- Current fire calculations assume the fire with all the fire load of the area right next to the BDF fire compartment wall. This is a very conservative assumption even if when taking uncertainties about SHiP fire loads into account. The liquid scintillator of SHiP is far away from the wall. Action/Rahul to revise with more realistic scenarios
- TA852 is a EI90 “shutter door”. TA851 door is not scope of NA-CONS anymore and handled under HI-ECN3 as foreseen by NA-CONS. Fire doors supposed to be normally closed. TA852 to be checked if to be closed / open
- Action/Rahul to check with EN-CV if underground ventilation covers b911 shaft
- Dynamic confinement and smoke extraction strategy to be discussed separately. Large impact from dedicated smoke extraction on cost and resources expected
- Cable resistance should be of 90 min for safety systems, but also fire resistance of cable trays to be checked. Action/Rahul to check SRF of SPS/TCC2 and requirements
- ASD system currently foresees to release air from BDF target area back into the confined area. A sufficient distance should be taken into account between air inlet and release points. Action/Rahul to check min. distance with EN-CV
- Sprinklers in PT853 and PT854 exist, but their functionality is unknown. Systems likely cannot be consolidated and will almost certainly need to be dismantled and replaced — a major project not yet estimated in budget or resources. Checking feasibility of sprinklers shaft in BA80: Action/Michael to follow up with Anna; Action/Rahul to check with Melania
- Safety interlocks
- Interface TT85–ECN3 fire safety systems: To be checked by Action/Rahul. SPS concept triggers evacuation only in adjacent fire compartments — if in BDF, upstream BDF evacuated but not TDC85; if in TCC8 near TDC85, fire door upstream. Fire compartment exists between TDC85 and BDF target complex; TDC85 evacuation might be required. Interface between the two systems located in BA81.
- Smoke extraction interlock: General smoke extraction strategy to be discussed with RP/OHS/CV as potential major cost impact. Action/Rahul to organize dedicated meeting
- Action/Rahul to add case of confinement wall in specific configuration
- Under-pressure in underground areas can be interrupted to switch to secure network. Action/Rahul to clearly state it in the text
- Cost effective solution to reduce fire propagation risks from liquid scintillator
- Sirens and pushbuttons shall be standard
- Dry riser layout was already based on BDF/SHiP layout
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