



WLCG Service Incident Reports

WLCG Service Coordination Team

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WLCG Collaboration Workshop, 7th July 2010

Overview

- Brief reminder of Service Incident Reports (introduced in February run of CCRC'08)...
- Summary of SIRs since LHC restart (Q2 – 1 day)
- Drill-down into 1 specific SIR
- Discussion

- Degradation goes beyond some MoU target for any service classified as critical for at least one of the VOs !
- SCOD asks for it !
- When it's useful for your own purpose
 - Tracking of incidents and the restoration → your knowledgebase for when it happens next time


SIRs – Categorization

- Since the LHC restart on 30 March 2010 there have been some 20 CERN-CASTOR related SIRs, 6 (8?) DB-related and 9 others
- Quickly review these by category...

Date	Duration	Summary
29 June	4 hours	CASTOR outage due to AFS unavailability
28 June	4 hours	High volume of SRM logs and second DLF overload
22 June	3 hours	LDAP Overloaded
16 June	1 hour	CMS jobmanager daemons stuck on AFS
14 June	2 mins	LSF reconfiguration after node move affected CASTORLHCB
13 June	n/a	two ATLAS "temp" class files lost due to diskserver crash
7 June	3.5 hours	default pool overloaded with disk to disk copies
1 June	6 hours	Jobmanager was not submitting new work
31 May	1.5 hours	LSF reconfiguration after node move affected CASTORPUBLIC
25 May	3 hours	stuck rsyslog affected T0Merge
20 May	6 hours	CMS T0Express caused LSF overload
14 May	2 months	Castor data incorrectly recycled
13 May	3 hours	CMS stress test load
1 May	7 hours	Castor Affected Piquet Call
29 Apr	5 hours	GridFTP checksum errors for large files
22 Apr	4 hours	CMS alarm ticket for long write wait times
21 Apr	2 hours	lxfsrc5706 filesystem error
16 Apr	3 hours	High error rate on SRM
7 Apr	5 hours	Timeout recalling files from t0merge
6 Apr	3 hours	Local SRM BDII stopped working, caused SAM test failures
1 Apr	7 mins	LHCB lhcbhistos service class overload
30 Mar	2 x 1 h?	two short periods of SRM unavailability - all frontend threads stuck
30 Mar	1 hour	T0ATLAS disk servers rebooted

CASTOR SIRs - Comments

- More quantitative statements regarding service degradation would be useful – particularly true in incident summaries, but also in text body
- Analysis and follow-up: who ensures that this happens and to which bodies is this reported?
- How is this information shared?



DB SIRs

Site	Date	Duration	Summary
ASGC	29 June	~15 hours	Streams LCRs not applied from central 3D DB for 15 hours
CERN	26 June	1 hour	ATLAS offline DB (ATLR) – 9 Oracle services did not failover properly after a node eviction
CERN, PIC + T1s	24, 25 June	10 hours	LHCb streaming to PIC not working for 10 hours, to other sites not working for 40 minutes
CERN	2 June	?	ATLAS and LHCb online and offline databases – access and QoS compromised
CERN	31 May, 1 June	?	CMS online, LCGR and ATLAS offline databases – services unavailable during patching
CERN	26 May	?	CMS offline database – h/w failure affecting one node

DB SIRs – Comments

- Two formats used – 1 for Streams and 1 for others
 - A single format – closer to the “standard” – would be beneficial
- Several are not very conclusive in their analysis or recommendations, others still “open”
 - e.g. “Next time the problem happens detailed hang analysis/tracing will be performed”

Site	Service	Date	Duration	Summary
RAL	SE	30 June	N/A	1083 CMS files lost
CERN	AFS	29 June	5 hours	Complete FC disk array affected CASTOR and also LHC!
KIT	CMS dCache	22 June	3 hours	Service down
CERN	CREAM CE	7 June	3 hours	Job submission failure
PIC	Power	21 May	19 hours	Whole site out
CERN to ASGC	OPN	12 – 15 May	Days	Reduced bandwidth
CNAF	StoRM	28 & 29 April	9/12 hours	SRM blockage (h/w) followed by MCDISK full and StoRM bug
IN2P3	AFS	26 April	17.5 hours	AFS crashed after service overload. Batch also affected
IN2P3	Batch	24 April	17 hours	Service location service stopped responding blocking most batch system commands
IN2P3	Grid downtime notification	20 April	9 hours & 5 days	Grid downtime notification impossible after two separate incidents

Summary

- More consistency in formats and wording, e.g. based on that in MoU
 - Service Interruption;
 - Degradation by > 20%, > 50%
- More consistency in follow-up: introduce high-level reviews at T1SCM
 - Is information considered correct and complete?
 - Has follow-up been done?
- Try to identify areas where real improvements can be made: monitor against realistic metrics