

**Complementary solutions to improve the beam vacuum protection and to protect sensitive equipments (RF, kickers, experiments,…)**



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**Main Topics**



- **Review of the beam vacuum failure modes**
- **Pending issues**
- **Mitigation solutions**
- **Closing remarks**



## **Introduction MCI definition**





*Courtesy L. Tavian*





#### **Accidental beam loss making a hole on the beam pipe**

### **Short on the cryomagnet coil or lira creating a hole in the cold bore**

#### **Expected consequences depend on the type of beam vacuum**

- Experimental beam vacuum (min. 6 months for repair)
	- Opening of the Detectors, beam pipe exchange, detector repair…
- Beam vacuum at cryogenic temperature e.g. arcs, triplets and SAMs (min. 12 weeks for repair)
	- Warm-up, magnet exchange, in situ cleaning, cool down…
- Beam vacuum operated at ambient temperature (min. 3 weeks for repair)
	- Mechanical intervention, bake out and NEG activation

#### **Impact onto the beam vacuum depends on the type of damages (ranking)**

- Contamination by dust, MLI or soot
	- Dust and MLI could be cleaned in-situ, soot implies the removal of contaminated components
- Internal pressurization of the beam vacuum
	- Could lead to buckling of the bellows and require the exchange of cryomagnets…
- Venting to air or to dry helium
	- Venting to dry helium does not require the warm-up of cryomagnets…





#### • **Beam pipe pressurization resulting from an injection of cold helium**

- Expected consequences depend on the type of beam vacuum
	- Beam vacuum operated at ambient temperature (LSS and Experimental areas)
		- Mechanical intervention, bake out and NEG activation
	- Experimental beam vacuum
		- Opening of the Detectors, beam pipe exchange…
	- Beam vacuum at cryogenic temperature (arcs, triplets and SAMs)
		- Warm-up, magnet exchange, in situ cleaning, cool down…
- Impact onto the beam vacuum depends on the efficiency of compensatory measures decided after the incident of sector 3-4
	- Reinforcement of the supports of the cryomagnets with vacuum barriers
		- Limits the risk of mechanical displacement and damaging of the Plug-in modules (PIMs) and nested bellows
	- Additional pressure relief valves (or unclamped flanges)
		- Limit the pressurization level of the insulation vacuum
	- By-pass at the vacuum barriers (on pumping stations)
		- Limit the pressurization level of the insulation vacuum





- **Reinforcement of the supports of the cryomagnets with vacuum barriers**
	- Limits the risk of mechanical displacement and damaging of the Plug-in modules (PIMs) and nested bellows
	- **Preventing the injection of cold helium and contamination into the beam vacuum**





### **Review of the beam vacuum failure modes Beam Vacuum damaged by collateral effects (3/4)**



• **DN200/160/100 pressure relief valves and/or declamped flanges to limit the pressurization of the insulation vacuum**

– Limit the pressurization level of the insulation vacuum



Without DN<sub>200</sub> (declamping of existing flanges)



DN200 "declamped" configuration



DN200 "spring" configuration



DN100 "declamped" configuration



Without DN200 DN200 "spring" configuration DN100 "spring" configuration





- **By-pass at the vacuum barriers (on pumping stations)**
	- Limit the pressurization level of the insulation vacuum
	- Implemented on sectors not yet consolidated with DN200 pressure relief valves
	- $\mathcal{P}$  Proposal being prepared to extend this configuration to all arcs (2012)







### **Pending Issues RF cavities, kickers and Experimental areas (1/4)**



- **Vacuum failure without pressurization**
	- Venting with dry helium without contamination should not be a major issue
		- Commissioning: several days will be required
	- Venting with air without contamination will required a bake out for the kickers and a warming up of the SC RF cavities
		- Bake out/venting followed by commissioning: several weeks
	- Venting with contamination will impact significantly the performances of these equipments
		- Removal from the tunnel to be considered
		- Not enough spare available

### • **Vacuum failure with pressurization**

- Critical in most of these equipments
	- Supports in the Experimental areas are not design to stand induced forces
	- Ceramics, bellows could fail in presence of an internal pressurization

#### None of these vacuum sectors is equipped with rupture disks



# **Pending Issues**

**RF cavities, kickers and Experimental areas (2/4)**



- **Configuration around and on between the kickers does not favor optimum solution**
	- 0.5 m between kickers
		- Cannot protect one kicker against its neighbor...
	- 2 m between kickers and Q4D2/Q5 cryomagnets
		- Cannot protect one kicker against its neighboring cryomagnet...
	- Can protect kickers from the arc
		- Not obvious that absolutely required, "damping" effect of NEG coatings and Q6/Q5 cryomagnets





# **Pending Issues**

**RF cavities, kickers and Experimental areas (3/4)**



- **Configuration around and on between the cavities does not favor optimum solution**
	- 0.5 m between cavity 2 and 3
		- Cannot protect one cavity against its neighbor...
		- Can protect cavity 1 and 4…
	- $-$  >30 m between kickers and D3 cryomagnets
		- Can protect the cavities against their neighboring cryomagnets...
	- Can protect cavities from the arc
		- Not obvious that it is absolutely required, "damping" effect of NEG coatings and Q6/Q5/D4/D3 cryomagnets





# **Pending Issues**

**RF cavities, kickers and Experimental areas (4/4)**



- **Configuration around and on the Experimental areas does not favor optimum solution**
	- Few meters between the "central" beam vacuum sector and Q1 cryomagnets
		- Cannot protect the Experimental beam vacuum from the triplets...
	- $>$  50 m between the Experimental beam vacuum and the D2Q4 cryomagnets,
		- Can protect the Experiments against D2Q4 cryomagnets...
	- Can protect the Experimental beam vacuum from the arc
		- Not obvious that absolutely required, "damping" effect NEG coatings and cryomagnets





## **Mitigation solutions Pressure relief valves**



### • **New design of DN200/160/100 valves**

- Opens in case of a slight overpressure an then "recloses" at equilibrium (internal/external)
- "Self" positioning to improve tightness reliability
- Limits contamination /condensation of huge quantities of air
	- Water (MLI) and Oxygen (explosion risk) are the most delicate
- To be applied to all "declamped" positions (DN100/160/200)
	- Proposal being studied for all positions (2012)











# **Mitigation solutions Rupture disks (1/4)**



- **New design of rupture disks**
	- Opens in case of pressurization and then closes off when pressures are at equilibrium
	- Limits the contamination /condensation of huge quantities of air
		- Water (MLI) and Oxygen (explosion risk) are the most delicate
	- Self protected in case of a failure of the disk
		- Accidental venting is avoided by the viton sealed cap
	- Less critical design, more adapted to an extended use in the arcs
		- Limits the buckling of the bellows (PIMs and nested) in case of an internal pressurisation





![](_page_15_Picture_0.jpeg)

**Mitigation solutions Rupture disks (2/4)**

Accidental rupture of the disk

![](_page_15_Picture_3.jpeg)

![](_page_15_Picture_4.jpeg)

*Complemen equipments* (*Ref. April'* 10.

![](_page_16_Picture_0.jpeg)

Technology<br>Department **Vacuum** Surfaces.. **Coatings** 

![](_page_16_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Figure_2.jpeg)

*Constance from incident (m) equipments (RF, kickers, experiments,…)* J.M. Jimenez – LHC MAC April'10.

![](_page_17_Figure_0.jpeg)

*equipments (RF, kickers, experiments,…)* J.M. Jimenez – LHC MAC April'10.

![](_page_18_Picture_0.jpeg)

## **Mitigation solutions Rupture disks (4/4)**

![](_page_18_Picture_2.jpeg)

### • **External pressurization should no longer be a problem**

- 1.5 bar for consolidated sectors, for an MCI (40 kg/s)
- 3.5 bars for the non-consolidated sectors, for an MCI  $(40 \text{ kg/s})$
- PIMs and Nested bellows have a higher buckling pressure, 3.5 and 5 bars respectively

### • **Internal pressurization is a major issue**

- If an impact of the beam onto the beam screen / cold bore can not be excluded
- Recommends to install additional rupture disks. In case of an MCI,
	- 200 m of machine could have buckled bellows if each SSS is equipped
	- 400 m of machine could have buckled bellows if each 1 SSS over 2 is equipped
	- 600 m of machine could have buckled bellows if each 1 SSS over 3 is equipped
	- Etc.

![](_page_19_Picture_0.jpeg)

# **Mitigation solutions Fast shutters (1/2)**

![](_page_19_Picture_2.jpeg)

### • **Prerequisites**

- Shall not be necessarily leak tight
- Shall limit the propagation of the contamination
- Shall close within 20-50 ms
- Shall not be dangerous for the machine in case beams intercept the sealing plate
- Shall use a low-Z material for the sealing plate
	- Transparent to the beam
	- Faster since lighter
	- Spring or pyrotechnic actuator (adapt commercially available actuators)
- $\Rightarrow$  Requires reliable interlock signals
	- Beam loss monitors
	- Pressure gauges or nQPS in the absence of circulating beams
- Needs a complete development and validation tests
- Being studied in the TE-VSC group
	- Conceptual design expected by end 2010
	- $\mathcal{F}$  Installation foreseen for 2012

![](_page_20_Picture_0.jpeg)

## **Mitigation solutions Fast shutters (2/2)**

![](_page_20_Picture_2.jpeg)

- **Vacuum failure without pressurization**
	- Propagation of the contamination is an issue since the arc is not sectorised
		- No space left in an interconnection to install a fast shutter…

![](_page_20_Picture_6.jpeg)

Still looking for ideas…

![](_page_21_Picture_0.jpeg)

## **Mitigation solutions Half-shells**

![](_page_21_Picture_2.jpeg)

#### • **Two half-shells in Vetronite or equivalent**

- Shall protect the bellows (PIMs and nested) in the interconnections
	- Increase resistance to plasma discharge (high temperature resistance)
	- Avoid damages induced by the projections of melted metal
	- Limit the injection of MLI in the Beam Vacuum
	- Slightly increase the buckling pressure by a "guiding effect"
- Shall use insulating material to repulse the plasma/arcing risk
- Easy to retrofit during the consolidation of the splices

![](_page_21_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_12.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_13.jpeg)

![](_page_22_Picture_0.jpeg)

### **Closing Remarks**

![](_page_22_Picture_2.jpeg)

### • **Prerequisites and required time to implement**

- Half-shells are easy to install and will be coupled with the consolidation of the splices (2012)
- Additional rupture disks sounds a good idea
	- Installed at all extremities of the 4 Experimental areas  $\Rightarrow$  Needs a venting to dry Neon to equip the central vacuum sector
		- Will allow to put back into operation, the sector valves…
	- In the arcs  $\Rightarrow$  Needs a warm up and can be coupled with the consolidation of the splices
		- Proposal will be presented to LMC by Automn'10
- Reliability and limitation of collateral damages in case of a membrane failure is being considered (see new design)
- Fast-closing valves need a technical development and validation
	- On going studies, first proposal (conceptual) by end 2010
	- Implementation in 2012
- **E** Implementation in the arcs seems difficult

![](_page_23_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_2.jpeg)

• **Many thanks to all contributors from TE, EN and BE Departments for their contributions and helpful discussions.**