


Safe Machine Parameters – Status and future requirements

V. Kain, K. Li and SPS OP

Status

- SPS safe machine parameters
 - Energy and intensity related flags



Sources:

Setup beam flag: high intensity
BCTs 3 and 5


Probe beam flag: low intensity
BCT 4 (single source)

Energy flags: BETS system
→ High availability logic: “1 out
of 4” ((BEM4-A, BEM4-B,
BEM6-A, BEM6-B)

- Only SPS SBF is distributed over timing
 - Others directly fed to extraction BIS through optical fibers
 - No cross-check on SPS SBF timing distribution

SPS hardwired interlock systems – SMP?


- ❑ Beam permit → SPS beam dump
- ❑ Extraction permits → extraction kickers



→ SPS setup beam flag (SPS SBF) not used in ring BICs

Addition to current paradigm – SPS TED Beam Flag (SPS_TBF)

- With the TEDs, part of the line can be studied without the downstream part necessarily available




- Interlocking philosophy: If a TED is in beam the interlocks of the downstream equipment are ignored.
 - The **maximum allowed intensity** with TED is $2.3e+11 \times 144: 3.5 \times 10^{13} p^+$
 - → **additional interlocking required for LIU**
 - The slave BIC TED input will take this into account exploiting the **new SPS TED Beam Flag**

Safe machine parameters → only used for the SPS fast extractions

- SPS and LHC SMP flags are used in the **extraction interlock system**

- Master and slave BICs

- Slave BICs only SBF either LHC or SPS
- Clients of Slave BICs → **new SPS_TBF**



	SOFTWARE	INPUT
	INIT	TRUE
	INIT	TRUE
1	not used	
2	not used	
3	TT60-A	FALSE
4	TT60-B	FALSE
5	TED-in TT60	TRUE
6	not used	
7	not used	
8	TI2 Upstream	FALSE
9	TI2 Downst...	FALSE
10	TED-in TI2	TRUE
11	INI Beam-1	TRUE
12	Probe Beam...	FALSE
13	BPF-1	FALSE
14	SBF-1	FALSE


= Extraction Permit

+ SPS SBF

Example: LSS6, idem for LSS4 extraction


Management of threshold for flags

- ❑ Most are hardcoded
- ❑ For operational flexibility and commissioning some need to be adjustable
 - Probe beam flag
 - TED beam flag
- ❑ Use Management of Critical Settings in this context



Question from organizers: use SBF for ring BICs in future?


- ❑ Philosophy in SPS for maskable vs unmaskable different from LHC.
 - Not all entries needed for all beams (high or low intensity) and facilities!
- ❑ Masking allows for degraded operation (e.g. ZS broken)
 - Can still run LHC beams
- ❑ Allows for distinction between normal and MD operation
 - MD moveable installations: crab cavities, UA9
- ❑ If separating out interlocking per beam types, then could be possible to unmask automatically with SBF
 - A la proposal for slow extraction



- ❑ For the time being : cannot use SPS SBF to remove masks systematically

Slow extraction interlocking improvement

- → Can use SBF for unmasking channels



Proposal

Simplified MASTER BIC equation:
 (! SHiP destination AND ! NA destination) OR [TT21 AND
 ((SHiP destination AND SHiP interlocks) OR
 (NA destination AND NA interlocks))]

Future requirements for SMP

- ❑ Also require cross-check of SMP information
 - Currently not done
- ❑ Additional source for probe beam flag?
 - BCT4 wrong information published in the past with indiv beam extracted into empty LHC.

- ❑ Slow extraction interlocking: require "destination flags"
 - Would the SMP be the right place to generate this? Or should this come from the timing system directly

Future requirements for SMP

- ❑ Wire scans not possible with 288 LIU bunches at 450 GeV/c
 - Would damage the wire
- ❑ Settings of BSRT filters/gains depend on intensity/density
 - Currently BSRT is disabled on most cycles
- ❑ → Would require distribution of **intensity and energy information from SMP** via timing: BEAM INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
 - Required for beam instrumentation to self protect
 - → Beam instrumentation more operational
 - Settings management would become less complicated
 - Total intensity and energy available in SMP, but not distributed.
 - Propose additional property (source FBCT): maximum bunch intensity in circulating train

A propos: future requirements for SMP

Beam information distribution: hot topic

□ Other things that were discussed:

– Distribute circulating bunch pattern

- Fixed target vs LHC beams?
- Believe can do without this.

– Distribute intensity before beam is injected (e.g. from what is circulating in PS,...)

- Should rather pre-program expected values and have a BQMlike system in the PS/PSB to not inject into the SPS to protect against too high intensities wrt to programmed values

– What about optics/emittance

- Brightness counts....
- BCMS vs LHC25ns
- Would setting extreme values for LHC beams and FT beams be sufficient for clients?
 - E.g. LHC beams: always use thresholds for BCMS even if working with LHC25NS
 - To be further discussed

Question from organizers: SMP useful concept also for other injectors?

- ❑ Beam information distribution is useful for every circulating machine

- ❑ PS use cases:
 - Certain cavities do not pulse without beam to protect the power amplifier from noisy RF signals.
 - Currently done with dedicated hardware
 - Trigger internal dump for EAST slow extraction in case intense TOF bunch was not extracted
 - Auto-calibration of various systems
 - Would require information every 10 ms.

- ❑ Other SPS use case:
 - Triggering dynamic economy. Dedicated FESA class to generate timing. Subscribes to BCT
 - Beam presence flag for beam dumping system

Summary and Conclusion

- ❑ Safe machine parameters are "only" used for the interlocking of the fast extractions in LSS4 and LSS6 in the SPS
- ❑ Due to nature of inputs and operational modes: the SPS setup beam flag is not used for the ring BICs
- ❑ The generated SMP information is not distributed over timing except the SPS SBF
- ❑ More flags are in the pipeline for TED interlocking
 - Destination flags for slow extraction interlocking?
- ❑ The biggest additional requirement for the future is "beam information distribution"
 - How safe this has to be, needs to be defined.
 - Requirement collection and functional specification has only started.