



# **SPS crab cavity test stand – Results of interlock test and readiness for taking beam**

G.Vandoni

MPP 18<sup>th</sup> May 2018

# Outline

Test stand layout

MD phasing

Generalities on interlocks architecture

Machine and equipment protection

BIS

RF

Timescales

Conclusions

# MPP and Doc on crab interlocks for SPS

9 Dec 2016: Foreseen interlocks for the operation of crab cavities in SPS

29 Sep 2017: Final plan for interlocking of crab cavities in SPS


EDMS 1843638: Interlocks for the HL-LHC Crab-cavity test stand in SPS,  
L.Arnaudon, G.Vandoni

**Approved!** R.Calaga, K.Cornelis, T.Otto, D.Wollman, 13/3/2018


EDMS 1921540: DSO tests report, released 8 May 2018

Electron lens review 2016, indico R.Calaga, RF Overview of crab Cavities for HL-LHC and potential failure modes

# Test stand architecture – tunnel



# System architecture – Crab-cavity test stand



# Overview of the MD phases

The MDs were split into 4 main categories (for 2018):

1. RF-beam commissioning (2x10h)
2. Transparency (1-2x10h)
3. Performance (1-2x10h)
4. High intensity (2x10h)

**low intensity,**  
1 to 12 bunches, 2  $10^{10}$

MPP review

**high intensity,**  
1 bunch to 4 x 72 trains

Before going to high intensities, a **special MPP** will be held to **assess the cavity performance** concerning protection issues.

Will perform **failure studies in parallel** during the MDs, as the beam parameters vary.

Progressive increase in energy + intensity || failure scenarios:


**flexible interlocking** as we learn to know the system.

Lee Carver, SPS-CC MD Planning Overview, [SPS Test Day #2](#)

# Interlock types

type	why	what
Personnel safety	Radiation (X-rays) ODH and cryo hazard mechanical hazard	Access versus RF Power to cavities Table movement
Machine protection	Aperture  Protection SPS and crabs	Beam & extraction versus table position, movement, vacuum sector valves  SIS
Equipment protection	Protection SPS and crabs	RF Power versus Vacuum, cryogenics.  Beam versus HOM power

# RF Controls layout




# RF Controls layout

TO/FROM Access


To beam interlock BIS board

To RF Power interlock



# IOT Interlock modules

Services



To Access

To CIBUs

To RF Power

RF

Same for IOT2

\*HOM Power threshold 200W implemented to protect LHC-type HOM coupler feedthroughs after failure of high power new design HOM FT's during dressed cavity tests

# From crab test stand via CIBU- BIS board entries

## BIS SPS RING – BA6

Software Permit	INPUT	DISABLED	MASKED	MATRIX	PERMIT
1	WARMUP-LSBK	FALSE	NO	FALSE	TRUE
2	WFC	TRUE	NO	TRUE	TRUE
3	MAXES Status	TRUE	NO	TRUE	TRUE
4	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
5	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
6	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
7	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
8	BLM-LSBK	TRUE	NO	TRUE	TRUE
9	Turn by turn Interlock	TRUE	NO	TRUE	TRUE
10	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
11	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
12	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
13	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE
14	not used	FALSE	YES	TRUE	TRUE

SIS Permit:  
Table OUT/IN

VVS CIBU

SPS RING  
CC CIBU

BLM CIBU

SPS EXTR1  
CC CIBU

- 1 new entry, unmaskable, from CC
- VVS exception for V1/V3
- Software permit, maskable, with Table position
- CC BLM individual threshold setting, in BLM sector's CIBU

## BIS EXTR1 – BA6

Software Permit	INPUT	MATRIX EQUATION	PERMIT
1	E-440 Flag		FALSE
2	E-450 Flag		FALSE
4	TT50-A		FALSE
4	TT50-B		FALSE
5	TED-in TT60		TRUE
6	TT66-A		FALSE
7	TT66-B		FALSE
8	TI2 Upstream		FALSE
9	TI2 Downstream		FALSE
10	TED-in TI2		TRUE
11	BU Beam-1		FALSE
12	Probe Beam Flag		FALSE
13	BFF-1		FALSE
14	SBF-1		FALSE

- 1 new entry, unmaskable, from CC

# SPS Ring and Extr CC CIBUs (unmaskable)

\*HOM Power threshold 200W implemented to protect LHC-type HOM coupler feedthroughs after failure of high power new design HOM FT's during dressed cavity tests

	Table OUT	Table IN	Table undefined / error / moving	HOM Power < 200 W	RF PLC status OK	RF parameters set	VWSB_61731 open	VWSB_61757 open	VWSB_61736 open	VWSB_61752 open	BLM one sector < threshold
Beam enabled	■						■	■			
EXTR enabled	■						■	■			
Beam enabled		■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Beam NOT enabled			■								
EXTR NOT enabled		■									

# BIS – Conformity and Functional Tests

## BIS conformity reports

	TE/MPE/EP - Beam Interlock System (BIS)		
	<b>Commissioning Report for BIC User Permit System</b>		
Date :	Thu 08 Mar 2018	MI Member Name(s) :	RSEC

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### General User Informations

BIC Name	CIB.BA6.S6	Input	5	Beam	B1
CIBU/CIBF ID#	354	CIBUS	Rack	RA4726	
User System Name	Crab Cavity RING		Group	BE-RF	

### General User Informations

BIC Name	CIB.BA6.TT60A	Input	7	Beam	B1
CIBU/CIBF ID#	355	CIBUS	Rack	RA4726	
User System Name	Crab Cavity LSS6		Group	BE-RF	

## BIS functional tests with time stamping

TE/MPE is looking into the time-stamping during table movement tests 2/5  
 Proposal to go through the procedure with timestamps at the beginning of the MD

# RF Power Interlocks

All tested or being tested during present commissioning and RF conditioning, off beam



3.5 10<sup>-7</sup>mbar

4.0 10<sup>-7</sup>mbar

Monitored but not used for interlocking, they may be used for LHC.

# RF Power Interlocks - timescales

	Reaction time
Arc detection	$< 1 \mu\text{s}$
Reflected RF power (or any RF Power parameter)	$< 1 \mu\text{s}$
Vacuum FPC	$< 0.1 \text{ to } 5 \text{ ms}$
SIS	$\approx 1\text{s}$

# Interlock non-conformity

Table position to Vacuum valves opening is now via software	Cable to be pulled for hardware interlock
Vacuum to cryogenics is now via software	Cable to be pulled for hardware interlock
Interlocks Engineering Specification defines only Safety and Machine Protection interlocks, not the equipment mutual protection	Modify the Interlocks Engineering Specification to include all equipment protection interlocks

# Conclusion

- Functional test of BIS with timestamps could be repeated for completeness at MD start
- SIS (maskable BIS entry) only includes the table position: it is evolutive

**Phases 1-2:** READY (after functional BIS test)

**Stopping point: MPP review in June**

**Phases 3-4:** Evolution of the interlocking scheme via RF parameter set interlocking RF and SIS



## ***Back-up slides***

# Potential Failure Modes

- Cavity stored energy is 10-12 J
- Some “slow” failure
  - RF arcing,  $\tau_F \sim 1$  ms
  - Power supply trips (50 – 300 Hz):  $\tau_F \sim$  few ms
  - Mechanical changes:  $\tau_F \sim 100$ 's ms
- Fast Failures (10's  $\mu$ s – ms)
  - Cavity quench, RF breakdown, Sudden discharge
  - Fast orbit changes, external forces
- LHC Collimation, maximum allowed (old numbers)
  - Slow: 0.1% of beam/second for 10s
  - Transient:  $5 \times 10^{-5}$  in 1 ms
  - Fast: Up to 1 MJ in 200 ns into  $0.2 \text{ mm}^2$

[R.Calaga,](#)  
[Electron Lens review 2016](#)

# Truth Table for Transfer Table

○ TEST STAND ARCHITECTURE

● INTERLOCKS FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION


○ ACTIONS

○ CONCLUSIONS

		PLC COMMANDS				INPUTS FROM														
						TABLE CONTROL					LOCAL		ACCESS		VACUUM	CRYO	TUNNEL			
OUTPUTS TO		TO PARKING	TO EXP	SERVICE	LIFE	park	exp	moving	fault	life	EM Switch	key lock	VETO A	VETO B	Valves closed	He Level OK to move	EM Switch	TO Park	TO Exp	stop
TABLE CONTROL	TO PARK	1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	0	x	x	x
		1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	0	x	x	x
		1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	1	0	0	x	x	1	1	0	1	x	x
		1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	1	0	0	x	x	1	1	0	x	1	x
	TO EXP	0	1	0	1	x	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	0	x	x	0
		0	1	0	1	x	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	x	0	x	x	0
		0	1	0	1	x	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	x	x
		0	1	0	1	x	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	x	x
	STOP	0	0	0	1	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		0	0	0	1	x	x	x	x	1	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
		0	0	0	1	x	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x
	SERVICE PERMIT	0	0	1	1	x	x	x	x	1	0	x	x	x	1	1	0	x	x	x
x		x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
LIFE	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
PLC	TABLE OK	x	x	x	1	x	x	0	0	1	0	1	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	1
PASS	FB	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	FB	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1	x	x	x	x	x	x	
	SAFE	x	x	x	1	1	0	0	0	1	x	x	x	x	1	1	x	x	x	x
		x	x	x	1	0	1	0	0	1	x	x	x	x	1	1	x	x	x	x
CIBU	LSS6-PERMIT A	x	x	x	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x
	LSS6-PERMIT B	x	x	x	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x
	RING-PERMIT A	x	x	x	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x
	RING-PERMIT B	x	x	x	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x

# Aperture and crab cavities

LHC beam extraction in LSS6




CCCM aperture

## Fast extraction to LHC

Crab-cavity in beam does **not** yield **enough aperture** for extracted beam

NA slow extraction in LSS6



## Slow extraction of fixed target beam at 400GeV, incl. extraction bump

purple : raw beam envelope

red: beam envelope + tolerance

Crab cavity in beam gives sufficient aperture for slow extraction to NA

**No bumper dipole interlock** (opp. to Coldex)

H.Bartosik @

**SPS Test Day, I**

<https://indico.cern.ch/event/463435/>