



Personnel Protection Systems

New control solutions for safety applications

KT – Innovation Day – 26th October 2018

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Personnel Protection Systems @ CERN



DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

1

Risk Assessment

All hazards are analyzed and all possible accident scenarios identified.

2

Safety Instrumented Functions

The system's automatic safety actions are translated into mathematical Boolean formulas.

3

System Architectural Design

All safety components and the logic controller are chosen and the detailed design is finalized.

4

PLC Code Development & Cabinets

The logic controller (PLC) is programmed and extensively tested. The electrical cabinet is mounted.

5

Site Installation & Commissioning

All mounting and cabling works on site are realized. The electrical cabinet is connected and final commissioning /DSO tests performed.



TRIGGERING EVENT- RULES FOR VETO REMOVAL FROM LASER X COVERED BY HOOD X:

```
LSR_X_Offline=0 ∧ (MODE_OPER=1  
V  
Hood_X=1 ∧ (MODE_ACCE=1 V MODE_PATROL=1))
```

OUTPUT → VETO_LSR_X = 1

ELSE


OUTPUT → VETO_LSR_X = 0

DOMAIN OF OUR PROPOSITION

Personnel Protection Systems @ CERN


Small/Medium size Safety Systems Experimental Areas

Our proposition intends to help dealing more efficiently with this type of installations by reducing development and maintenance costs related to the logic controller part.




LASER ROOMS

Small rooms with 1 or 2 access doors and max 5 class-4 lasers.



ADAM-LIGHT

Small bunker with 1 only access door and few hazardous equipment inside.



MEDICIS LAB

Few communicating rooms hosting radiological hazards.

TEN similar installations are expected per year !

Our Primary Objective

Make Affordable Safety

A safety system can effectively reduce damages to personnel operating in hazardous situations. The cost of the system shall be then considered as an investment that shall however remain reasonably proportional to the Value at Risk.



Reduce Costs for Material & Installations

The material costs for controllers and cabinets cabling are often prohibitive for small size experimental facilities funded by universities or other institutions.



Solution Compliant with SIL-2/3 Requirements

The conformity on any electrical / electromechanical device related to personnel safety shall be proven against the IEC-61508 standard.




No Specific Software Development

A model of development where any PPS installation has its own version of safety software can become unsustainable after few dozens of instances.



Minimal Maintenance

Minimize the decay of resources that, year after year, remain blocked into maintenance tasks.




Our Proposition



Acknowledgments:
University Federico II (Naples)



The R&D Activity: basic concept



The R&D Activity: first prototype



24V




16 Digital Inputs



8 Digital Outputs

Development Milestones



Conclusions

➤ **Our proposition allows to:**


- Build compact boxes for mural fixation;
- Eliminate costs for big cabinets design, cabling and PLC programming;
- Reduce sensibly the maintenance works.

➤ **Fast return on investment after deployment of 2 small/medium size PPS.**

➤ **Potential applications for renovation of SPS North EXP Areas, 60 Laser rooms and other small facilities @ CERN.**

➤ **Other areas of application outside CERN**

- Medical sector: interlock of radiological treatment rooms;
- Other research laboratories: Alba, ITER, etc.
- Industrial sector: interlock of hazardous machinery.




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
Large size accelerator Complexes (as LHC, PS, SPS)

PS Machine Overview EIS-f & EIS-m

- ☐ EIS-f / Beam Stopper
- ☐ EIS-f / Magnet
- ☐ EIS-m / Main Magnet, Cavities RF




Small/Medium Size PPS (Experimental Areas)



MEDICIS LAB

ADAM-LIGHT Exp



TEN similar installations are requested per year to BE/ICS !

Main Limitations of PLC solutions

Most Basic PLC Configuration:



Siemens PLC 1200 Safety series



Siemens Simatic Panel



- **Cost of Material:** approx. 2'500 CHF for Siemens parts.
- **Production Time:** 1 staff engaged for *min* 2 weeks (1w cabinet mounting, 1w SW development & testing).
- **Maintenance Costs:** dozens of PLCs with different SW to be kept updated.
- **Siemens Update Policy:** annual new releases of PLC firmware and development software impacts on operation of the experiments.

Other available options: two products of interest

Lasermet ICS-6

IEC 60825
Laser safety standard

No Software.
Prebuild interlock logic
based on relays.

Compact practical
solution for mural
installation.



National Instruments 9350


IEC 61508
Certified SIL 3 capable

Diagnostic indicators

Interlock logic performed by a
reprogrammable FPGA

Front I/O connector
spring terminal

Backplane connector



Disadvantages



Certified only against laser safety
standard.



Too limited prebuild interlock logic.



Remote monitoring NOT possible.



Very limited I/O space (8DI / 8DO) &
no com between modules.




Expensive: more than 1'000 usd.



Remote monitoring only if integrated
in a cRIO chassis.

Other available options: FPGAs

Microsemi FPGA



Disadvantages



A certification against iec-61508 is not available.



Specific techniques of redundant programming shall be adopted.




Programming environment not certified against iec-61508.



Integration in a custom PCB more complex: longer dev times.

The R&D Activity: basic idea



Simple Boolean Logic Computation


IF *[Premise]* **THEN** *[Action]*

The R&D Activity: software part

(1) Logic Specification



(2) Logic Simulation



(3) Memory Flashing



(4) Exhaustive Testing

