For all use cases, the fast EIS (power converters and extraction kickers) as well as the extraction interlock system always ensure that no beam above $144 \times 2.32 \times 10^{11}$ protons will impact the slowly moving TEDs/TBSEs even in case of an access system intrusion interlock.

No modification of the TED and TBSE behaviour for the access system is therefore required.

Any comments from the DSOs?



Extra slides



Proposed interlocking implementation

- New Safe Machine Parameter Flag in the SPS: SPS TED BEAM FLAG A and B
 - SPS_TBF

- The new flag is taken into account in the user permit on the beam interlock controller of the TEDs, where it is checked whether it is moving or not.
 - The logic will be completed to take into account the SPS_TBF as follows:

```
User Permit = TRUE when ( (TED_IN \cap SPS_TBF=TRUE) \cup TED_OUT ) else User Permit = FALSE
```

- The affected Beam Interlock Controllers
 - input 1 of the slave BIC TT60B (in BA6) for Extraction 1
 - input 1 of the slave BIC TT40B (in BA4) for Extraction 2
 - input 1 of the slave BIC TI2D (in SR2) for Extraction 1
 - input 1 of the slave BIC TI8D (in SR8) for Extraction 2

