WLCG AuthZ Call

Europe/Zurich
513/R-068 (CERN)

513/R-068

CERN

19
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Description

Notes:

Previous Actions:

  • Action: Maarten to tidy up and review open issues and pull requests for the token profile, and then circulate a potential 2.0 draft
  • Action: Maarten to look at reviving the RTE Task Force


Proposed agenda:

  • CHEP 2026 talk?

 

Zoom meeting:

Link below, in the videoconference section. Please ensure you are signed in to Indico to see the meeting password!

Next Meeting: 

  • Nov 13
Zoom Meeting ID
61554826915
Description
Zoom room for WLCG AuthZ Call
Host
Tom Dack
Alternative hosts
Maarten Litmaath, Hannah Short
Useful links
Join via phone
Zoom URL

Present: Maarten L, Tom D (Notes), David K, Matt Doidge, Federica A, Roberta M, Patrick, John SDSJr, Dave D, Berk B

Apologies: Mischa S, Enrico V

Notes:

Action: Maarten to look at reviving the RTE Task Force

  • Usage of SHA1, which should be phased out for a while now
  • https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/LCG/EL9vsSHA1CAs
  • SHA1 not supported on EL10 - cannot just enable SHA1, but you must enable legacy settings, which comes with several other things
    • It is not unanticipated that this would be blocked by policy levels
  • Therefore, should look to move away from SHA1 where possible
  • Maarten & Brian have discussed
    • Most middleware shouldn't worry about SHA1 in root certs, as they exist in the Trust store. 
    • Currently verifying whether this works - looking at dCache (would also cover StoRM, as both use CaNL-Java). Brian has also done other checks, so HTCondor has likely also been checked, but XRootD by default will also check the root certificates - Maarten has asked Brian for details about what sites would need to check or configure.
  • Dave K contributes from IGTF (EuGridPMA & TAGPMA)
    • IGTF is sympathetic, but has not set a deadline
    • Pointed out that if the CA root certificate is the only having SHA1, then it doesn't matter because it's in the store
      • DigiCert to be suspended from TAGPMA due to not engaging
      • Australian Site in Melbourne having issues with their host and user certificates, formerly issued by DigiCert
        • after the meeting, Maarten has updated the relevant GGUS ticket with a pointer to the ASGC catch-all CA for Asia-Pacific
    • No Catch-all CA for US & EU
      • Dave K expresses that EU doesn't need one due to other routes
      • eMudhra CA would also be an option - commercial CA in India
      • Look to work toward no longer depending on our own set of CAs, which these days are still needed because of our user (not host) certificates
    • Need to, as a community, review what is required of CAs to ensure trustworthiness
      • We might need to be concerned about "whims" of the CA/Browser Forum impacting us badly
      • But then again, if those CAs work for the rest of the internet, why should we remain an exception?
    • Google Trust Service CAs are nearly now approved by TAGPMA 
    • Let's Encrypt is also expected to get there next year
  • WLCG may need to set deadlines in order to see movement with this
    • Had been suggested already in WLCG Ops
    • End of 2026 has been suggested, which would then need to be announced soon
    • At the very least, the few SHA-1 CRLs should be changed to SHA-2
  • Separate issues around CRLs which for many CAs are not available via IPV6
    • there is a workaround, with an IVP6 mirror
  • Various "Dark Clouds" around Certs, means token work must keep progressing steadily

 

Job Accounting with only Tokens 

  • Complete solutions for ARC-CE and for HTCondor CE with HTCondor batch system
    • Not a solution when other batch systems are used instead
    • HTCondor solution is orthogonal to APEL's own solution, but decoupled from APEL code
      • Look to imitate this within the APEL code, to provide a solution. 
      • Maarten to look to have a direct meeting with Adrian to look and make a plan of action
      • Look so that other batch systems - including Slurm - could hopefully be covered the same way.

 

AOB:

  • Closed Token Task Force progressing with WLCG issues, but still needs AuthZ group to do some of the actual work!
    • Also other groups, such as Token Trust & Traceability, DOMA BDT
    • AuthZ WG is mainly concerned with the token profiles and IAM evolution
  • Tentative timeline with some deadlines over the next year
    • Maarten presented on the timeline recently, and notes that further progress following the new profile should be expected over the course of this year.
      • Updated tentative timeline is shown on page 18 of this talk
        • Mind the 2025 typo in the milestones for 2026
  • TTT Group working on a token risk assessment since the middle of summer, and should report on this by the end of the year.
  • Questions around status of no longer storing tokens
    • Noting concerns around DB handling ever more concurrent tokens (21 M for ATLAS, uncharted territory for IAM).
    • Aim is to do this in v1.14 after required DB changes are done in v1.13, so that roll back would be more manageable, if needed
    • Federica to follow up with Francesco & Enrico on the possibility of a v1.14 pre-release to be used for ATLAS.
  • Token issuer public key cache standardization proposal
    • Dave D notes this is waiting on Brian B, and shares that as Brian has a proposal due, this may be delayed.
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