This talk will introduce some of the desirable security properties in a democratic election / referendum process, and present the challenges they imply in the context of internet voting. In light of those elements, we will discuss a couple of the lessons learnt over the roughly 14 years of experience offering internet voting in Geneva. As a third subtopic, we will get an overview of the new federal requirements, which outline the road for improvement.
Finally, this will allow us to present a bird's eye perspective on the new cryptographic protocol for a verifiable internet voting system which we have been working on with the evoting group at the Berner Fachhochschule, which is scheduled to be used in 2019.
About the speaker
Thomas worked with the CERN Computer Security team in 2010, writing his EPFL master studies thesis, on the topic of static source code analysis. Since then, he spent a couple of years as a Java Consultant, before joining the State of Geneva as a developer on the internet voting system.
He is now the in house expert on cryptographic voting protocols.