

Safety topics requiring further investigation

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- Scope of the CDR Study
- Safety Objectives met
- Future Studies
 - Fire Safety
 - Cryogenic Safety
 - Radiation Protection
- Conclusions

- Identification of hazards, based on project breakdown structure, and “Standard Best Practice” to cope with them.
- Three safety domains require special treatment:
 - **Fire** in underground facilities
 - **Cryogenics** in underground facilities
 - **Radiation Protection**
- Safety performance based study for Fire and Cryogenics
 - Safety Objectives
 - Facility lay-out + Safety infrastructure + Realistic accident scenarios
 - Evaluation of safety objectives (Life, Environment, Property, Continuity of operation).
- Standard prescriptive measures for Radiation Protection

- Life Safety Objective
 - Occupants are able to escape from the facility during accident scenarios. Rescue teams can safely intervene.
- Environmental Protection Objective
 - During accident, limited amounts of pollutants are emitted to air and water
- Property Protection Objective
 - Essential services continue operating, the accident will not cause further incidents and the loss of property is limited
- Operational Continuity Objective
 - The downtime after the accident is acceptably long

- Tunnel design
 - fire compartments every 440 m and
 - conceptual design and sizing of smoke extraction
- Scenarios
 - Fire dynamics simulations for 3 accident scenarios
- Meet the Life safety objective:
 - no victims among occupants and fire fighters

- Fire Compartments
 - Difficulty: Accelerator and its services must pass
 - How ? Return of experience from SPS
 - When ? In parallel with accelerator installation of immediately afterwards ?
 - Safety concepts based on autonomous, rail-based vehicle: needs to pass



- Property Protection:
 - Detailed evaluation of heat radiation/ convection
 - Assessment of structural tunnel safety (heat < 10 MW)
 - Smoke contamination
- Environmental Protection:
 - Release of smoke and polluted water
 - Release of slightly radioactive particles with smoke: inclusion in fire dynamics simulations on the way (FIRIA – project)




- Fire Brigade Operations



Geneve est sacrée capitale Suisse du bouchon routier

- Intervention time from Meyrin Site prohibitive
- Decentralised CERN fire brigade at each access point ?
- Collaboration with local fire brigades (rural area, voluntary services) ?
- **FCC Concept for fire and rescue required**



e^+ / e^-

h h

Fire load in Klystron galleries
(oil-insulated RF modulators)

Both Projects

Construction of the compartment walls, transport during shutdowns


Logistics of Fire & Rescue Service: central fire station not suitable

Extinguishing means in underground areas


Release of radioactive particles with smoke and extinguishing water (→ RP)

- Tunnel design
 - (fire) compartments every 440 m and
 - (Smoke) extraction, used for cold helium gas
- Scenarios
 - 6 accident scenarios with Helium release rates between 100 g/s and 32 kg/s
 - Simple analysis of helium gas volumes and height of breathable layer
- Meet the Life safety objective
 - Release rate < 300 g/s: no victims
 - When higher spill rates possible, restrict access

- (Fire) Compartments:
 - Behaviour at high Helium release rates (capacity verified until mass-flow of 1 kg/s)
 - Pressure build-up
- (Smoke) extraction:
 - Behaviour at low temperature
 - Brittleness, condensation



- Present knowledge of helium release flow:
 - Mostly qualitative description
 - Few experiments (LHC He-spill test, 2014)
 - CFD description of few scenarios



e^+ / e^-	h h
Rapid Helium release from RF cavities	Behaviour of tunnel compartment walls (pressure)
	Behaviour of smoke extraction with cold helium
Both Projects	
Detailed study of the thermodynamics and (turbulent fluid-flow of released Helium)	
Safety devices for elongated cryostats (cold powering, cryogenic supply line)	

- Standard Radiation Protection design criteria

	CERN sites		Off-site
	Radiation workers	Other personnel	Members of the public
Limit	6 - 20 mSv/y	1 mSv/y	0.3 mSv/y
↕	Optimisation required (ALARA)		↕
Optimisation threshold	100 µSv/y	10 µSv/y	10 µSv/y

Prompt radiation in areas accessible during operation

Singular losses (incident event)

< 6 mSv: designated area

< 1 mSv: non-designated area

Continuous losses (nominal operation)

< 10 µSv/h: controlled radiation area

< 3 µSv/h: supervised radiation area



< 0.5 µSv/h: non-designated area

- Determination of radiation levels and induced radioactivity in arcs, collimation, triplet and experimental areas (impact for access and maintenance) for the hh-collider
- Design of ventilation systems with recycling scheme to minimise environmental impact
- Preliminary estimates for activation by synchrotron radiation for the ee-collider

- Accelerator operation activates tunnel air and cooling water
 - Released via shafts to the environment
- Impact assessment:
 - Monte-Carlo radiation transport calculation (FLUKA)
 - Model of ventilation/cooling circuits
 - Comparison with target figures in host states
- Special concern:
 - Effluents during fire, release of slightly activated particles and water (FIRIA-project)


- More detailed activation studies needed for
 - Planned loss points (collimators, dumps)
 - Experiments

- Activation by synchrotron radiation and beam in the ee-collider






RADIATION AND ENVIRONMENT MONITORING UNIFIED SUPERVISION



A radiation monitoring program for workers, public and environment must be designed



CROME
CERN Radiation Monitoring Electronics

e^+ / e^-	h h
Refined activation study for synchrotron radiation	Detailed activation studies and intervention scenarios for experiments & mitigation of high radiation levels
Activation by e^+ / e^- at loss points (experiments, collimators, dumps)	
Validation of shielding study derived from hh (proof of conservatism)	

Both Projects

- Management of effluents (air, water) and their environmental impact
- Activation studies for experiments, based on more detailed detector designs
- Design of radiation monitoring program for occupational and environmental exposure
- Management of radioactive material and waste (storage, flow)

- The CDR Safety Study demonstrated that planned facilities can meet the **Life Safety Objectives**
- Additional studies are necessary for a TDR:
 - Fire Safety:
 - Implementation of fire compartmentalisation
 - Impact of fire scenarios on property and environment (slightly radioactive particles)
 - Cryogenic Safety
 - More accurate description of Helium releases
 - Interaction of cold gas with smoke extraction, pressure on compartment walls

- Additional studies are necessary for a TDR:
 - Radiation protection
 - Radioactivity in experiments and beam loss points
 - Management of effluents (air and water)
 - Radiation monitoring programme
- Precise study programme will be determined once CERN's strategy is defined
 - Specific topics in e^+/e^- collider:
 - RP: synchrotron radiation
 - Cryo: strong, short term He-release from RF
 - Fire: fire load from Klystrons



Thank you for your attention

