


GridPP

UK Computing for Particle Physics

SSC-19.03 Lessons Learned and Best Practices

David Crooks






GridPP
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
Overview

- Quick recap of SSC
- Outcomes from reports
- Ongoing work





- Discussed in Abingdon
- Malware injected via LHCb DIRAC, forming botnet throughout EGI Infrastructure
- Suspension on CE and SE measured independently
- 62 resource centres took part, 17 in the UK



Overall status

- All sites engaged well and appropriately, and acted as a credit to GridPP



- Three sections:
 - Reporting/Communications
 - Containment/Operations
 - Forensics
- Scores are formative/diagnostic; *i.e.* may include other elements as well as site response
 - Behaviour of software
 - SSC framework
 - Other parts of SSC



- T_0 is the broadcast on afternoon of Friday 15th (in all cases)
- Calculations are based on working hours
 - Uses timezones recorded in GOC DB
 - Assumes 0900 - 1700

$$Score = Min \left(100, DONE \times 100 \times \frac{Target}{Actual} \right)$$


- Forensics does not use time for calculation



Reporting/Communications

- In this case, based entirely on the first report to the CSIRT from a site
- Any communication before broadcast gives “Actual” time as zero
 - Sites responding early get some bragging rights, but scoring is based on the broadcast
- Average 94/100 (mean 73)
 - Most sites responded within 4 working hours
 - Remainder on Monday afternoon, within ~1 working day
 - Excellent results
- Key requirement - **please respond to CSIRT emails**
 - If this is to say “I’m swamped, but I’ve seen your email”, that’s perfect






- Suspension measured by independent process checking CEs and SEs every 30 minutes
- User suspended (CE)
 - Average 94 (mean 92)
 - Identified a couple of issues to run down
- User suspended (SE)
 - Average 48 (mean 62)
 - certainly down to DPM issues; non-DPM sites were better
 - Followed up during challenge (Sam/Raul)




- Bot last seen
 - Average 98 (mean 90)
 - Good containment!
- Bot last seen also detects if payload ran at site

- Key requirement: **Check deployment of, and test, suspension methods**
 - Task for both sites and security teams (see later)




- Details of payload running at site
- Found user
- Found Job IDs
 - Via DIRAC or direct submission (cream only)
- Found UUID in binary (filename, etc.)
- Found inner (memory) UUID
 - Generated at runtime, only findable in memory dump
 - We believe no site found this (or at least reported it)
- Average 26 (mean 27)
 - However, health warning!





- As we know, timing of challenge meant that many jobs died over weekend, thus robbing many sites of opportunity to perform forensics
- This area is different in that we don't expect all sites to do all the forensics
- Communications and containment are the most important
- CSIRT making the malware available ~now to allow sites to take another look
 - recommend that UK sites take up this offer where appropriate
- **Key requirement: Sites need to be able to trace jobs from different submission methods**
 - Significant task for training and documentation





Lessons learned

- Timing was not great, either for sites or VO (undergoing operational upgrade that week).
 - Entirely likely that incidents occur/are reported late on Friday or overnight, but balance this with making challenge useful
- First response time was excellent
- CE suspension results suggest that this is generally in good shape
- SE suspension results suggest that work is needed
 - Good documentation on suspension process for different storage types
 - Resolve DPM issue or use workaround
- Generally, structured testing of suspension systems is essential





- Timing
- VO CSIRT communications didn't work as well as it should
 - Some procedural improvements on VO side
- Important in new split traceability world
 - Applies to *all VOs*
 - What to do in UK for VOs who may not have security team?
 - IC act as proxy for information available in GridPP DIRAC?
- Handling the large volume of tickets
- Some refinement of communication templates





- Training at HEPSYSMAN
 - <https://indico.cern.ch/event/721692/>
 - Also has links to all forensics slide decks used, including on SSC malware
- Intention to make malware available to sites
 - Particularly for sites that didn't see it/didn't have a chance to analyse in place
 - Already spoken to some, if interested please talk to me so that we can coordinate/check if we want anything in place beforehand
- Generally, most important parts are not elaborate
 - Documentation, Procedures, Training, Awareness
- Suspension testing
 - As discussed over the summer, starting up suspension testing on CEs
 - SEs coming soon
 - Manual testing first with a view to regular, structured testing






Key requirements

- Please respond to CSIRT emails
- Check deployment and test suspension methods
- Sites need to be able to trace jobs from different submission methods





- Please talk to me about your results/if you would like to have access to the malware at your site
- Questions?