

The VOMS Authentication Library

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- It is not a very well known fact
 - But the VOMS APIs also provide a way to setup an SSL connection to use proxies with it.
 - #include <vomsssl.h>
 - The necessary code has always been there, it was just not published.
 - Made public on request from developers.
 - They allow to customize a not yet established SSL connections to accept proxies.
 - No dependence on Globus to do this.
 - Both client- and server-side.



- What it does, exactly ?
 - Enables usage of GT2, GT3 and RFC proxies (hint: only use the latter) as long as EE certificates.
 - Checks .namespaces and .signing_policy files, if present.
 - Allows freely mixing the different kinds of proxies.
 - In the same chain.
 - Actually pretty common situation.
 - Expands the chain depth limit from OpenSSL.



- What to support?
 - What the standards define?
- Standards are often not respected!
 - It does not matter what the RFCs say.
 - There are certificates and CAs out there which simply go straight against the RFC.
 - Even in the EUGridPMA distribution.
 - You cannot simply disable them for that.
- Even if you read a MUST NOT in the RFC, you will encounter that very case sometime and will have to handle it.



- There are no "optional" parts in the standard.
 - They will be used somewhere.
 - And if you do not support them, you will fail.
 - The standard has "recently" changed in an backwards-incompatible way.
 - Basically, certificates that did not qualify as self-signed CA certificates before, do qualify now.
 - Already encountered such a CA in the wild.
 - The available libraries do not handle them yet.



- Never assume that your libraries are reliable.
 - They will break or change behaviour from version to version.
 - See past esperiences with OpenSSL and Bouncycastle.
- Make sure to experiment with new versions of your libraries.
- You will find undocumented parts of the system you will have to use and support anyway.
 - Best example: The .signing_policy files: their content is not defined anywhere.
 - And unfortunately, you cannot throw them away
- Undocumented does not mean unimplemented.
 Study existing implementatios.



- Okay, you have this very secure AuthN library
 - It verifies everything correctly.
 - It handles all the edge cases
 - It handles aberrant behaviour
 - So you're good.
- Stop right there!
 - Who told you to verify everything?
- I'm not kidding.
 - There are legitimate use cases when you may not want to verify anything.
- Make sure you allow deactivation of specific parts.



- Writing correct code is not enough.
- Writing standard-conforming code is not enough.
- Writing documented code is not enough.

• This is a clear case where pragmatism is necessary:

– If it is used, support it, regardless of other considerations