Traceability Update

Vincent BRILLAULT, CERN/EGI-CSIRT

GDB, December 2019











Traceability/Isolation WG update

• Working group proposal approved by WLCG MG

Discussed at the last SPG meeting (early October)
 Not adding a new policy, redesigning existing ones

- VOs expected to implement the recommendations
 - Final policies/requirements not expected to diverge
 - VOs contacted for update, no response so far...





Recent examples of traceability exercises

- EGI SSC-19 identified multiple issues:
 - Missing procedures within the VO, wrong contacts
 - Logs not kept for long enough by the VO
 - Sites not knowing how to investigate malicious jobs
- EGI-OSG coordination exercise confirmed it:
 - Not able to identify malicious jobs at sites & at the VO





Going Forward: More challenges

Initial self-assessment from WG not enough
 Didn't identify issues found in more concrete exercises

- EGI SSC: too much effort , too focused for this?
 - Focusing on all sites of a single VO, not on all VOs
 - Long to setup up, heavy to run for sites, CSIRT & organizers
- A new simpler challenge: one malicious job for each VO?
 Only ensuring that VO traceability is really in place



Going Forward: Forensic documentation

- EGI forensic documentation focused on compromised servers

 Not really covering malicious jobs investigations
- Proposal: EGI to compile/coordinate new documentation
 - For each major job framework: what to look for & how (commands)
 - For each VO:
 - What can be extracted from pilot jobs? What helps the VO trace the job?
 - Where to look for? Files, paths, commands
- Help needed from experts in job framework and from VOs
 Please contact me if you have knowledge to share

Summary (TL;DR)

- WG recommendations approved by WLCG MG
 - Implementation ongoing/pending
- New lightweight challenge needed for validation

• New forensic documentation coordinated by EGI



